Rejected expectations: the scalar particles cai and jiu in Mandarin Chinese*

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1 Rejected expectations: the scalar particles cai and jiu in Mandarin Chinese* HUEI-LING LAI Abstract This article investigates the four uses of the particles cai and jiu in Mandarin Chinese: the temporal, restrictive, conditional, and emphatic uses. The major claim is that the various uses of the particles are related by virtue of their common link to an abstract semantic structure. The analysis not only accounts for the semantic similarities of the different uses but also suggests that it is just the scales on which cai and jiu operate that result in the seemingly different meanings of the particles. It is argued that cai and jiu presuppose a change of state of the truth value of a proposition and that this change happens at a different point from where it is expected to happen. For cai, the asserted value of change is located farther up on the structure than the expected value, whereas for jiu, the asserted value of change is located farther down. 1. Introduction The particles cai and jiu, normally analyzed as adverbs meaning only, form a recognized class of expressions in Mandarin Chinese. The various uses of these particles and the systematic relations between them have been discussed in past studies such as Chao (1968), Tsao (1976), Li and Thompson ( 1981), Paris ( 1985), and Biq (1984, 1988), among others. Following Biq s (1984, 1988) system, I classify the various uses into four: the temporal use, the restrictive use (her limiting use), the conditional use (her parametric use), and the emphatic use, as illustrated in examples (1) to ( 4), respectively: ( 1) a. Lisi SAN DIAN cai zai bangongshi. Lisi three o clock C be-in office Lisi showed up in his office only as late as THREE. Linguistics 37 4 (1999), /99/ Walter de Gruyter

2 626 H.-L. Lai b. Lisi SAN DIAN jiu zai bangongshi le. Lisi three o clock J be-in office LE Lisi has already been in his office as early as THREE. c. Xianzai cai san dian! wo yiwei si dian le! now C three o clock I think four o clock LE It s only three o clock now! I thought that it was already four. d. Zheme quai jiu san dian le, wo yiwei cai lian dian ne! so fast J three o clock LE I think C two o clock NE How could it already be three o clock? I thought it was only two o clock. Sentence (1a) implies that Lisi showed up later than the speaker expected, while (1b) implies that the speaker expected Lisi to show up later than three o clock. The expectation with respect to cai and jiu can actually reverse as shown in (1c) and (1d). Sentence (1c) with cai indicates the speaker expected it to be one hour later. Sentence (1d) with jiu indicates the speaker expected it to be earlier. The direction of expectation is just the opposite of that in (1a) and (1b).1 (2) a. Ta chi le SAN GE pingguo cai bao. he eat LE three CL apple C full He became full only after eating (as many as) THREE apples. b. Ta chi SAN GE pingguo jiu bao le. he eat three CL apple J full LE He became full after only eating (as many as) THREE apples. In the restrictive use given in (2), both particles seem to mean only given appropriate contexts, yet they actually exhibit different semantic effects. Besides, as in their temporal usage, these examples show that cai and jiu express scalar contrast. In the conditional use, cai is related to necessary conditions and jiu is related to sufficient conditions: ( 3) a. XINGQITIAN, Amei cai qu manpao. Sunday Amei C go jogging Amei goes jogging only if IT IS SUNDAY. b. XINGQITIAN, Amei jiu qu manpao. Sunday Amei J go jogging Amei goes jogging if (whenever) IT IS SUNDAY. In addition to the aforementioned uses, cai and jiu can express emphasis:

3 The particles cai and jiu in Chinese 627 ( 4) a. Wo zuotian kan le Zhong-Ri lanqiusai, I yesterday watch LE China Japan basketball game NA CHANG BISAI cai jingcai ne!2 that CL game C great NE I watched the China Japan basketball game yesterday. THAT GAME was great! b. LISI jiu shi wo yao zhao de ren. Lisi J be I want look-for DE person LISI is exactly the person that I am looking for. The examples show that the two particles are systematically related to each other in their meanings. They also illustrate important properties of these particles: dependency of a semantic constituent often marked by a focus, introduction of scales (e.g. of times or of numbers), and certain semantic effects on the presuppositional level. Their meanings are similar but not identical to English only vs. already, German erst vs. schon (cf. König 1977, 1979, 1981, 1991; Löbner 1989; van der Auwera 1993) or Spanish solo vs. ya (cf. Garrido 1992). Biq (1984, 1988), the most comprehensive analysis among the previous ones, argues that cai and jiu are focus adverbs in that cai marks denyingexpectation focus and jiu marks simple focus. Their semantic properties can be represented in semilogical notation as illustrated in the following from Biq (1988: 86 87, [17]). (5) cai (S )=P(K) & YY [P(Y ) & expected (Y)Y K], KµD, YµD jiu (S ) =P( K) & ZY [P( Y)& Y K], KµD, Y1D S =the sentence combined with cai or jiu P =the relevant properties ascribed to the domain of quantification K=the asserted value Y =any member of the domain of quantification D=domain of quantification Based on the core meanings, she tries to unify the different uses of cai and jiu with the help of pragmatic notions like scalar implicature, the informativeness principle, and the relevance principle. Although her analysis greatly advances our knowledge of the properties involved with the particles, it is not quite clear how the various uses can be reconciled.3 In particular, Biq s line of argument does not follow from the remaining rule for jiu in (5); the rule for jiu is more like that for ye also since it asserts the focused value, P( K), and assumes that there is another alternative value in the domain, Y K, to make the sentence true as well, namely P(Y ). Nor does her analysis of jiu as a simple focus

