A Survey of Computational Assumptions on Bilinear and Multilinear Maps. Allison Bishop IEX and Columbia University

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "A Survey of Computational Assumptions on Bilinear and Multilinear Maps. Allison Bishop IEX and Columbia University"

Transcription

1 A Survey of Computational Assumptions on Bilinear and Multilinear Maps Allison Bishop IEX and Columbia University

2 Group Basics There are two kinds of people in this world. Those who like additive group notation, and those who like multiplicative group notation. inefficient: discrete log?? efficient: group operation identity test

3 Bilinear Groups efficient:

4 When Faced with a New Group Assumption: Is it secret? Is it safe? Is it useful? Is it needed?

5 Kinds of Assumptions Generic group models q-type assumptions static assumptions Variants: Symmetric/Asymetric Composite Order/ Prime Order Linear/ Bilinear/ MultiLinear

6 Kinds of Proof Techniques Brute Force Cancelation Encoding Dual System Deja Q basic generic group arguments BB IBE G06, W 05 W09, LW10, LOSTW10, CM14, W16

7 Billinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption Symmetric group: Given: Distinguish:

8 SXDH Assumption Asymmetric group: Given: Distinguish:

9 A Basic q-type Assumption Symmetric group: Given: Distinguish:

10 A Driving Example: IBE Decryption:

11 Arguing Generic Security Look at exponents you are given in G: Look at the blinding factor: All you can do is take linear combinations of degree at most 2

12 Proof Challenges Beyond Generic Security Hard Problem Simulator Attacker Simulator must balance two competing goals: answer attacker queries leverage attacker success

13 Arguing Selective Security - Embed the challenge as a function of known ID* Given: Distinguish: Choose then Simulator can produce key for any ID not equal to ID*!

14 How to Leverage a q-type Assumption [example from W05] What if we don t want to fix ID* ahead of time? Can t make Keys the simulator can make To partition small PP with parameter q: Use a q-size assumption!

15 Simulation Techniques Deja Q [CM13,W16] q-type Dual pairing vector spaces [OT08,OT09,] Composite Order Subgroup Decision SXDH/DLIN *These arrows are partial and not transitive!

16 Composite Order Bilinear Groups How the pairing operates: a c d E b f ab df

17 Subgroup Decision Assumptions in Composite Order Bilinear Groups Example: Given Distinguish from

18 Subgroup Decision in a Multilinear Group? Here s what it might look like in a 3-linear group: Given Distinguish from

19 Deja Q Basic Example r 1 a r 1 a r 1 a r 1 a 2 r 1 a 3 Subgroup decision r 1 a 2 r 1 a 2 r 1 a 3 r 1 a 3 r 1 a q r 1 a q r 1 a q

20 Deja Q Basic Example Mod p Mod q r 1 a r 1 a r 1 a 2 r 1 a 2 r 1 a 3 r 1 a 3 Chinese Remainder Theorem Mod p Mod q r 1 a t 1 b r 1 a 2 t 1 b 2 r 1 a 3 t 1 b 3 r 1 a q r 1 a q r 1 a q t 1 b q

21 Deja Q Basic Example Mod p Mod q Mod p Mod q r 1 a t 1 b 1 r 1 a 2 t 1 b 1 2 r 1 a 3 t 1 b 1 3 Subgroup Decision + Chinese Remainder Theorem r 1 a t 1 b 1 + t 2 b 2 r 1 a 2 t 1 b 12 + t 2 b 2 2 r 1 a 3 t 1 b t 2 b 2 3 r 1 a q t 1 b 1 q r 1 a q t 1 b 1 q + t 2 b 2 q

22 Deja Q Basic Example r 1 a Mod p Mod q t 1 b 1 + t 2 b t q b q Subgroup Decision + Chinese Remainder Theorem Subgroup Decision + Chinese Remainder Theorem r 1 a 2 t 1 b 12 + t 2 b t q b q 2 r 1 a 3 t 1 b t 2 b t q b q 3 r 1 a q t 1 b 1 q + t 2 b 2 q + + t q b q q

23 Deja Q Basic Example b 1 b q b 1 q b q q t 1 t q = Uniformly random Mod q Full rank

24 Deja Q Basic Example r 1 a Mod p Mod q t 1 b 1 + t 2 b t q b q z 1 r 1 a 2 t 1 b 12 + t 2 b t q b q 2 r 1 a 3 t 1 b t 2 b t q b q 3 Identically Distributed to z 2 z 3 z 3 r 1 a q t 1 b 1 q + t 2 b 2 q + + t q b q q z q

