Cascades and Fluctuations in an Economy with an Endogenous Production Network
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1 Cascades and Fluctuations in an Economy with an Endogenous Production Network Mathieu Taschereau-Dumouchel Cornell University September /25
2 Introduction Production in modern economies involves a complex network of producers supplying and demanding goods from each other The shape of this network is an important determinant of how micro shocks aggregate into macro fluctuations is also constantly changing in response to micro shocks For instance, after a severe shock a producer might shut down which might lead its neighbors to shut down as well, etc... Cascade of shutdowns that spreads through the network This paper proposes a Theory of network formation and aggregate fluctuations 2/25
3 Introduction Production in modern economies involves a complex network of producers supplying and demanding goods from each other The shape of this network is an important determinant of how micro shocks aggregate into macro fluctuations is also constantly changing in response to micro shocks For instance, after a severe shock a producer might shut down which might lead its neighbors to shut down as well, etc... Cascade of shutdowns that spreads through the network This paper proposes a Theory of network formation and aggregate fluctuations 2/25
4 Introduction Production in modern economies involves a complex network of producers supplying and demanding goods from each other The shape of this network is an important determinant of how micro shocks aggregate into macro fluctuations is also constantly changing in response to micro shocks For instance, after a severe shock a producer might shut down which might lead its neighbors to shut down as well, etc... Cascade of shutdowns that spreads through the network This paper proposes a Theory of network formation and aggregate fluctuations 2/25
5 Introduction Production in modern economies involves a complex network of producers supplying and demanding goods from each other The shape of this network is an important determinant of how micro shocks aggregate into macro fluctuations is also constantly changing in response to micro shocks For instance, after a severe shock a producer might shut down which might lead its neighbors to shut down as well, etc... Cascade of shutdowns that spreads through the network This paper proposes a Theory of network formation and aggregate fluctuations 2/25
6 Introduction Production in modern economies involves a complex network of producers supplying and demanding goods from each other The shape of this network is an important determinant of how micro shocks aggregate into macro fluctuations is also constantly changing in response to micro shocks For instance, after a severe shock a producer might shut down which might lead its neighbors to shut down as well, etc... Cascade of shutdowns that spreads through the network This paper proposes a Theory of network formation and aggregate fluctuations 2/25
7 Literature Review Endogenous network formation Atalay et al (2011), Oberfield (2013), Carvalho and Voigtländer (2014) Network of sectors and fluctuations Horvath (1998), Dupor (1999), Acemoglu et al (2012), Baqaee (2016), Acemoglu et al (2016), Lim (2017) Non-convex adjustments in networks Bak, Chen, Woodford and Scheinkman (1993), Elliott, Golub and Jackson (2014) 3/25
8 I. Model 3/25
9 Model There are n units of production (firm) indexed by j {1,...,n} Each unit produces a differentiated good Differentiated goods can be used to produce a final good n ( Y produce other differentiated goods Representative household Consumes the final good Supplies L units of labor inelastically j=1 y 0 j )σ 1 σ σ σ 1 4/25