4 628 H.-L. Lai follow from her semantic representation. I will propose a more accurate analysis of jiu, along with cai. In particular, I will show how the various uses of the two particles can be reconciled from their central meanings. This article aims at two goals. One is to account for the systematic relationship between the particles: what principles determine the semantic sharing of labor between them and how semantics and pragmatics interact to achieve the observed effects. The other and more important goal is to identify a more abstract basic meaning for each particle. And with the core meanings, all the uses connected with the two particles, including those presented by Biq (1984, 1988), can be derived from context and/or common-sense knowledge.4 This study hence provides a more explanatory account with respect to the linguistic phenomena in question than previous analyses. 2. An analysis of cai and jiu In this section, an analysis of cai and jiu will be given in terms of a set of linguistic data. I will start with the temporal use, followed by the restrictive use, the conditional use, and the emphatic use The temporal use of cai and jiu The examples given in (1) show that cai brings about contrary semantic effects to the sentences that contain it, as does jiu. In this section, more data is provided in connection with the particles. I will argue that they can all be explained under the same semantic representations The late early effect of cai and jiu. Like erst and schon in German, cai and jiu in Mandarin can have a temporal frame adverbial as focus, as illustrated in (1a) and (1b). In this use, cai carries a presupposition of relative lateness of the change of state considered whereas jiu carries a presupposition of relative earliness of that change. This becomes evident when we look at the cooccurrence compatibilities within a discourse as illustrated in (6), where the felicity of a discourse lies in the compatibility between the evaluations of the time between the speaker judgment and the presuppositions of the particles. ( 6) a. Lisi lai de zui wan, Lisi come DE most late

5 The particles cai and jiu in Chinese 629 ta SAN DIAN cai zai bangongshi. he three o clock C be-in office #ta SAN DIAN jiu zai bangongshi le. he three o clock J be-in office LE Lisi is the last person that showed up; he was in his office only (as late as) THREE. b. Lisi lai de zui zao, Lisi come DE most early ta SAN DIAN jiu zai bangongshi le. he three o clock J be-in office LE #ta SAN DIAN cai zai bangongshi. he three o clock C be-in office Lisi is the earliest person that showed up; he has been in his office (as late as) THREE O CLOCK. This late early effect of the sentences in (1a) and (1b) are obviously induced by the particles cai and jiu, whose effect would be otherwise absent as in (7).5 ( 7) Lisi san dian zai bangongshi. Lisi three o clock be-in office Lisi was in his office at three o clock. These observations correspond to the well-known cases of temporal particles in German, erst/schon, and in English, only/already, in which similar semantic incompatibilities occur with the particles ( König 1977; Löbner 1989). Besides, as pointed out by Löbner (1989: 174), erst p or schon p puts the state p under a certain specific presupposition. Erst (t e, p) (cf. only) orschon (t e, p) (cf. already) introduces the perspective that after a phase of not-p a positive phase sets in and, under this perspective, states that p is the case at the reference time. Semantic deviance can be observed if such a presupposition of succession of a negative and a positive phase is not obtained (cf. also König 1977). Like erst/only...so far and schon/already, cai and jiu involve a presupposition indicating attainment of a positive state resulting from a change from a negative state (van der Auwera 1993: 619).6 The late early effect brought about by cai and jiu comes from the comparison between the actual time of change and some alternative time of change that is possibly the expected time for the positive state to be obtained. Like the contrast between erst and schon, the difference between cai and jiu lies in that cai contains a component of late change whereas jiu contains a component of early change. More precisely, cai and jiu presuppose a change of state in the truth value of a proposition, and they presuppose that the point where this change

6 630 H.-L. Lai happens is not in the range at which it is expected to happen. The particles hence compare the actual states with hypothetical expected states. The meaning distinction of cai(w[x])(t) and jiu(w[x])(t) can be represented and diagrammed as follows, where t is the specified time given by a time adverbial or the reference time of the context and t stands for the expected alternative times: (8) a. cai (w[x])(t) e: " w [ w before t (i.e. Zt [t <t9w[t ]]) a: " w [ w at t (i.e. w[t]9" Zt [t <t9w[t ]]) " w[x] w[x] CCCCC CCCCCCCCCA t " w[x] w[x] e: CCCCCC CCCCCCCCA t " w[x] w[x] CCCCCCC CCCCCCCA t " w[x] w[x] a: CCCCCCCC CCCCCCA t b. jiu (w[x])(t) e: " w at t (i.e. " w [ w after t; i.e. " w[t]9zt [t<t 9w[t ]]) a: w at t (i.e. " w [ w before or at t; i.e. w[t]) " w[x] w[x] CCCCCCCCCC CCCCA t " w[x] w[x] e: CCCCCCCCC CCCCCA t " w[x] w[x] CCCCCCC CCCCCCCA t " w[x] w[x] a: CCCCCC CCCCCCCCA t

