Gender in conditionals

Transcription

1 Gender in conditionals Fabio Del Prete 1 Sandro Zucchi 2 1 CLLE-ERSS (CNRS, Toulouse), 2 Università degli Studi di Milano 9 November 2017 The University of Sheffield, Department of Philosophy

2 Indexical gender presuppositions of 3 rd singular pronouns The pronouns he, she have been reported to have indexical gender presuppositions: they presuppose that their descriptive gender-specific content is satisfied by their referents in the actual world (Cooper 1983). You cannot utter (1) felicitously to say of an individual x who is a woman that there is a possibility that x is male and American: (1) It could be that he is American (pointing at Scarlett). You cannot utter (2) felicitously in a context in which you know that Scarlett is a woman and Jones mistakenly believes that she is a man: (2) Jones believes that he (pointing at Scarlett) is a university professor.

3 Indexical gender presuppositions of pronouns anaphoric to proper names Pronouns anaphoric to proper names also have indexical presuppositions. Thus, (3) is infelicitous: (3) John i didn t realize that Scarlett j was a woman. He i thought that he j liked him i. (Sharvit 2008)

4 Conditionals an expected fact Conditionals (4), (5), uttered in a context in which the conversational agents know that Sasha is a girl, supports the above generalization concerning the indexical presuppositions of pronouns anaphoric to proper names (Yanovich 2010): (4) If Sasha 1 were a boy, I would buy her 1 a doll. (5)??If Sasha 1 were a boy, I would buy him 1 a doll.

5 Conditionals an unexpected fact However, this is not the case for (6)-(7), uttered in a context in which we don t know Sasha s gender (Yanovich 2010): (6) If Sasha i is a boy, I ll buy him i a doll. (7) If Sasha i is a girl, I ll buy her i a toy car. In (6)-(7), the presupposition of the pronoun is met in the possible world described by the antecedent, i.e. in a world in which Sasha is male/female.

6 Contrasting indicative conditionals The contrast between (4)-(5) and (6)-(7) doesn t just depend on (6)-(7) being indicative conditionals. (4) If Sasha 1 were a boy, I would buy her 1 a doll. (5)??If Sasha 1 were a boy, I would buy him 1 a doll. (6) If Sasha i is a boy, I ll buy him i a doll. (7) If Sasha i is a girl, I ll buy her i a toy car. The indicative predictive conditionals (8)-(9), uttered in a context in which we know that John is a man, also require the presupposition to be met in the actual world (M. Kaufmann, p.c.). (8) If John i undergoes an operation to become a woman, we ll buy him i a toy car. (9)??If John i undergoes an operation to become a woman, we ll buy her i a toy car.

7 The Indexical Presupposition Analysis of 3sg pronouns To capture the indexical gender presuppositions of 3sg pronouns, we assume the following semantic rules (in a Kaplanian semantic framework): [[he i ]] c,g,w,t = g(i), if g(i) is male in the world c w and at the time c t of the context c; undefined otherwise. [[she i ]] c,g,w,t = g(i), if g(i) is female in the world c w and at the time c t of the context c; undefined otherwise.

8 Gender facts in an intensional semantics for conditionals Assuming the Stalnakerian Semantics below as the proper analysis of conditionals, we can predict the contrast in (4)-(5): (Stalnakerian Semantics) [[if p, q]] c,g,w,t = 1 iff [[q]] c,g,w,t = 1, where w is the world closest to w such that [[p]] c,g,w,t = 1. (4) If Sasha 1 were a boy, I would buy her 1 a doll. (5)??If Sasha 1 were a boy, I would buy him 1 a doll. However, we also incorrectly predict that one of the following sentences ends up undefined (hence, it should be infelicitous): (6) If Sasha i is a boy, I ll buy him i a doll. (7) If Sasha i is a girl, I ll buy her i a toy car. Indeed, if Sasha is female, (6) ends up undefined, and if Sasha is male, (7) ends up undefined.