10 Model Firm j produces good j y j = ( n ) α ǫ A x ǫ 1 ǫ 1 ǫ α α (1 α) 1 αzj ij l 1 α j i=1 Firm j can only use good i as input if there is a connection from firm i to j Ω ij = 1 if connection and Ω ij = 0 otherwise A connection can be active or inactive Matrix Ω is exogenous A firm can only produce if it pays a fixed cost f in units of labor θ j = 1 if j is operating and θ j = 0 otherwise Vector θ is endogenous 5/25
11 Model Firm j produces good j y j = ( n ) α ǫ A x ǫ 1 ǫ 1 ǫ α α (1 α) 1 αzj ij l 1 α j i=1 Firm j can only use good i as input if there is a connection from firm i to j Ω ij = 1 if connection and Ω ij = 0 otherwise A connection can be active or inactive Matrix Ω is exogenous A firm can only produce if it pays a fixed cost f in units of labor θ j = 1 if j is operating and θ j = 0 otherwise Vector θ is endogenous 5/25
12 Model Firm j produces good j y j = ( n ) α ǫ A Ω ijx ǫ 1 ǫ 1 ǫ α α (1 α) 1 αzj ij l 1 α j i=1 Firm j can only use good i as input if there is a connection from firm i to j Ω ij = 1 if connection and Ω ij = 0 otherwise A connection can be active or inactive Matrix Ω is exogenous A firm can only produce if it pays a fixed cost f in units of labor θ j = 1 if j is operating and θ j = 0 otherwise Vector θ is endogenous 5/25
13 Model Firm j produces good j y j = ( n ) α ǫ A Ω ijx ǫ 1 ǫ 1 ǫ α α (1 α) 1 αzj ij l 1 α j i=1 Firm j can only use good i as input if there is a connection from firm i to j Ω ij = 1 if connection and Ω ij = 0 otherwise A connection can be active or inactive Matrix Ω is exogenous A firm can only produce if it pays a fixed cost f in units of labor θ j = 1 if j is operating and θ j = 0 otherwise Vector θ is endogenous 5/25
14 Model Firm j produces good j y j = ( n ) α ǫ A Ω ijx ǫ 1 ǫ 1 ǫ α α (1 α) 1 αzjθj ij l 1 α j i=1 Firm j can only use good i as input if there is a connection from firm i to j Ω ij = 1 if connection and Ω ij = 0 otherwise A connection can be active or inactive Matrix Ω is exogenous A firm can only produce if it pays a fixed cost f in units of labor θ j = 1 if j is operating and θ j = 0 otherwise Vector θ is endogenous 5/25
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18 Social Planner Problem P SP of a social planner subject to max y 0,x,l θ {0,1} n ( n ( j=1 1. a resource constraint for each good j y 0 j + n x jk k=1 y 0 j ) σ )σ 1 σ 1 σ ( n A α α (1 α) 1 αzjθj i=1 2. a resource constraint on labor n l j +f j=1 n θ j L j=1 ) α ǫ Ω ijx ǫ 1 ǫ 1 ǫ ij l 1 α j 7/25
19 Social Planner Problem P SP of a social planner subject to max y 0,x,l θ {0,1} n ( n ( j=1 1. a resource constraint for each good j y 0 j + n x jk k=1 y 0 j ) σ )σ 1 σ 1 σ ( n A α α (1 α) 1 αzjθj i=1 2. a resource constraint on labor n l j +f j=1 n θ j L j=1 ) α ǫ Ω ijx ǫ 1 ǫ 1 ǫ ij l 1 α j 7/25
20 Social Planner Problem P SP of a social planner ( n ( max y 0,x,l θ {0,1} n j=1 subject to y 0 j ) σ )σ 1 σ 1 σ 1. a resource constraint for each good j (Lagrange multiplier: λ j) y 0 j + n x jk k=1 ( n A α α (1 α) 1 αzjθj i=1 ) α ǫ Ω ǫ 1 ǫ 1 ijx ǫ ij l 1 α j 2. a resource constraint on labor (Lagrange multiplier: w) n l j +f j=1 n θ j L j=1 7/25
21 II. Social Planner with Exogenous θ 7/25
22 Social Planner with Exogenous θ Define q j = w/λ j From the FOCs, output is (1 α)y j = q jl j q j is the labor productivity of firm j Proposition 1 In the efficient allocation, q j = z jθ ja ( n i=1 Ω ijq ǫ 1 i Furthermore, there is a unique vector q that satisfies (1). ) α ǫ 1 (1) 8/25
23 Social Planner with Exogenous θ Knowing q we can solve for all other quantities easily. Lemma 1 Aggregate output is Y = Q ( L f ) n θ j j=1 where Q ( n j=1 qσ 1 j ) 1 σ 1 is aggregate labor productivity. Labor allocation 9/25
24 III. Social Planner with Endogenous θ 9/25
25 Social Planner with Endogenous θ with max θ {0,1} nq q j = z jθ ja ( ( n L f i=1 ) n θ j j=1 Ω ijq ǫ 1 i ) α ǫ 1 Very hard problem (MINLP NP Hard) The set θ {0,1} n is not convex Objective function is not concave 10/25
26 Social Planner with Endogenous θ with max θ {0,1} nq q j = z jθ ja ( ( n L f i=1 ) n θ j j=1 Ω ijq ǫ 1 i ) α ǫ 1 Very hard problem (MINLP NP Hard) The set θ {0,1} n is not convex Objective function is not concave 10/25
