Philosophiekolloquium FB Philosophie KGW
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1 Prof. Jürgen Mittelstrass: Was ist ein philosophisches Problem? Philosophische Probleme treten in der Regel innerhalb philosophischer Konzeptionen auf und werden dann auch mit den Mitteln dieser Konzeptionen gelöst. Die Frage ist, ob es auch unabhängig von philosophischen Konzeptionen philosophische Probleme gibt und wie man sie als solche erkennt. Die Frage ist auch, ob als philosophisch deklarierte Probleme nur Scheinprobleme sind (Carnap) oder sich unter Rekurs auf die Lebenswelt einfach auflösen (Wittgenstein). Von der Beantwortung derartiger Fragen hängen ein gut Stück eines geklärten Philosophieverständnisses und der Status der Philosophie, selbst in ihren institutionellen Formen, ab. Der Versuch einer Beantwortung.
2 Prof. Harvey Brown: Philosophical aspects of physical time I will raise a number of issues related to the concept of time in physics. These concern the arrow of time, the notion of simultaneity of distant events, and the claim that non-simultaneous events occurring at the same place are separated by a definite amount of time (i.e. that time has a metric). In each case I will try to highlight open questions related to our understanding of time.
3 Prof. Thomas Müller: Things in different sciences. Toward a logic for non-reductive monism One and the same thing for example, a cat can be the subject of different sciences that ascribe different classes of properties. These different properties ground different modal facts about the things involved; how does this work? We approach the issue with a view to the things that are the subject of different sciences, and inquire about their unity. What is a proper logical framework for a monistic view in which there is just one domain for all the sciences? We argue that case-intensional first order logic is the current best candidate, and provide some relevant illustrations.
4 Prof. Christine Chwaszcza: Practical Reasons and Social Agency In Shared Agency Michael Bratman proposes an account of shared intentions, 1 which is conceptually, metaphyiscally and normatively continuous with the account of intentionality in individual agency as first developed in his planning theory of intentions. 2 The social dimension of shared agency, according to Bratman, manifests itself in certain sociopsychological attidudes which participants have towards each other in light of their shared activity. Bratman thus takes a position distinct from Margaret Gilbert s proposal of conceiving of collective intentions in terms of non-moral obligations, John Searle s proposal to accept a sui generis type of we-intentions, and cognitive interpretations of interpersonal agency along the lines of David Lewis account of common knowledge. Bratman s analysis of shared intentions is in many respects philosophically attractive. In one rather crucial respect, however, I find it quite unconvincing. This respect concerns the cognitive structure of intentionality, which according to Bratman is marked off by certain norms of rationality that apply to shared intentions (social consistency, meansend coherence, and social agglomerativity). In my talk I will distinguish two types of shared agency, which I call social exchange and reciprocal agency. I will argue that Bratman s account offers a theoretical reconstruction of the first type, but not of the second. I will also address the philosophical challenge presented by reciprocal agency as discussed in game-theoretic settings of so-called coordination problems. Finally I will propose two improvements on Bratman s norms of practical rationality in order to deal with that challenge. 1 M. Bratman: Shared Agency, Oxford: OUP M. Bratman: Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1987.
5 Prof. Samuel Fletcher: On the Local Flatness of Spacetime Many discussions of the foundations of general relativity put a special emphasis on describing every relativistic spacetime as locally flat, or as locally Minkowskian. Such claims are prima facie puzzling: after all, curvature is itself a local property, being described by a tensor field on spacetime. Since, in general, relativistic spacetimes have non-vanishing curvature, so there is a straightforward sense in which they are not locally flat. Still, there is a natural intuition behind claims of local flatness arising from analogy with a sufficiently small region of a curved surface, like that of the Earth, which can to a good approximation be described as planar. But like many principles of general relativity, there does not seem to be much consensus regarding how to make this intuition more precise. And unlike the so-called principle of equivalence or principle of relativity, the puzzles concerning the principle of local flatness have received relatively little attention. Without attempting a comprehensive survey, we note three common articulations of what it could mean for spacetime to be locally flat or locally Minkowskian and argue that each of them is unsatisfactory. We then present a precise, coordinate-independent sense in which relativistic spacetimes might be described as (approximately) locally flat, and discuss to what extent this notion can be non-trivial -- that is, be a substantive restriction on the possibilities relativity theory allows.
6 Prof. Katie Steele: Abduction versus induction and the precision of causal claims It is widely held that there are two kinds of ampliative inference abduction and induction and yet what the Distinction actually amounts to is much contested. Here I revisit this debate, with a particular function in mind: to account for climate scientists differing confidence in explanations of past climate versus predictions of future climate (an example intended to be illustrative of a general tendency in science). Notwithstanding the recent emphasis on explanatory power in discussions of abduction and truth, this differing confidence is puzzling: surely a convincing (causal) explanatory theory goes hand-in-hand with convincing predictions, and conversely, unconvincing predictions are underpinned by an unconvincing (causal) explanatory theory. Here I suggest that, granted explanation and prediction both turn on causation, we nonetheless generally seek a less precise causal story for explaining known data, as compared to predicting new data. I appeal to a difference-making or contrastive account of causation to substantiate this claim, and show how it plays out for the climate science example. My account effectively amounts to a novel way of cashing out and defending the traditional Peircian distinction between abduction and induction. In short, the two are not different styles of inference but rather represent different aims in inference; moreover, it is generally easier to meet the aim of abduction.
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