25 Dual Pairing Vector Spaces b 2 b 1 Emulates some features of composite order, asymmetric group: E r s t z rs tz

26 Emulating Subgroup Decision using SXDH Asymmetric group: Given: Distinguish:

27 Dual System Using Subgroup Assumptions for Functional Encryption [W09 + too many to cite*] Most Basic Template: PP: CT: SK: Unconstrained by PP! SF CT: SF SK:

28 Using Subgroup Assumptions for Obfuscation [GBSW 15] Reduction will isolate each input. Main idea: Have poly many parallel obfuscations, C 0 C 0 C 1 each responsible for a bucket of inputs Hybrid Type 1: Allocate/Transfer inputs among different buckets, but programs do not change at all. Assumption used here. Hybrid Type 2: When one bucket only has a single isolated input, then apply Kilian and change the program. Information-theoretic / No Assumption needed.

29 Ok, So what are these buckets really like? Matrix Branching Programs Simple example: [Barrington, Want implement: GGHRSW] F(x Oblivious 1 x 2 ) = XOR( Matrix x 1, xbranching 2 ) Program for F: n-bit input x=x 1 x 2 x n (e.g. n=3 here) 2k invertible matrices over Z N æ 1 0 ö æ M Evaluation 1,0 = ç on x: M 1,1 = ç è 0 1 ø è ì ï Õ = í M i,x(i mod n) I if F(x) = 0 æ i=1...k 1 0 ö B if æ îï F(x) 0 =1 1 ö M Where 2,0 = ç B is fixed matrix M 2,1 = I ç over Z è 0 1 ø è 1 0 N ø ö ø M 1, 0 M 1, 1 M 2, 0 M 2, 1 M 3, 0 M 3, 1 M 4, 0 M 4, 1 æ 0 1 ö B = ç è 1 0 ø [Barrington]: All log-depth (NC 1 ) circuits have poly-size Matrix Branching Programs M k, 0 M k, 1

30 Kilian Simulation Towards Obfuscation Oblivious Matrix Branching Program for F: n-bit input x=x 1 x 2 x n 2k invertible matrices over Z N Evaluation on x: ì ï Õ M i,x(i mod n) = í îï i=1...k (e.g. n=3 here) I if F(x) = 0 B if F(x) =1 Where B is fixed matrix I over Z N Kilian Randomization: Chose R 1,, R k-1 random over Z N Kilian shows that for each x, can statistically simulate M x matrices knowing only product. ~ ~ ~ M 1, 0 M 1, 1 ~ ~ M 2, 0 M 2, 1 ~ ~ M 3, 0 M 3, 1 ~ ~ M 4, 0 M 4, 1 ~ ~ M k, 0 M k, 1

31 Hybrids Intuition C 0 C 0 C 0 ~ M 1, 1 ~ M 1, 0 ~ M 1, 1 ~ ~ M 2, 0 M 2, 1 ~ ~ M 2, 0 M 2, 1 ~ M 2, 0 ~ ~ M 3, 0 M 3, 1 ~ ~ M 3, 0 M 3, 1 ~ M 3, 0 ~ ~ M 4, 0 M 4, 1 ~ ~ M 4, 0 M 4, 1 ~ M 4, 1 ~ ~ M k, 0 M k, 1 ~ ~ M k, 0 M k, 1 ~ M k, 0

Instantiating the Dual System Encryption Methodology in Bilinear Groups

Instantiating the Dual System Encryption Methodology in Bilinear Groups Instantiating the Dual System Encryption Methodology in Bilinear Groups Allison Lewko joint work with Brent Waters Motivation classical public key cryptography: Alice Bob Eve Motivation functional encryption:

More information

Converting Pairing-Based Cryptosystems from Composite-Order Groups to Prime-Order Groups

Converting Pairing-Based Cryptosystems from Composite-Order Groups to Prime-Order Groups Converting Pairing-Based Cryptosystems from Composite-Order Groups to Prime-Order Groups David Mandell Freeman Stanford University, USA Eurocrypt 2010 Monaco, Monaco 31 May 2010 David Mandell Freeman (Stanford)

More information

Projective Arithmetic Functional Encryption. and. Indistinguishability Obfuscation (io) from Degree-5 Multilinear maps