27 Social Planner with Endogenous θ Consider the relaxed and reshaped problem P RR ( ) n max θ {0,1} nq L f θ j j=1 with q j = z jθ ja ( n i=1 Ω ijq ǫ 1 i ) α ǫ 1 Parameters a > 0 and b 0 are reshaping constants Reshape the objective function away from optimum (i.e. when 0 < θ j < 1) For a: if θ j {0,1} then θ a j = θ j For b: {θ i = 0} {q i = 0} and {θ i = 1} Parameters such that P1 and P2 are satisfied: { θ b i qǫ 1 i } = q ǫ 1 i a = 1 σ 1 and b = 1 ǫ 1 σ 1 ( ) 11/25
28 Social Planner with Endogenous θ Consider the relaxed and reshaped problem P RR ( ) n max θ [0,1] nq L f θ j j=1 with q j = z jθ ja ( n i=1 Ω ijq ǫ 1 i ) α ǫ 1 Parameters a > 0 and b 0 are reshaping constants Reshape the objective function away from optimum (i.e. when 0 < θ j < 1) For a: if θ j {0,1} then θ a j = θ j For b: {θ i = 0} {q i = 0} and {θ i = 1} Parameters such that P1 and P2 are satisfied: { θ b i qǫ 1 i } = q ǫ 1 i a = 1 σ 1 and b = 1 ǫ 1 σ 1 ( ) 11/25
29 Social Planner with Endogenous θ Consider the relaxed and reshaped problem P RR ( ) n max θ [0,1] nq L f θ j j=1 with q j = z jθ a ja ( n i=1 Ω ijθ b i q ǫ 1 i ) α ǫ 1 Parameters a > 0 and b 0 are reshaping constants Reshape the objective function away from optimum (i.e. when 0 < θ j < 1) For a: if θ j {0,1} then θ a j = θ j For b: {θ i = 0} {q i = 0} and {θ i = 1} Parameters such that P1 and P2 are satisfied: { θ b i qǫ 1 i } = q ǫ 1 i a = 1 σ 1 and b = 1 ǫ 1 σ 1 ( ) 11/25
30 Social Planner with Endogenous θ Consider the relaxed and reshaped problem P RR ( ) n max θ [0,1] nq L f θ j j=1 with q j = z jθ a ja ( n i=1 Ω ijθ b i q ǫ 1 i ) α ǫ 1 Parameters a > 0 and b 0 are reshaping constants Reshape the objective function away from optimum (i.e. when 0 < θ j < 1) For a: if θ j {0,1} then θ a j = θ j For b: {θ i = 0} {q i = 0} and {θ i = 1} Parameters such that P1 and P2 are satisfied: { θ b i qǫ 1 i } = q ǫ 1 i a = 1 σ 1 and b = 1 ǫ 1 σ 1 ( ) 11/25
31 Social Planner with Endogenous θ Consider the relaxed and reshaped problem P RR ( ) n max θ [0,1] nq L f θ j j=1 with q j = z jθ a ja ( n i=1 Ω ijθ b i q ǫ 1 i ) α ǫ 1 Parameters a > 0 and b 0 are reshaping constants Reshape the objective function away from optimum (i.e. when 0 < θ j < 1) For a: if θ j {0,1} then θ a j = θ j For b: {θ i = 0} {q i = 0} and {θ i = 1} Parameters such that P1 and P2 are satisfied: { θ b i qǫ 1 i } = q ǫ 1 i a = 1 σ 1 and b = 1 ǫ 1 σ 1 ( ) 11/25
32 Social Planner with Endogenous θ Proposition 2 Under some parameter restrictions and if Ω is sufficiently connected then the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary to characterize a solution to P RR. Furthermore, a solution to θ {0,1} n to P RR also solves P SP. Details This proposition Only provides sufficient conditions In the paper: Test the approach on thousands of economies Tests 12/25
33 Social Planner with Endogenous θ Proposition 2 Under some parameter restrictions and if Ω is sufficiently connected then the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary to characterize a solution to P RR. Furthermore, a solution to θ {0,1} n to P RR also solves P SP. Details This proposition Only provides sufficient conditions In the paper: Test the approach on thousands of economies Tests 12/25
34 Example with n = 2 Relaxed problem without reshaping ( ) n V (θ) = Q(θ) L f θ j j=1 with q j = z jθ ja ( n i=1 Ω ijq ǫ 1 i ) α ǫ θ θ Problem: V is not concave First-order conditions are not sufficient Numerical algorithm can get stuck in local maxima 13/25
35 Example with n = 2 Relaxed problem with reshaping V (θ) = Q (θ) ( L f ) n θ j j=1 with q j = z jθ 1 σ 1 j A ( n ǫ 1 1 σ 1 Ω ijθi i=1 q ǫ 1 i ) α ǫ θ θ Problem: V is now (quasi) concave First-order conditions are necessary and sufficient Numerical algorithm converges to global maximum 14/25
36 IV. Economic Forces at Work 14/25