7 e: expectable alternative scales a: actual focus scale t : expectable alternative time values t: actual time value The particles cai and jiu in Chinese 631 Notice that these schemata just illustrate the phenomenon that alternatives to the proposition actually expressed are taken into account (following Rooth 1985, 1992). The e in the schemata means that it is expected that the change happened as indicated some time earlier or later, that is, as in one of the e-scales, rather than as indicated in the a-scale. The expectation in general is, with cai, that the asserted time of change is later than some expected time. Hence we have a whole range of alternatives, which all have earlier time values than t, indicated by t, as shown in (8a). With jiu, however, the expectation in general is that the asserted time of change is earlier than some expected time. Hence we have a whole range of alternative scales, which all have some expected time, indicated by t, later than the asserted time t, as shown in (8b). In what follows, I will specify just one e-scale as a representative in the diagrams for easy illustration. Furthermore, the assumed change " w [ w (following Löbner 1989) holds for stative verb constellations; I will discuss nonstative verb constellations later. Notice that it is well known that a change of state by definition is actually an event. For easier exposition, I will separate stative verb constellations from eventive verb constellations. Also, in the diagram, I concentrate on a contextually limited time frame, which contains only ONE change " w [ w (also following Löbner 1989). The idea can be illustrated with examples in ( 1a), which can be diagrammed as in (9): (9)a. cai (Lisi x zai bangongshi)(san dian) [x: a time point] " Lisi in his office at x Lisi in his office at x e: CCCCCCCCCCCC CCCCCCCCCCCCA t<3 p.m. a: " Lisi in his office at x Lisi in his office at x CCCCCCCCCCCCC CCCCCCCCCCCA 3 p.m. (9)b. jiu (Lisi x zai bangongshi)(san dian) [x: a time point] " Lisi in his office at x Lisi in his office at x e: CCCCCCCCCCCCC CCCCCCCCCCCA 3 p.m.<t

8 632 H.-L. Lai a: " Lisi in his office at x Lisi in his office at x CCCCCCCCCCCC CCCCCCCCCCCCA 3 p.m. In both (9a) and (9b), the asserted time of change from the negative state where Lisi was not in his office to the positive state in which Lisi was in his office is the same. Due to the semantic contribution of cai, it is expected that the time for Lisi to be in his office is earlier than three o clock, as illustrated in (9a). Therefore, the time of change is later than expected. In (9b), on the other hand, it is expected that the alternative time for Lisi to be in his office is later than three o clock because of the semantic contribution of jiu; hence the time of change is earlier than expected The immediacy effect of cai and jiu. In addition to focusing on overt temporal expressions, cai and jiu can have deictically referred temporal foci that are not linguistically expressed: ( 10) a. Wanfan cai hao. supper C ready Supper was just ready. b. Wanfan jiu hao. supper J ready Supper is about to be ready. Biq (1984, 1988), following previous analyses, maintains that cai and jiu in (10) express a past immediacy and a future immediacy, respectively, with respect to the discourse time. How can these effects actually be derived? In (10a) the change happened right before the speech time with the meaning contribution of cai. What ( 10a) expresses is that the change from " supper ready to supper ready happened JUST NOW assuming a focus on the reference time, as opposed to some other alternative time earlier than just now when the change could have happened. Compared to some other expectable earlier alternative time, the time denoted by just now is later than expected. Also, compared to earlier alternative times in the past, the time value of just now, which refers to the first moment before the speech time when the beginning of change has happened, is indeed closer to the speech time. That is how the immediate past interpretation is obtained. The sentence in ( 10b), however, expresses that supper is not yet ready at the speech time. The meaning contribution of jiu to the sentence is that it signals that the change from " supper ready to supper ready is going to happen pretty soon. Hence,

9 The particles cai and jiu in Chinese 633 compared to later alternative times, in which it might be true that supper would be ready then, the pretty soon time value is earlier than expected. Furthermore, compared to alternative later times, the pretty soon time value is closer to the speech time. Hence the immediate future interpretation is derived The early late effect of cai and jiu. So far the framework proposed seems to account for the contrary evaluations of lateness and earliness between cai and jiu pretty well. The puzzle now is that the contributions of cai and jiu to the sentences in (1c) and (1d) respectively seem to be exactly the opposite of those in (1a) and (1b). How can the proposed framework capture this apparent paradox that contrary evaluative implicatures are associated with the same lexical form? Let us consider (1c) with cai first. In (1c), the change from " It s three o clock to It s three o clock in the actual situation happened at the reference time. However, the actual time was earlier than the speaker expected; that is, the speaker expected that the change should have happened one hour earlier since he thought it was already four o clock. Therefore, compared to the expected earlier time for change, the reference time, when the change just happened, is indeed LATER THAN EXPECTED. The implicature it s early associated with the sentence simply comes from the evaluation of the actual time, against the alternative expected time. As for jiu in (1d), the scenario is exactly the opposite. The speaker expected that it was not yet three o clock. That is, the speaker expected that the change from " It s three o clock to It s three o clock was going to happen one hour later, as indicated in the following discourse. In reality, the change happened at the reference time. Hence, compared to the alternative expected time for change, the reference time in which the change already happened is indeed EARLIER THAN EXPECTED. The implicature it s late of (1d) results from the difference between the actual time and the expected time The meaning differences between cai and jiu. The analysis with regard to presupposed change of state and expectation seems to suggest an apparent symmetric relationship between cai and jiu. Specifically, constant meaning structures as illustrated in (8a) and (8b) for cai and jiu, respectively, are maintained for the examples so far when considering the actual scale and the expectable alternative scales. Nevertheless, if we look closer to the actual meaning of cai and jiu, we will find that they indeed have an asymmetric relationship. Crucially, two observations can be noted.