Projective Arithmetic Functional Encryption. and. Indistinguishability Obfuscation (io) from Degree-5 Multilinear maps Projective Arithmetic Functional Encryption and Indistinguishability Obfuscation (io) from Degree-5 Multilinear maps Prabhanjan Ananth Amit Sahai Constructions of io All current constructions of io are

More information

Lecture 7: Boneh-Boyen Proof & Waters IBE System

Lecture 7: Boneh-Boyen Proof & Waters IBE System CS395T Advanced Cryptography 2/0/2009 Lecture 7: Boneh-Boyen Proof & Waters IBE System Instructor: Brent Waters Scribe: Ioannis Rouselakis Review Last lecture we discussed about the Boneh-Boyen IBE system,

More information

Indistinguishability Obfuscation from the Multilinear Subgroup Elimination Assumption

Indistinguishability Obfuscation from the Multilinear Subgroup Elimination Assumption Indistinguishability Obfuscation from the Multilinear Subgroup Elimination Assumption Craig Gentry Allison ewko Amit Sahai Brent Waters November 4, 2014 Abstract We revisit the question of constructing

More information

14 Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement

14 Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement 14 Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement 14.1 Cyclic Groups Definition 14.1 Example Let д Z n. Define д n = {д i % n i Z}, the set of all powers of д reduced mod n. Then д is called a generator of д n, and д n

More information

Dual System Encryption: Realizing Fully Secure IBE and HIBE under Simple Assumptions

Dual System Encryption: Realizing Fully Secure IBE and HIBE under Simple Assumptions Dual System Encryption: Realizing Fully Secure IBE and HIBE under Simple Assumptions Brent Waters University of Texas at Austin Abstract We present a new methodology for proving security of encryption

More information

Lecture 17 - Diffie-Hellman key exchange, pairing, Identity-Based Encryption and Forward Security

Lecture 17 - Diffie-Hellman key exchange, pairing, Identity-Based Encryption and Forward Security Lecture 17 - Diffie-Hellman key exchange, pairing, Identity-Based Encryption and Forward Security Boaz Barak November 21, 2007 Cyclic groups and discrete log A group G is cyclic if there exists a generator

More information

Tools for Simulating Features of Composite Order Bilinear Groups in the Prime Order Setting

Tools for Simulating Features of Composite Order Bilinear Groups in the Prime Order Setting Tools for Simulating Features of Composite Order Bilinear Groups in the Prime Order Setting Allison Lewko The University of Texas at Austin alewko@csutexasedu Abstract In this paper, we explore a general

More information

Fully Homomorphic Encryption and Bootstrapping

Fully Homomorphic Encryption and Bootstrapping Fully Homomorphic Encryption and Bootstrapping Craig Gentry and Shai Halevi June 3, 2014 China Summer School on Lattices and Cryptography Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) A FHE scheme can evaluate unbounded

More information

Fully-secure Key Policy ABE on Prime-Order Bilinear Groups

Fully-secure Key Policy ABE on Prime-Order Bilinear Groups Fully-secure Key Policy ABE on Prime-Order Bilinear Groups Luke Kowalczyk, Jiahui Liu, Kailash Meiyappan Abstract We present a Key-Policy ABE scheme that is fully-secure under the Decisional Linear Assumption.

More information

Function-Hiding Inner Product Encryption

Function-Hiding Inner Product Encryption Function-Hiding Inner Product Encryption Allison Bishop Columbia University allison@cs.columbia.edu Abhishek Jain Johns Hopkins University abhishek@cs.jhu.edu Lucas Kowalczyk Columbia University luke@cs.columbia.edu

More information

On Kilian s Randomization of Multilinear Map Encodings

On Kilian s Randomization of Multilinear Map Encodings On Kilian s Randomization of Multilinear Map Encodings Jean-Sébastien Coron and Hilder V. L. Pereira University of Luxembourg November 20, 2018 Abstract. Indistinguishability obfuscation constructions

More information

Obfuscation and Weak Multilinear Maps

Obfuscation and Weak Multilinear Maps Obfuscation and Weak Multilinear Maps Mark Zhandry Princeton University Joint work with Saikrishna Badrinarayanan, Sanjam Garg, Eric Miles, Pratyay Mukherjee, Amit Sahai, Akshayaram Srinivasan Obfuscation