37 Complementarities Impact of operating 2 on the incentives to operate 1 and 3 Operating 3 leads to a larger q 3 because 2 is operating Operating 1 increases q 2 because 2 is operating Complementarity between operating decisions of nearby firms 15/25
38 Complementarities Impact of operating 2 on the incentives to operate 1 and 3 Operating 3 leads to a larger q 3 because 2 is operating Operating 1 increases q 2 because 2 is operating Complementarity between operating decisions of nearby firms 15/25
39 Complementarities Impact of operating 2 on the incentives to operate 1 and 3 Operating 3 leads to a larger q 3 because 2 is operating Operating 1 increases q 2 because 2 is operating Complementarity between operating decisions of nearby firms 15/25
40 Complementarities Impact of operating 2 on the incentives to operate 1 and 3 Operating 3 leads to a larger q 3 because 2 is operating Operating 1 increases q 2 because 2 is operating Complementarity between operating decisions of nearby firms 15/25
41 Complementarities Impact of operating 2 on the incentives to operate 1 and 3 Operating 3 leads to a larger q 3 because 2 is operating Operating 1 increases q 2 because 2 is operating Complementarity between operating decisions of nearby firms 15/25
42 Complementarities lead to clustering 16/25
43 V. Quantitative Exploration 16/25
44 Network data Two datasets that cover the U.S. economy Cohen and Frazzini (2008) and Atalay et al (2011) Both rely on Compustat data Public firms must self-report customers that purchase more than 10% of sales Use fuzzy-text matching algorithms and manual matching to build networks Cover 1980 to 2004 and 1976 to 2009 respectively 17/25
45 Parameters Parameters from the literature α = 0.5 to fit the share of intermediate (Jorgenson et al 1987, Jones 2011) σ = ǫ = 6 average of estimates (Broda et al 2006) Robustness with smaller ǫ in the paper log(z it) N ( 0,0.39 2) from Bartelsman et al (2013) f n = 5% to fit employment in management occupations Calibrate n = 3000 to match number of active firms in Atalay et al (2011) Unobserved network Ω: Pick to match the observed in-degree distribution Generate thousands of such Ω s and report averages In-degree 18/25
46 Parameters Parameters from the literature α = 0.5 to fit the share of intermediate (Jorgenson et al 1987, Jones 2011) σ = ǫ = 6 average of estimates (Broda et al 2006) Robustness with smaller ǫ in the paper log(z it) N ( 0,0.39 2) from Bartelsman et al (2013) f n = 5% to fit employment in management occupations Calibrate n = 3000 to match number of active firms in Atalay et al (2011) Unobserved network Ω: Pick to match the observed in-degree distribution Generate thousands of such Ω s and report averages In-degree 18/25
47 Shape of the network What types of network does the planner choose? Compare optimal networks to completely random networks Differences highlights how efficient allocation shapes the network Optimal networks Random networks A. Power law shape parameters In-degree Out-degree B. Measures of proximity Clustering coefficient Average distance between firms Efficient allocation features More highly connected firms More clustering of firms Def. clust. coeff. 19/25
48 Cascades of shutdowns Because of the complementarities between firms Exit of a firm makes it more likely that its neighbors exit as well which incentivizes the second neighbors to exit as well /25
49 Cascades of shutdowns Because of the complementarities between firms Exit of a firm makes it more likely that its neighbors exit as well which incentivizes the second neighbors to exit as well (a) Downstream connections (b) Upstream connections Cumulative number of firms shutting down All firms High out-degree firms High in-degree firms Cumulative number of firms shutting down All firms High out-degree firms High in-degree firms Distance from shocked firm d Distance from shocked firm d Robustness 20/25