9 Indicative vs. counterfactual conditionals Jackson 1987 points out that, while counterfactual (10) makes perfect sense, the corresponding indicative in (11) is incoherent: (10) If Oswald had not shot Kennedy, things would be different today from the way they actually are. (11)??If Oswald did not shoot Kennedy, things are different today from the way they actually are. The same contrast also holds between counterfactuals and predictive indicatives, as in the following examples (Weatherson 2001): (12) If Warren Beatty were to become the next president, things would be different from the way they actually will be. (13)??If Warren Beatty becomes the next president, things will be different from the way they actually will be.

10 Jackson s moral Indicatives, unlike counterfactuals, are not intensional: they do not introduce a distinction between the closest world in which the antecedent is true and the actual world. This is why the indicatives (11) and (13) are incoherent: it cannot be that the way things are (will be) in the actual world differs from the way things are (will be) in the actual world. (11)??If Oswald did not shoot Kennedy, things are different today from the way they actually are. (13)??If Warren Beatty becomes the next president, things will be different from the way they actually will be. Jackson s conclusion is that (11) and (13) are evidence for the Material Conditional Analysis of indicatives (MCA). (e.g., (11) Either Oswald shot Kennedy or things are different today from the way they actually are )

11 Gender facts in an extensional semantics for conditionals As we have seen, the Stalnakerian Semantics, paired with the Indexical Presupposition Analysis of 3sg pronouns, fails to account for the way the presuppositions of such pronouns project in (6)-(7): (6) If Sasha i is a boy, I ll buy him i a doll. (7) If Sasha i is a girl, I ll buy her i a toy car. The question that we tackle now is whether MCA would fare better than the Stalnakerian Semantics.

12 Enter strong Kleene Under the Indexical Presupposition Analysis of 3sg pronouns, sentences containing such pronouns may be True, False or Undefined. If indicative if A, then B is equivalent to not-a or B, then under the Strong Kleene rule below we predict that (6)-(7) can both be True (hence, Defined): Strong Kleene. Either p or q is True if one of p, q is True, no matter whether the other is True, False or Undefined. (6) If Sasha i is a boy, I ll buy him i a doll. (7) If Sasha i is a girl, I ll buy her i a toy car. Suppose Sasha is a boy and I ll buy him a doll. Then (14) (equivalent to (6)) is true because its right disjunct is true and (15) (equivalent to (7)) is true because its left disjunct is true. Supposing Sasha is a girl and I ll buy her a toy car, the truth of (14)-(15) is explained in a parallel way. (14) Either Sasha i is not a boy or I ll buy him i a doll. (15) Either Sasha i is not a girl or I ll buy her i a toy car.

13 Extensional predictive conditionals What happens if we apply MCA to the predictive indicatives (8)-(9)? (8) If John i undergoes an operation to become a woman, we ll buy him i a toy car. (9)??If John i undergoes an operation to become a woman, we ll buy her i a toy car. Under this account, (9) is equivalent to (16): (16) Either John i will not undergo an operation to become a woman or we ll buy her i a toy car. The problem: suppose that we know that John will not undergo the operation; it follows that the first disjunct of (16) is true, thus (16) is predicted to be true; thus, we end up without an explanation of why (9) is bad.

14 Enter robustness The prediction that a conditional should be assertable if its antecedent is false is a familiar problem for MCA. This analysis can be rescued if, following Jackson, we require that, to be assertable, an indicative conditional must be robust relative to its antecedent: if A, then B is robust relative to A iff the (subjective) probabability of the truth of if A, then B is high, and it would stay high also if it came to be known that A is true.

15 Back to the problematic case Consider again the problematic conditional (9): (9)??If John i undergoes an operation to become a woman, we ll buy her i a toy car. If it came to be known that John will undergo the operation, the subjective probability that (9) is true would not stay high, because the first disjunct in (16) would be false and the second disjunct undefined: (16)??Either John i will not undergo an operation to become a woman or we ll buy her i a toy car. Thus, once we assume robustness as a condition for assertability, conditional (9) is correctly predicted to be infelicitous: although this conditional would be true if John did not undergo the operation, still it would be unassertable.