More information

CPSC 467b: Cryptography and Computer Security

CPSC 467b: Cryptography and Computer Security CPSC 467b: Cryptography and Computer Security Michael J. Fischer Lecture 11 February 21, 2013 CPSC 467b, Lecture 11 1/27 Discrete Logarithm Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange ElGamal Key Agreement Primitive Roots

More information

Unbounded HIBE and Attribute-Based Encryption

Unbounded HIBE and Attribute-Based Encryption Unbounded HIBE and ttribute-based Encryption llison Lewko University of Texas at ustin alewko@cs.utexas.edu Brent Waters University of Texas at ustin bwaters@cs.utexas.edu bstract In this work, we present

More information

Open problems in lattice-based cryptography

Open problems in lattice-based cryptography University of Auckland, New Zealand Plan Goal: Highlight some hot topics in cryptography, and good targets for mathematical cryptanalysis. Approximate GCD Homomorphic encryption NTRU and Ring-LWE Multi-linear

More information

Advanced Cryptography 03/06/2007. Lecture 8

Advanced Cryptography 03/06/2007. Lecture 8 Advanced Cryptography 03/06/007 Lecture 8 Lecturer: Victor Shoup Scribe: Prashant Puniya Overview In this lecture, we will introduce the notion of Public-Key Encryption. We will define the basic notion

More information

Cryptography CS 555. Topic 22: Number Theory/Public Key-Cryptography

Cryptography CS 555. Topic 22: Number Theory/Public Key-Cryptography Cryptography CS 555 Topic 22: Number Theory/Public Key-Cryptography 1 Exam Recap 2 Exam Recap Highest Average Score on Question Question 4: (Feistel Network with round function f(x) = 0 n ) Tougher Questions

More information

Lecture 17: Constructions of Public-Key Encryption

Lecture 17: Constructions of Public-Key Encryption COM S 687 Introduction to Cryptography October 24, 2006 Lecture 17: Constructions of Public-Key Encryption Instructor: Rafael Pass Scribe: Muthu 1 Secure Public-Key Encryption In the previous lecture,

More information

5.4 ElGamal - definition

5.4 ElGamal - definition 5.4 ElGamal - definition In this section we define the ElGamal encryption scheme. Next to RSA it is the most important asymmetric encryption scheme. Recall that for a cyclic group G, an element g G is

More information

TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITEIT EINDHOVEN Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science Exam Cryptology, Tuesday 30 October 2018

TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITEIT EINDHOVEN Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science Exam Cryptology, Tuesday 30 October 2018 Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science Exam Cryptology, Tuesday 30 October 2018 Name : TU/e student number : Exercise 1 2 3 4 5 total points Notes: Please hand in all sheets at the end of the exam.

More information

Lemma 1.2. (1) If p is prime, then ϕ(p) = p 1. (2) If p q are two primes, then ϕ(pq) = (p 1)(q 1).

Lemma 1.2. (1) If p is prime, then ϕ(p) = p 1. (2) If p q are two primes, then ϕ(pq) = (p 1)(q 1). 1 Background 1.1 The group of units MAT 3343, APPLIED ALGEBRA, FALL 2003 Handout 3: The RSA Cryptosystem Peter Selinger Let (R, +, ) be a ring. Then R forms an abelian group under addition. R does not

More information

Lecture Notes, Week 6

Lecture Notes, Week 6 YALE UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE CPSC 467b: Cryptography and Computer Security Week 6 (rev. 3) Professor M. J. Fischer February 15 & 17, 2005 1 RSA Security Lecture Notes, Week 6 Several

More information

Background: Lattices and the Learning-with-Errors problem

Background: Lattices and the Learning-with-Errors problem Background: Lattices and the Learning-with-Errors problem China Summer School on Lattices and Cryptography, June 2014 Starting Point: Linear Equations Easy to solve a linear system of equations A s = b

More information

Dual System Encryption via Doubly Selective Security: Framework, Fully-secure Functional Encryption for Regular Languages, and More

Dual System Encryption via Doubly Selective Security: Framework, Fully-secure Functional Encryption for Regular Languages, and More Dual System Encryption via Doubly Selective Security: Framework, Fully-secure Functional Encryption for Regular Languages, and More Nuttapong Attrapadung (Nuts) AIST, Japan @Eurocrypt 2014, Copenhagen

More information

RSA. Ramki Thurimella

RSA. Ramki Thurimella RSA Ramki Thurimella Public-Key Cryptography Symmetric cryptography: same key is used for encryption and decryption. Asymmetric cryptography: different keys used for encryption and decryption. Public-Key