10 634 H.-L. Lai First, although both particles presuppose a change of phase, they differ in terms of conversational implicatures. Examine the following. ( 11) a. Amei BA DIAN cai zai bangongshi; Amei eight o clock C be-in office Amei was in her office only (as late as) EIGHT O CLOCK. b. #Ta QI DIAN lai de. she seven o clock come DE She came at SEVEN O CLOCK. The assertion in (11a) cannot be canceled as shown by the incompatibility with the follow-up sentence (11b). This is because the change of state happens only at the asserted time is part of the meaning of cai. Thus, the assertion does not allow for cancellation. No implicature associated with cai allows for the change to happen before the asserted time. On the other hand, jiu has two possible interpretations. It refers to the last moment before the change happens (as in the immediate future interpretation in [10b]) except when sentential le is present, in which case it expresses that the change actually happened at the indicated time. In either interpretation, there is a conversational implicature associated with the sentence. Specifically, in (10b), supper is not ready yet at the speech time is an implicature of the sentence, as it can be canceled (Grice 1975; Levinson 1983). Observe the following dialogue between two speakers: ( 12) A: Wanfan (mashang) jiu hao ma? supper immediately J ready Q Is supper about to be ready? B: Dui, shishishang, wanfan yijing hao le. yes, in fact supper already ready LE Yes, in fact, supper IS ready. Speaker A s implicature that supper is not ready yet is canceled by speaker B, who asserts instead that supper IS ready at the speech time. However, when co-occurring with sentential le, jiu, like already, encodes the existence of a given state of affairs at reference time ( Michaelis 1992: 321). That is, the change could actually happen before the reference time; all that is required is that the proposition denoted by the sentence holds at the reference time. Accordingly, for jiu, the information that the change happened at the reference time is a conversational implicature, which is cancelable: ( 13) a. Amei BA DIAN jiu zai bangongshi le; Amei eight o clock J be-in office LE Amei has already been in her office (as early as) EIGHT O CLOCK.

11 The particles cai and jiu in Chinese 635 b. Shishishang, ta shi QI DIAN lai de. in-fact she be seven o clock come DE In fact, it was SEVEN O CLOCK that she came (into her office). The sentence with jiu in (13a) is compatible with either Amei came to her office some time earlier than eight, in which the change of state happened before the reference time, or Amei came to her office precisely at eight, in which the change of state happened at the reference time. As the latter is a conversational implicature, it is cancelable by the following sentence in (13b), which asserts that Amei indeed came to her office one hour earlier than the reference time. Second, to signal a change of state in the past, jiu co-occurs with sentential le, whereas cai does not. Compare the following examples in (14) with examples (1a) and (1b). ( 14) a. Lisi SAN DIAN cai hui zai bangongshi. Lisi three o clock C will be-in office Lisi will be in his office only (as late as) THREE O CLOCK. b. Lisi SAN DIAN jiu zai bangongshi. Lisi three o clock J be-in office Lisi will already be in his office (as late as) THREE O CLOCK. Example (1a) shows that cai does not co-occur with sentential le. To express that something is not going to happen until the indicated time in the future, a future temporal expression or a modal verb expressing future is used, together with cai. In (14a) we find modal verb indicating future, hui will. The particle jiu, however, co-occurs with sentential le to denote that something has happened as in (1b). Sentence (1b) with jiu... le expresses that it is expected that Lisi could have been in his office some time later. Without le, a future interpretation is automatically derived as in ( 14b). In fact, without le, jiu cannot describe an event in the past (cf. Li and Thompson 1981). Sentence (15a) is ungrammatical because of the conflict between the temporal expressions zuotian yesterday and the future temporal meaning expressed by jiu. Sentence (15b) is grammatical, however, since mingtian tomorrow is compatible with jiu, which expresses that the change is going to happen soon with respect to the reference time (cf. Li and Thompson 1981: 331) although it is expected alternatively that the change is going to happen at some later time.

12 636 H.-L. Lai ( 15) a. *Lisi zuotian jiu lai. Lisi yesterday J come b. Lisi mingtian jiu lai. Lisi tomorrow J come Lisi will already come (as early as) tomorrow. Obviously, the fact that the coocurrence of jiu... le expresses that something has happened is due to the meaning contribution of sentential le. Hence, their meanings have to be compatible somehow in such a way that they can co-occur. The particle le has attracted quite a lot of attention in the past works. Essentially, previous analyses have focused on whether there should be two le s, a verbal le and a sentential le, as argued by Chao (1968), Li and Thompson (1981), Li et al. (1982), Chu (1983), and Chu and Chang (1987), or one le, as held by Huang and Davis (1989) and Shi (1990). The argument rests on the fact that although le can occur in two positions, namely, verb-finally or sentence-finally, it causes ambiguity when it occurs after a one-syllable verb in the sentence-final position. Although I am not concerned with the possible ambiguity of le, I am particularly interested in sentential le here since both cai and jiu can co-occur with verbal le, but cai cannot co-occur with sentential le whereas jiu can, as given in (16). ( 16) a. Lisi cai xie le yi feng xin (*le). Lisi C write LE one CL letter LE Lisi only wrote a letter. b. Amei jiu xie le san feng xin le. Amei J write LE three CL letter LE Amei has already written three letters. Li et al. (1982: 28) give five categories in which sentential le conveys a currently relevant state (CRS) if the state of affairs it represents (a) is a changed state, (b) corrects a wrong assumption, (c) reports progress so far, (d) determines what will happen next, and (e) is the speaker s total contribution to the conversation at that point. Among them, there is one specific property that is relevant to the discussion in question, namely the so-called excessiveness use of le by Shi (1990) (cf. Chao 1968; Li and Thompson 1981; Li et al. 1982), in which le expresses something that is not part of speaker expectation, as illustrated in the following example: ( 17) Lisi shui zhao le. Lisi sleep asleep LE Lisi has fallen asleep already.