16 Why we are not stopping here MCA, paired with the Stalnakerian semantics for counterfactuals, predicts the facts. So why not stop here? Because MCA runs into well-known problems in other areas (unrelated to gender): it predicts (incorrectly) the validity of inference patterns like Transitivity and Strengthening of the antecedent and also that (if A, then B) or (if B, then A) is true whenever A and B are not undefined (?).

17 Considering a possible world as actual An alternative to Jackson s MCA is suggested by Weatherson 2001 and Nolan 2003: 1. when using a counterfactual, the speaker evaluates the consequent in the closest world in which the antecedent is true, by taking for granted that this world is distinct from the actual world; 2. when using an indicative, the speaker evaluates the consequent in the closest world in which the antecedent is true, by considering this world as actual. According to this alternative view, the reason why (11) and (13) are incoherent is that the world referred to by actually is the closest world w in which the antecedent is true and it can t be that in w things are different from the way they are in w.

18 Our proposal In a Kaplanian framework, the suggestion by Weatherson and Nolan amounts to regarding indicative conditionals as monsters: they shift the context of utterance c to a context c relative to whose world and time the antecedent is true (see Santorio 2012). We propose the following semantics: Indicatives (Monstrous semantics) [[if p, q]] c,g,w,t = 1 iff [[q]] c,g,c w,c t = 1, where c w is the world closest to w such that [[p]] c,g,c w,c t = 1, for every c which, for all the speaker knows at < c w, c t >, might be the context she is in. Counterfactuals (Stalnakerian semantics) [[if p, q]] c,g,w,t = 1 iff [[q]] c,g,w,t = 1, where w is the world closest to w such that [[p]] c,g,w,t = 1.

19 Jackson s contrast explained Now contrasts (10)-(11) and (12)-(13) follow: actually refers to the world of the context, which for indicatives, but not for counterfactuals, is the closest world at which the antecedent is true. (10) If Oswald had not shot Kennedy, things would be different today from the way they actually are. (11)??If Oswald did not shoot Kennedy, things are different today from the way they actually are. (12) If Warren Beatty were to become the next president, things would be different from the way they actually will be. (13)??If Warren Beatty becomes the next president, things will be different from the way they actually will be.

20 Gender in conditionals explained The contrast between (7) and (9) is also expected: (7) If Sasha i is a girl, I ll buy her i a toy car. (9)??If John i undergoes an operation to become a woman, we ll buy her i a toy car. Given our Monstrous semantics for indicatives, the indexical presuppositions of the pronouns in the consequent must be met at a pair <c w, c t>, which, for all the speaker knows in c, might be the world and time of utterance, where c w is the world closest to the actual world c w in which the antecedent is true at c t. In the context of utterance of (7), Sasha s gender is not known, and Sasha is required to be female at <c w, c t>, thus the presupposition of her is met. But in the context of utterance of (9), John s gender is known (it is known to be male at utterance time), thus John is male at <c w, c t> and the presupposition of her isn t met.

21 Extensions and refinements of the proposal In the time we have left, we are going to discuss some extensions of our proposal and some answers to possible objections.

22 Epistemic shift Santorio 2012 describes the following case ( epistemic shift ; pp. 4-5): Rudolf Lingens and Gustav Lauben are kidnapped. Lingens and Lauben are amnesiacs: each of them knows that he is one of the two kidnapped amnesiacs, but doesn t know which. They will be subjected to the following experiment. First, they will be anesthetized, then a coin will be tossed. If the outcome is tails, Lingens will be released in Main Library, Stanford, and Lauben will be killed. If the outcome is heads, Lauben will be released in Widener Library, Harvard, and Lingens will be killed. Lingens and Lauben are informed of the plan and the experiment is executed. Later, one of them wakes up in a library. He says: (17) If the coin landed tails, I am in Main Library, Stanford. (18) If the coin landed heads, I am in Widener Library, Harvard.