50 Resilience of firms Magnitude of shock necessary to make a firm exit varies Implications: Probability of firm shut down after 1 std shock All firms 92% High out-degree firms 20% High in-degree firms 56% Highly-connected firms are hard to topple but upon shutting down they create large cascades Robustness 21/25
51 Resilience of firms Magnitude of shock necessary to make a firm exit varies Implications: Probability of firm shut down after 1 std shock All firms 92% High out-degree firms 20% High in-degree firms 56% Highly-connected firms are hard to topple but upon shutting down they create large cascades Robustness 21/25
52 Aggregate fluctuations The shape of the network changes with the business cycle Model Correlation with output Data CF (2008) AHRS (2011) A. Power law shape parameters In-degree Out-degree B. Clustering coefficient Implications: Recessions are periods with fewer highly-connected firms and in which clustering activity around most productive firms is costly 22/25
53 Aggregate fluctuations The shape of the network changes with the business cycle Model Correlation with output Data CF (2008) AHRS (2011) A. Power law shape parameters In-degree Out-degree B. Clustering coefficient Implications: Recessions are periods with fewer highly-connected firms and in which clustering activity around most productive firms is costly 22/25
54 Aggregate fluctuations Size of fluctuations Y = Q ( L f j θ j ) Implications: Table: Standard deviation of aggregates Output Labor Prod. Prod. labor Y Q L f j θ j Optimal network Fixed network Substantially smaller fluctuations in optimal network economy comes from the reorganization of network after shocks Intuition 23/25
55 Aggregate fluctuations Size of fluctuations Y = Q ( L f j θ j ) Implications: Table: Standard deviation of aggregates Output Labor Prod. Prod. labor Y Q L f j θ j Optimal network Fixed network Substantially smaller fluctuations in optimal network economy comes from the reorganization of network after shocks Intuition 23/25
56 Intuition A given network θ k is a function that maps z Y k (z) 24/25
57 Intuition A given network θ k is a function that maps z Y k (z) 24/25
58 Intuition A given network θ k is a function that maps z Y k (z) 24/25
59 Intuition A given network θ k is a function that maps z Y k (z) 24/25
60 Intuition A given network θ k is a function that maps z Y k (z) 24/25
61 Intuition A given network θ k is a function that maps z Y k (z) 24/25
62 Intuition A given network θ k is a function that maps z Y k (z) 24/25
63 Intuition A given network θ k is a function that maps z Y k (z) 24/25
64 Intuition A given network θ k is a function that maps z Y k (z) 24/25
65 Intuition A given network θ k is a function that maps z Y k (z) From extreme value theory ( ) Var(Y) = Var max Y k {1,...,2 n k } declines rapidly with n 24/25
66 Conclusion Additional results in the paper: Impact of position in the network on firm-level characteristics Endogenous skewness in distribution of employment, productivity, output Summary Theory of network formation and aggregate fluctuations Propose an approach to solve these hard problems easily The optimal allocation features Clustering of activity Cascades of shutdowns/restarts Optimal network substantially limit the size of fluctuations 25/25
67 Conclusion Additional results in the paper: Impact of position in the network on firm-level characteristics Endogenous skewness in distribution of employment, productivity, output Summary Theory of network formation and aggregate fluctuations Propose an approach to solve these hard problems easily The optimal allocation features Clustering of activity Cascades of shutdowns/restarts Optimal network substantially limit the size of fluctuations 25/25