13 The particles cai and jiu in Chinese 637 Assume a scenario in which Lisi had a final exam the next day. Assume also that he had been sitting up for a couple of days preparing for the final exam and he felt exhausted. Although there was an exam the next day, he could not force himself to stay awake and he fell asleep at his desk. Then sentence (17) is uttered by the speaker, with sentential le, to express not only the obtaining of the situation of Lisi s having fallen asleep but also the speaker s surprise at finding that Lisi had fallen asleep. In other words, in cases like (17), sentential le anchors to a reference time, either the speech time or a time specified by a time adverbial, denoting that the proposition holds at the reference time. That is, the change of state happened some time before the reference time, though it was not expected to have happened by then and might have happened some time later than the reference time. The meaning representation of sentential le can be illustrated as in (18). (18) le (w[x])(t): e: " w [ w after t (i.e. "t [t t9w[t ]]) a: " w [ w before t (i.e. w[t]) It is this specific property of sentential le as shown in example (17) that is crucial for the semantic in/compatibility between cai and le vs. jiu and le. As to the other properties of sentential le observed by Li et al., one can speculate that ultimately expectation contradiction may be the more abstract semantic notion that can unify them. Li et al. ( 1982: 25 26) further point out that sentential le cannot be used in the following situations: (a) asserting a general truth, (b) denoting general states or ongoing situations involving no change, (c) expressing a simple assertion of an event that happened in the past, and (d) reporting and expository and scientific writing. One can generalize that the common feature of these different situations is that they presumably do not involve speaker s expectations. Since further discussion will lead too far astray for this paper, I will leave this issue open and come to the in/compatibility between cai and le vs. jiu and le. Given this specific function of sentential le and the meaning distinctions between cai and jiu, we can derive that cai and sentential le do not co-occur whereas jiu and le do. Crucially, for cai, the asserted value is that w is not true until the reference time t; that is, w is not true before t. What le asserts is that w becomes true before t. Since the assertions made by cai and le are not compatible, they cannot co-occur. As for jiu, it asserts that w becomes true either before t or at t, which is consistent with the asserted value of le. Hence, they are compatible and can co-occur.8

14 638 H.-L. Lai So far I have restricted my attention to stative-verb constellations, in which all changes are changes from one state to another, and the new state holds constantly throughout all the time points on the time axis after it obtains until further information is given to the contrary. Can the same framework be extended to account for events, which are different from states insofar as they cannot be said to stay true even within a contextually limited time frame? It turns out that it is not necessary to propose anything particularly to account for different aspectual classes. The semantic effects cai and jiu bring about with them follow from the interaction between their natures and the meanings of the two particles. If w expresses an activity, w already becomes true when the activity starts. Cai and jiu hence focus on the initial point of an activity. With cai, it starts later than expected; with jiu it starts earlier than expected. If w expresses an accomplishment or an achievement, w becomes true only when the end point is reached. With cai, the end point is reached later than expected; with jiu, the end point is reached earlier than expected. If w expresses a semelfactive, w already becomes true when the semelfactive starts. With cai, it starts later, than expected, and with jiu, it starts earlier than expected. The semantic structures of cai and jiu... le in stative-verb constellations can be extended to eventive-verb constellations. The following example illustrates the generalization.9 ( 19) a. Lisi SAN DIAN cai zhaodao tade biao. Lisi three o clock C find his watch Lisi found his watch only (as late as) THREE O CLOCK. b. Lisi LIANG DIAN jiu zhaodao tade biao le. Lisi two o clock J find his watch LE Lisi has already found his watch as early as TWO O CLOCK. The predicate zhaodao tade biao find his watch is an achievement that is an instantaneous event with a single stage and a new situation resulting from the obtaining of the outcome. Due to the meaning contribution of cai, (19a) signals that the change from " Lisi found his watch to Lisi found his watch did not happen until three o clock although the event could have happened earlier. In (19b) with jiu... le, the change from " Lisi found his watch to Lisi found his watch already happened at two o clock although the event could alternatively happen at some time later The restrictive use of cai and jiu The many few effect of cai and jiu. The particles cai and jiu induce parallel implicatures in the restrictive usage in quantity contexts

15 The particles cai and jiu in Chinese 639 that are similar to the ones triggered in the temporal usage.10 In fact, in this usage, the induced scale can be seen as indirectly derived from the temporal scale. Löbner (1989: ) points out the characteristics of this similar use of erst and schon in German: although the focus of the particle is not directly about the reference time, it is about the (numerical ) value of some time-dependent function at the reference time. Also, as in the temporal usage, cai and jiu in the restrictive usage presuppose that there is a change from a negative state to a positive state happening at some point on the scale. Therefore, in either sentence (2a) or (2b), the focus expresses the number of apples required to make him feel full at the reference time. Moreover, a monotone development of the timedependent function is presupposed (Löbner 1989); that is, as time goes on, the number of apples to be eaten by a person increases one after another. In sentences (2a) and (2b), it is eating the third apple at the reference time t that makes him feel full. Therefore, at some time point t that is earlier than t, the number of apples eaten is supposed to be smaller than three. Accordingly, the state of fullness has not been reached yet at t. Furthermore, because of the meaning contributions of cai and jiu, the sentences are associated with different implicatures. Specifically, the quantity three apples is more than expected to make him feel full in (2a), whereas the same amount is less than expected in (2b). In what follows, let us consider whether the developed schemata for the temporal usage of cai and jiu can be applied here to account for the many few effect and the few many effect of the particles in the restrictive usage. As pointed out in (2a) and (2b), cai and jiu focus on the value of a function from time to a value on a numerical scale. The scale indicates the number of apples that makes the change from not feeling full to feeling full. In both cases, the asserted value at which the change happens is three (apples). However, cai and jiu express that the expected number differs from the asserted number. Crucially, in (2a) with cai, which expresses that the change happens later than expected, the asserted number is thus more than the expected alternative number. On the other hand, in (2b) with jiu, which expresses that the change happens earlier than expected, the asserted number is less than expected. The respective diagrams for them are given in (20). The scale illustrated in (20a) or (20b) represents the number of apples. As shown in (20a) for cai, the asserted amount, three, is located farther up on the scale than the expectable alternative amount indicated by p, which is smaller than three. In (20b) with jiu, the alternative amount for the change indicated by p is farther up on the scale than the asserted amount.