23 Santorio s account Santorio s point is that under a standard account of indexicals and a standard possible world account of indicative conditionals, (17)-(18) cannot be both asserted truly in the described context: (17) If the coin landed tails, I am in Main Library, Stanford. (18) If the coin landed heads, I am in Widener Library, Harvard. Santorio solution is based on the following assumptions: 1. indexical pronouns are variables which, in (17)-(18), are bound by an epistemic necessity operator. 2. The epistemic necessity operator shifts the contextually provided assignment for these variables by quantifying over world assignment pairs <g,w>, where w is an epistemic alternative for the speaker where the antecedent of the conditional is true and g assigns to each indexical an individual which, as far as the speaker knows, is the counterpart in w of the individual assigned to the indexical by the assignment provided by the context of utterance. Given 1-2, we expect I to refer to Lingens in (17) and to Lauben in (18), thus accounting for the fact that (17)-(18) can be both true.

24 Our predictions Our account makes the same predictions as Santorio s concerning (17)-(18): (17) If the coin landed tails, I am in Main Library, Stanford. (18) If the coin landed heads, I am in Widener Library, Harvard. Suppose Lauben utters (17). Any context c, compatible with what Lauben knows, where c w is the world closest to the utterance world in which the coin landed tails is a context in which the speaker at <c w,c t > is Lingens. Thus, (17) is true, since in c w Lingens is in the Stanford Library. Suppose Lauben utters (18). Any context c, compatible with what Lauben knows, where c w is the world closest to the utterance world in which the coin landed heads is a context in which the speaker at <c w,c t > is Lauben. Thus, (17) is true, since in c w Lauben is in the Widener Library. By a parallel reasoning, (17)-(18) can both be asserted truly by Lingens.

25 Predictive conditionals Santorio also points out the following case: Suppose that, after having been informed about the experiment but before undergoing it, one of the amnesiacs says: (19) If the coin lands tails, I will be in Main Library, Stanford. (20) If the coin lands heads, I will be in Widener Library, Harvard.... (19)-(20) are not good utterances in the scenario. According to Santorio, in (19)-(20) will is the modal operator taking antecedent and consequent as arguments and will, unlike the silent epistemic necessity operator in (17)-(18), is unable to bind indexicals: (17) If the coin landed tails, I am in Main Library, Stanford. (18) If the coin landed heads, I am in Widener Library, Harvard. If this is the case, (19) is only true if uttered by Lingens, while (20) is only true if uttered by Lauben. Given that the amnesiac doesn t know whether he is Lingens or Lauben, he is in no position to assert (19) or (20).

26 Back to our account of indicatives If Santorio is right, we should distinguish different kinds of indicative conditionals and restrict our monstrous semantics to indicative non-predictive conditionals. Our account of (9) was based on the assumption that indicative conditionals are context-shifters: (9)??If John i undergoes an operation to become a woman, we ll buy her i a toy car. If predictive conditionals are not context-shifters, the female pronoun in (9) is independently ruled out: the context for evaluating we ll buy her i a toy car is not a local context provided by the conditional antecedent. Yet, while the behavior of first person pronouns in predictive conditionals is prima facie puzzling if predictive conditionals are monstrous, the evidence is not one-sided.

27 Characterizing predictive conditionals Future tense in (6)-(7) has only scope over the consequent: the antecedent is understood in the relevant context as a supposition concerning Sasha s gender at the time of utterance. On the other hand, the antecedent of (9) conveys a supposition concerning John s undergoing an operation at a future time. So, future tense in (9) has scope over the whole conditional. By predictive conditionals we mean indicative conditionals in which future tense has scope over the whole conditional (e.g. (9)).

28 Predictive conditionals and monstrosity Consider Weatherson s contrast again: (12) If Warren Beatty were to become the next president, things would be different from the way they actually will be. (13)??If Warren Beatty becomes the next president, things will be different from the way they actually will be. Sentence (13) is a predictive conditional (since the supposition of the antecedent also concerns a future time). Yet, (13) contrasts with the counterfactual conditional in (12) exactly in the way we expect if (13), unlike (12), has the monstrous semantics we suggest. Moreover, consider the following example inspired by Williamson 2006: (21) If Bernie becomes president, Bernie will actually become president. Sentence (21), a predictive conditional, has a tautological flavor, but this is unexpected if the conditional is non monstrous.