68 Labor allocation Lemma 2 The optimal labor allocation satisfies ( ) ( (σ 1) q l = (1 α)[i n αγ] 1 L f }{{} Q (1) }{{} (2) ) n θ j j=1 where I n is the identity matrix and where Γ is an n n matrix where Γ jk = Ω jkq ǫ 1 j ni=1 captures the importance of j as a supplier to k. Ω ik q ǫ 1 i Determinants of l j (1) Importance of j as a supplier ( ) Leontief inverse [I n αγ] 1 = I n +αγ+(αγ) (2) Relative efficiency Return 25/25
69 Social Planner with Endogenous θ P1 The alternative problem P RR is easy to solve Proposition 3 If Ω ij = c id j for some vectors c and d then the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and sufficient to characterize a solution to P RR. Proposition 4 Let σ = ǫ and suppose that f > 0 and z z > 0 are not too big. If Ω is sufficiently connected, then the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and sufficient to characterize a solution to P RR. 25/25
70 Social Planner with Endogenous θ P1 The alternative problem P RR is easy to solve Proposition 3 If Ω ij = c id j for some vectors c and d then the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and sufficient to characterize a solution to P RR. Proposition 4 Let σ = ǫ and suppose that f > 0 and z z > 0 are not too big. If Ω is sufficiently connected, then the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and sufficient to characterize a solution to P RR. 25/25
71 Social Planner with Endogenous θ P1 The alternative problem P RR is easy to solve Proposition 3 If Ω ij = c id j for some vectors c and d then the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and sufficient to characterize a solution to P RR. Proposition 4 Let σ = ǫ and suppose that f > 0 and z z > 0 are not too big. If Ω is sufficiently connected, then the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and sufficient to characterize a solution to P RR. 25/25
72 Social Planner with Endogenous θ P1 The alternative problem P RR is easy to solve Proposition 3 If Ω ij = c id j for some vectors c and d then the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and sufficient to characterize a solution to P RR. Proposition 4 Let σ = ǫ and suppose that f > 0 and z z > 0 are not too big. If Ω is sufficiently connected, then the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and sufficient to characterize a solution to P RR. 25/25
73 Social Planner with Endogenous θ P2 A solution to the alternative problem P RR also solves P SP Proposition 5 If θ solves P RR and that θ j {0,1} for all j, then θ also solves P SP. Solution θ to P RR is such that θj {0,1} for all j (P2) if the ( ) condition is satisfied there are many firms the network is sufficiently connected Details Return 25/25
74 Social Planner with Endogenous θ P2 A solution to the alternative problem P RR also solves P SP Proposition 5 If θ solves P RR and that θ j {0,1} for all j, then θ also solves P SP. Solution θ to P RR is such that θj {0,1} for all j (P2) if the ( ) condition is satisfied there are many firms the network is sufficiently connected Details Return 25/25
75 Social Planner with Endogenous θ P2 A solution to the alternative problem P RR also solves P SP Proposition 5 If θ solves P RR and that θ j {0,1} for all j, then θ also solves P SP. Solution θ to P RR is such that θj {0,1} for all j (P2) if the ( ) condition is satisfied there are many firms the network is sufficiently connected Details Return 25/25
76 Reshaping Intuition: First-order condition on θ j: Marginal Benefit(θ j,f (θ)) Marginal Cost(θ j,g (θ)) = µ j µ j Under ( ) the marginal benefit of θ j only depends on θ j through aggregates For large connected network F and G are independent of θ j Return FOCs 25/25
77 Reshaping Intuition: First-order condition on θ j: Marginal Benefit( θj,f (θ)) Marginal Cost( θj,g (θ)) = µj µ j Under ( ) the marginal benefit of θ j only depends on θ j through aggregates For large connected network F and G are independent of θ j Return FOCs 25/25
78 Reshaping Intuition: First-order condition on θ j: Marginal Benefit ( θj, F (θ) ) Marginal Cost ( θj, G (θ) ) = µ j µ j Under ( ) the marginal benefit of θ j only depends on θ j through aggregates For large connected network F and G are independent of θ j Return FOCs 25/25