16 640 H.-L. Lai (20) a. cai (ta bao x pingguo)(san ge) [x: number of apples] " he full eating x apple he full eating x apple e: CCCCCCCCCCCC CCCCCCCCCCCCA p " he full eating x apple he full eating x apple a: CCCCCCCCCCCCCC CCCCCCCCCCA 3 b. jiu... le (ta bao x pingguo)(san ge) [x: number of apples] " he full eating x apple he full eating x apple e: CCCCCCCCCCCCC CCCCCCCCCCCA p " he full eating x apple he full eating x apple a: CCCCCCCCCCC CCCCCCCCCCCCCA The few many effect of cai and jiu. Contrary to the many few effect just discussed, cai seems to be associated with the implicature less than expected while jiu seems to be associated with the implicature more than expected, as shown in the following examples: ( 21) a. Zhangsan cai chi le san ge pingguo. Zhangsan C eat LE three CL apple Zhangsan ate only three apples so far. b. (Cai wu fengzhong), Lisi jiu chi san ge pingguo le.11 only five minute Lisi J eat three CL apple LE (In only five minutes), Lisi has already eaten five apples. Imagine a scenario in which Zhangsan likes apples a lot. This time for some reason, he did not eat as many as he usually did. Hence the speaker uses cai in (21a) to express that three apples is an amount that is less than the speaker expected Zhangsan should have eaten. Imagine that Lisi was extremely hungry after working for a long time. In only five minutes, he swallowed down three apples, which normally takes a person longer than five minutes to eat. In other words, in as short a time as five minutes, three apples is more than the speaker would expect a person to eat. Hence jiu is used in (21b) to denote more than expected. Apparently, cai is associated with contrastive evaluations in (2a) and (21a), respectively and so is jiu in (2b) and (21b), respectively. Could the account for (2a) and (2b) be applied to (21a) and (21b)? I argue that in example (21a) and example (21b), cai and jiu focus on the reference time. Hence, given monotonic mapping between time and number, the speaker

17 The particles cai and jiu in Chinese 641 expected that the number of apples that Zhangsan would have eaten was more than three at the reference time since cai implies later than expected. But the real situation turns out that the amount was three. Hence, corresponding to the expected number, the actual number of apples eaten by Zhangsan was smaller. The implicature he ate fewer apples than expected is hence derived. The situation is opposite in (21b). In this case, the time for three apples to have been eaten by Lisi happened earlier than the speaker expected it should have been since jiu implies earlier than expected. Again, assuming monotonic development, the number of apples to have been eaten at the reference time was expected to be smaller. Hence, the asserted number was more than expected. The contrast between (21a) and (21b) can be diagrammed as follows: (22) a. cai (Zhangsan chi-le san ge pingguo)(r) [r: reference time] " Zhangsan ate 3 apples at x Zhangsan ate 3 apples at x e: DCCCCCCCCCCCCC DCCCCCCCCCCCA t " Zhangsan ate 3 apples at x Zhangsan ate 3 apples at x a: CCCCCCCCCCCCCCC CCCCCCCCCCA r b. jiu... le (Lisi chi san ge pingguo)(r) [r: reference time] " Lisi ate 3 apples at x Lisi ate 3 apples at x e: CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC CCCCCCCCCA t " Lisi ate 3 apples at x Lisi ate 3 apples at x a: CCCCCCCCCCCC CCCCCCCCCCCCCA r Discrepancy cases of cai and jiu. In addition to association with time-related scales, jiu differs from cai in a very important aspect: while cai is always directly or indirectly related to time, jiu can induce either a temporal or nontemporal scale. The peculiar asymmetric relationship between cai and jiu has puzzled previous researchers. In particular, they fail to notice the impact on the meaning of the sentence brought about by the interaction of jiu and sentential le and hence fail to appropriately account for the seemingly different semantic behavior exhibited by jiu. More precisely, when jiu co-occurs with sentential le, the temporal function of le overrides the nontemporal function of jiu; hence the scale induced by jiu... le is always time-related, as shown in the above