29 Back to Santorio s predictives If predictive conditionals, as we claim, are monstrous, how does our analysis account for the fact that (19)-(20) are odd? (19) If the coin lands tails, I will be in Main Library, Stanford. (20) If the coin lands heads, I will be in Widener Library, Harvard. Let s focus on (19) and assume the speaker is Lauben (the reasoning will be the same, for the other choices of predictive and speaker). The monstrous analysis assigns the truth conditions in (22) to (19): (22) [[(19)]] c,g,w,t = 1 iff [[I will be in Main Library, Stanford]] c,g,c w,c t = 1, where c w is the world closest to w such that [[the coin will land tails]] c,g,c w,c t = 1, for every c which, for all Lauben knows at < c w, c t >, might be the context he is in.

30 Our prediction (19) If the coin lands tails, I will be in Main Library, Stanford. (22) [[(19)]] c,g,w,t = 1 iff [[I will be in Main Library, Stanford]] c,g,c w,c t = 1, where c w is the world closest to w such that [[the coin will land tails]] c,g,c w,c t = 1, for every c which, for all Lauben knows at < c w, c t >, might be the context he is in. A context c such that at c w the coin will land tails after c t and the speaker at c t is Lauben is compatible with what Lauben knows. But in any such c, it is false that Lauben will be in Main Library, Stanford in c w. Thus, given what Lauben knows, it is not appropriate for him to utter (19).

31 Summing up We have proposed a unified monstrous semantics for indicatives to account for cases in which the presuppositions of 3sg pronouns are satisfied locally. Our monstrous semantics, paired with an intensional non-monstrous semantics for counterfactuals, can also account for previously described contrasts between indicatives and counterfactuals which involve actually and the 1sg pronoun. We have shown that this monstrous semantics accounts for cases in which the gender presupposition of a 3sg pronoun is not locally satisfied / a 1sg pronoun does not shift (in each case, we have argued that considerations pertaining to what information is accessible to the speaker at the utterance time play a crucial role).

32 Open issues One problem left open is why 1sg pronouns can also be bound in the antecedent of indicatives, while the presuppositions of 3sg pronouns don t seem to be locally satisfiable in this position see contrast between (23) (as uttered in Santorio s amnesiacs context) and (24) (as uttered in a context in which we don t know Sasha s gender). (23) If the coin lands tails and I am Lingens, I will be in Main Library, Stanford. (24)??If he i [pointing to Sasha] is a boy, I ll buy him i a doll. On the current monstrous analysis, which only shifts the evaluation context for the consequent of an indicative (leaving the evaluation context for the antecedent anchored to the actual context), the infelicity of (24) is expected but the acceptability of (23) is unexpected. We will examine such contrasts in future work.

33 Thank You!

34 References Cooper, R. (1983). Quantification and syntactic theory. Reidel, Dordrecht. Jackson, F. (1987). Conditionals. Blackwell, Oxford. Mackay, J. (2017). Explaining the actuality operator away. The Philosophical Quarterly. Nolan, D. (2003). Defending a possible-worlds account of indicative conditionals. Philosophical Studies, 116: Sainsbury, M. (2001). Logical forms. Blackwell, Oxford, 2nd edition. Santorio, P. (2012). Reference and monstrosity. The Philosophical Review, 121(3): Sharvit, Y. (2008). The puzzle of free indirect discourse. Linguistics and Philosophy, 31: Weatherson, B. (2001). Indicative and subjunctive conditionals. The philosophical Quarterly, 51(203): Wehmeier, K. F. (2004). In the mood. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 33: Williamson, T. (2006). Indicative versus subjunctive conditionals, congruential versus nonhyperintensional contexts. Philosophical Issues, 16: Yanovich, I. (2010). On the nature and formal analysis of indexical presuppositions. In New frontiers in artificial intelligence: JSAI-isAI Workshops, LENLS, JURISIN, KCSD, LILI, Tokyo, Japan, November 19-20, 2009, Revised Selected Papers, pages