79 Details of reshaping Simpler to consider P RD: max θ [0,1] n,q ( n j=1 q σ 1 j where B j = ( n ) i=1 Ωijθb i q ǫ 1 1 ǫ 1 i. First order condition with respect to θ k : ( q k Q L f θ k q k The terms are n θ j ) fq + j=1 q k Q = z k aθ a 1 k θ k q k ) 1 σ 1 ( L f ) n θ j j=1 q j Az jθ a j AB α j (LM: β j) n j=1 ( q k B j + Bj = B jθ b 1 zk θ k Ω kab a k α kj θ k q k θ k ( ) qk B j β j + Bj qj = µ θ k q k θ k B k µ j k AB α k (z k θ a kab α k ) σ 2 Q 2 σ B j ) ǫ 1 ( a+ b ) ǫ 1 Return 25/25
80 Testing the approach on small networks For small networks we can solve P SP directly by trying all possible vectors θ Comparing approaches for a million different economies: Number of firms n A. With reshaping Firms with correct θ j 99.9% 99.9% 99.9% 99.8% Error in output Y % % % % B. Without reshaping Firms with correct θ j 84.3% 83.2% 82.3% 81.3% Error in output Y 0.84% 0.89% 0.93% 0.98% Notes: Parameters f {0.05/n,0.1/n,0.15/n}, σ z {0.34,0.39,0.44}, α {0.45,0.5,0.55}, σ {4,6,8} and ǫ {4,6,8}. For each combination of parameters 1000 different economies are created. For each economy, productivity is drawn from log(z k ) iid N (0,σ z) and Ω is drawn randomly such that each link Ω ij exists with some probability such that a firm has on average five possible incoming connections. A network is kept in the sample only if the first-order conditions give a solution in which θ hits the bounds. The errors come from firms that are particularly isolated two θ configurations with almost same output 25/25
81 Testing the approach on large networks For large networks we cannot solve P SP directly by trying all possible vectors θ After all the 1-deviations θ are exhausted: With reshaping Without reshaping Firms with correct θ j 99.8% 72.1% Error in output Y % % Notes: Simulations of 200 different networks Ω and productivity vectors z that satisfy the properties of the calibrated economy. Very few obvious errors in the allocation found by the approach Return 25/25
82 Distribution of in-degree 10 0 (a) In-degree distributions Benchmark ǫ = (b) Out-degree distributions Benchmark ǫ = F(kin) 1 F(kout) Number of suppliers kin Number of costumers kout Figure: Distribution of the number of suppliers and the number of customers In-degree power law shape parameter Calibration: 1.43 Data: 1.37 (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008) and 1.3 (Atalay et al, 2011) Return 25/25
83 Figure: Distribution of in-degree and out-degree in Bernard et al (2015) Figure: Distribution of in-degree in Atalay et al (2011) Return 25/25
84 Clustering coefficient Triplet: three connected nodes (might be overlapping) Triangles: three fully connected nodes (3 triplets) Clustering coefficient = 3 number of triangles number of triplets Return 25/25
85 Firm-level distributions Optimal network Random network Figure: Distributions of log(q) return 25/25
86 Cascades of shutdowns (a) Downstream connections (b) Upstream connections Cumulative number of firms shutting down All firms High out-degree firms High in-degree firms Cumulative number of firms shutting down All firms High out-degree firms High in-degree firms Distance from shocked firm d Distance from shocked firm d Figure: α = 0.75 return 25/25
87 Cascades of shutdowns (a) Downstream connections (b) Upstream connections Cumulative number of firms shutting down All firms High out-degree firms High in-degree firms Cumulative number of firms shutting down All firms High out-degree firms High in-degree firms Distance from shocked firm d Distance from shocked firm d Figure: ǫ = 3 return 25/25
88 Resilience Probability of firm shutdown Benchmark α = 0.75 ǫ = 3 All firms 92% 82% 32% High out-degree firms 20% 8% 0% High in-degree firms 56% 19% 15% return 25/25
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