18 642 H.-L. Lai examples. But, without sentential le, jiu allows for a scale that is not related to time. Contrast the following examples. ( 23) a. Lisi cai chi le san ge pingguo. Lisi C eat LE three CL apple Lisi only ate three apples so far. b. Lisi jiu chi le SAN GE pingguo. Lisi J eat LE three CL apple Lisi only ate THREE APPLES. Unlike (23a) with cai, which induces a temporal scale as discussed, the scale induced by jiu in (23b) is a numerical one, namely the number of apples being eaten by Lisi. The asserted value is the maximal value in such a way that all values larger than that are excluded. An exhaustive interpretation is needed in this sentence. In other words, in (23b), it is asserted that Lisi ate no more and no less than three apples, but alternatively Lisi could have eaten more (apples) than three. Observe the following representation. (24) jiu (Lisi chi le x pingguo) (san ge) [x: number of apples] e: " [i(lisi ate x apples)=3]9 Zp [3<p 9 [i(lisi ate x apples)=p] a: i(lisi ate x apples)=3 " i(lisi ate x apples)=p " i(lisi ate x apples)=p e: CCCCCCCCCCCCCC CCCCCCCCCCCA p " i(lisi ate x apples)=3 " i(lisi ate x apples)=3 a: CCCCCCCCCCCCC CCCCCCCCCCCCA 3 ( i(lisi ate x apples)=3 As indicated in the diagram, the same semantic structure as in the temporal use or time-dependent use is maintained for jiu, only that the relevant dimension is number (of apples) being eaten. The expectation contradiction comes from the comparison of the alternative value indicated by p with the asserted value three. Hence jiu expresses that the asserted value is fewer than expected. The representation also shows that the sentence holds only at the asserted value, not before or after the asserted value. To support the generalization of the difference between cai and jiu, I will provide two more pairs of examples, given below.

19 The particles cai and jiu in Chinese 643 ( 25) a. Amin cai mai le chezi, fengzi hai mei mai. Amin C buy LE car house still NEG buy Amin only bought a car so far, he didn t buy a house yet. b. Amin jiu mai le CHEZI, fengzi hai mei mai. Amin J buy LE car house still NEG buy Amin only bought A CAR; he didn t buy a house yet. ( 26) a. *Lisi cai xihuan Amei, bu xihuan bieren. Lisi C like Amei NEG like anyone else Lisi likes only Amei so far; he doesn t like anyone else. b. Lisi jiu xihuan AMEI, bu xihuan bieren. Lisi J like Amei NEG like anyone else Lisi likes only AMEI; he doesn t like anyone else. The previous literature has problems in particular in accounting for the peculiar behavior of cai in sentence (25a) since their generalization about cai is that it has to be associated with a quantified object (Biq 1984, 1988; Paris 1985). It is obvious that the focused item is not a quantified object, but the reference time in (25a). Specifically, in (25a) it is asserted that Amin only bought a car and nothing else so far, but it is expected that his buying a car should have happened some time earlier in such a way that at the reference time, he could have bought a house as well. Thus the generalization that cai is always associated with a directly or indirectly time-related scale workswellwiththisexample astimegoesby,presumablythingsaperson is capable of buying are supposed to add up. As for jiu in (25b), the asserted value is the maximal value and all other values higher than the asserted one are excluded in satisfying the open sentence. That is, in (25b), it is asserted that Amin bought a car and nothing else, but it is expected that alternatively he could have bought more than a car, such as a house as well, as indicated in the follow-up context. Again, instead of the time-dependent scale, the scale induced by jiu in (25b) is the things that Amin bought. Jiu hence expresses less than expected in such cases. In short, the exact same representations for the temporal usage are constructed for cai and jiu in the restrictive usage to account for the many few effectaswellasthefew manyeffect associated with them. In the restrictive usage, the temporal scale and the reference time point might be replaced by a numerical scale that is a time-dependent function and can be seen as indirectly temporally ordered (cf. Löbner 1989). The discrepancy cases between cai and jiu are accounted for by the fact that cai always induces a time-related scale while jiu can induce either a temporal or a nontemporal scale. The contrast between examples (26a) and (26b) again clearly illustrates the point. Presumably Lisi s liking Amei and Lisi s liking someone else are not related to each other temporally. Since no temporally related

20 644 H.-L. Lai ordering is involved between the alternatives, cai is not compatible with the meaning of the sentence and hence (26a) is not acceptable The conditionals vs. cai and jiu Protases as topics. In addition to the temporal and the restrictive uses, cai and jiu may occur in a conditional construction where cai or jiu contributes a different function to the apodosis. Although it seems that no prototypical conditional constructions can be identified in Mandarin, there is indeed a syntactic structure that has, among others, a conditional interpretation. Haiman (1978) argues that conditionals ( protases) in many languages such as English, Japanese, Mandarin Chinese, and Hua, among others, are topics (cf. also Akatsuka 1986). In fact, Tsao (1990), following Chao (1968), proposes that in Mandarin Chinese, conditional clauses, just like time, concession, and reason clauses, should be analyzed as topics by providing several pieces of evidence. I will follow Tsao s analysis of the protasis of a conditional construction as a topic and will pursue the relationship between the conditional construction and the particles cai and jiu. Furthermore, in the logical analysis of conditionals, it has been remarked since Lewis (1975: 11) that if clauses have no separate meaning but restrict an adverbial quantifier like always:...the if of our restrictive if-clauses should not be regarded as a sentential connective. It has no meaning apart from the adverbs it restricts. The restrictive function can indeed be seen as a topic function. Partee (1991: 163 [5]) gives the following basic tripartite structure to generalize the correlation among a number of syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic structures (cf. also von Fintel 1994): (27) S Operator Restrictor Nuclear scope always if clause main clause topic comment focus frame focus....

21 The particles cai and jiu in Chinese 645 Just like the correlation between topic and comment, the if clause performs a restricting function on the main clause. In the conditional construction in Mandarin, however, the particle cai or jiu is associated with the protasis. This phenomenon seems to provide an apparent counterexample to the structure in (27). I will come back to this issue on the association of the protasis later. If the protasis of a conditional construction is some kind of topic, the semantic contribution that a protasis makes to a conditional construction should be compatible with its being a topic. Furthermore, since in general the protasis sets up a condition for the apodosis, there must be some kind of dependent link between them. More precisely, the nature of protases is to provide potentially infinite lists of information in such a way that they compose the framework for the fulfillment of the apodoses (cf. Haiman 1978; Chafe 1976). Stalnaker ( 1975: ), quoted in Haiman (1978: 580), suggests that a conditional clause add[s] the antecedent to our stock of knowledge and beliefs and then consider[s] whether or not the consequent is true. That is, the antecedent is added only temporarily just for the content of the consequent. This interpretation of the role of the protasis has an interesting pragmatic consequence. The protasis specifies the condition under which the apodosis is said to hold. Hence the weaker the protasis is, the stronger the overall statement. Conditionals are understood as containing a universal quantifier always that quantifies over possible worlds if they do not have overt quantifiers. The quantifier always is downward-entailing on its restrictor, hence weakening the restrictor and strengthening the overall statement.12 The strongest statement is the one without the protasis. Now, according to the Gricean maxim of quantity (Grice 1975), a speaker should make the strongest statement possible out of a definable class of statements. Why then would he pick up a conditional construction to weaken her/his statement? Consider the examples. ( 28) a. John will go jogging tomorrow. b. If tomorrow is Sunday, John will go jogging. c. If tomorrow is Sunday, and if the weather is nice, John will go jogging. If the speaker knows that tomorrow is Sunday, s/he will rather utter (28a); hence utterance of (28b) implicates that the speaker does not know that tomorrow is Sunday. Likewise, if the speaker knows that tomorrow is Sunday and the weather will be nice, he will rather utter (28a); hence utterance of (28c) implicates that the speaker does not know that tomorrow is Sunday and the weather will be nice. By adding more information

22 646 H.-L. Lai to the protasis, he makes the whole statement even weaker. In general, the more information the protasis provides, the weaker the whole statement of a conditional construction. We can have the following generalization according to downward monotonicity: (29) If w w and if w then Q, then if w then Q More precisely, conditionals can be seen as related to alternative protases that are informationally ordered. Crucially, all the alternative protases form a partially ordered set according to their informativeness. The lower a protasis is in that order, that is, the less information it provides, the stronger (the more informative) the conditional statement is. Furthermore, as soon as a lower proposition contains enough information to satisfy the apodosis, so does every information state along the same path, where more specific information is provided due to the downwardentailing property of conditionals illustrated above (cf. Ladusaw 1979; Landman 1991). The idea of path can be illustrated as follows: (30) path: $CCC$ p p 1 2 less specific information more specific information if p then q [ if p then q, as p is more specific than p Let us assume the following information structure for possible protases for (29). (31) w 1 w 1 mw 2 w 2 w 1 mw 2 mw 3 w 3 As indicated in (31), w 1 is a lower and hence a stronger condition, as it provides less information to satisfy the apodosis, compared with w 1 9 w 2, and w 1 9 w 2 9 w 3.Ifw 1 contains enough information to make the apodosis true, so do w 1 9 w 2 and w 1 9 w 2 9 w 3, where more information is provided. Hence the corresponding conditionals, if w 1 9 w 2 then Q and if w 1 9 w 2 9 w 3 then Q, are weaker than if w 1 then Q.13

23 The particles cai and jiu in Chinese Association with protasis of cai and jiu. So far I have made two claims about conditionals in Mandarin: (i) protases are topics; (ii) protases entail a partially ordered set of alternatives that are ordered according to their informativeness. Now how does the particle cai or jiu interact with conditionals? Remember that without an overt conditional marker, a pair of clauses may have other possible relations than a conditional one. Li and Thompson ( 1981) suggest that the dependence between a pair of clauses may be established either by the speaker s intention, which can be recognized in the context, or by a specific linking element such as particles. They mention cai and jiu as two among a few so-called backward-linking adverbs that relate the clause in which they occur to the speaker s previous clauses (1981: 655). A conditional relation, among others, is expressed when cai or jiu occurs. In addition to this observation, there is one more peculiarity of this construction that they do not mention: cai or jiu may be related to different alternative sets of propositions created by the focus in the protasis. Cai contributes the protasis as a necessary condition to the apodosis whereas jiu contributes the protasis as a sufficient condition to the apodosis. In this section, I will discuss the association of the particles with the protasis, and in the subsequent sections, I will discuss the association of cai with necessary conditions and the association of jiu with sufficient conditions. To see how cai and jiu can be related to different sets of alternative propositions created by different foci of sentences, consider the following batches of examples. (32) a. LISI LAI, wo cai qu. Lisi come I C go I ll go only if LISI COMES. b. LISI LAI, wo jiu qu. Lisi come I J go I ll go if LISI COMES. ( 33) a. LISI lai, wo cai qu. Lisi come I C go I ll go only if LISI comes. b. LISI lai, wo jiu qu. Lisi come I J go I ll go if LISI comes. ( 34) a. XINGQITIAN, Lisi cai qu manpao. Sunday Lisi C go jog Lisi goes jogging only if IT IS SUNDAY.

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