More information

Discrete Logarithm Problem

Discrete Logarithm Problem Discrete Logarithm Problem Finite Fields The finite field GF(q) exists iff q = p e for some prime p. Example: GF(9) GF(9) = {a + bi a, b Z 3, i 2 = i + 1} = {0, 1, 2, i, 1+i, 2+i, 2i, 1+2i, 2+2i} Addition:

More information

Efficient Selective Identity-Based Encryption Without Random Oracles

Efficient Selective Identity-Based Encryption Without Random Oracles Efficient Selective Identity-Based Encryption Without Random Oracles Dan Boneh Xavier Boyen March 21, 2011 Abstract We construct two efficient Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) systems that admit selectiveidentity

More information

5199/IOC5063 Theory of Cryptology, 2014 Fall

5199/IOC5063 Theory of Cryptology, 2014 Fall 5199/IOC5063 Theory of Cryptology, 2014 Fall Homework 2 Reference Solution 1. This is about the RSA common modulus problem. Consider that two users A and B use the same modulus n = 146171 for the RSA encryption.

More information

Identity-based Hierarchical Key-insulated Encryption without Random Oracles

Identity-based Hierarchical Key-insulated Encryption without Random Oracles Identity-based Hierarchica Key-insuated Encryption without Random Oraces Yohei Watanabe 1,3 Junji Shikata 1,2 1 Graduate Schoo of Environment and Information Sciences, YNU, Japan 2 Institute of Advanced

More information

Evidence that the Diffie-Hellman Problem is as Hard as Computing Discrete Logs

Evidence that the Diffie-Hellman Problem is as Hard as Computing Discrete Logs Evidence that the Diffie-Hellman Problem is as Hard as Computing Discrete Logs Jonah Brown-Cohen 1 Introduction The Diffie-Hellman protocol was one of the first methods discovered for two people, say Alice

More information

CONSTRUCTIONS SECURE AGAINST RECEIVER SELECTIVE OPENING AND CHOSEN CIPHERTEXT ATTACKS

CONSTRUCTIONS SECURE AGAINST RECEIVER SELECTIVE OPENING AND CHOSEN CIPHERTEXT ATTACKS CONSRUCIONS SECURE AGAINS RECEIVER SELECIVE OPENING AND CHOSEN CIPHEREX AACKS Dingding Jia, Xianhui Lu, Bao Li jiadingding@iie.ac.cn C-RSA 2017 02-17 Outline Background Motivation Our contribution Existence:

More information

Converting Pairing-Based Cryptosystems from Composite-Order Groups to Prime-Order Groups

Converting Pairing-Based Cryptosystems from Composite-Order Groups to Prime-Order Groups Converting Pairing-Based Cryptosystems from Composite-Order Groups to Prime-Order Groups David Mandell Freeman CWI and Universiteit Leiden freeman@cwi.nl Abstract. We develop an abstract framework that

More information

Obfuscation without Multilinear Maps

Obfuscation without Multilinear Maps Obfuscation without Multilinear Maps Dingfeng Ye Peng Liu DCS Center Cyber Security Lab nstitute of nformation Engineering College of nformation Sciences and Technology Chinese Academy of Sciences Pennsylvania

More information

A Profitable Sub-Prime Loan: Obtaining the Advantages of Composite Order in Prime-Order Bilinear Groups

A Profitable Sub-Prime Loan: Obtaining the Advantages of Composite Order in Prime-Order Bilinear Groups Full version of an extended abstract published in Proceedings of PKC 2015, Springer-Verlag, 2015. Available from the IACR Cryptology eprint Archive as Report 2013/300. A Profitable Sub-Prime Loan: Obtaining

More information

Identity Based Encryption

Identity Based Encryption Bilinear Pairings in Cryptography: Identity Based Encryption Dan Boneh Stanford University Recall: Pub-Key Encryption (PKE) PKE Three algorithms : (G, E, D) G(λ) (pk,sk) outputs pub-key and secret-key

More information

Huijia (Rachel) Lin UCSB Partial Joint work with Stefano Tessaro

Huijia (Rachel) Lin UCSB Partial Joint work with Stefano Tessaro Indistinguishability Obfuscation from Low-Degree Multilinear Maps and (Blockwise) Local PRGs [Lin16b, LT17, To appear, Crypto 17] Huijia (Rachel) Lin UCSB Partial Joint work with Stefano Tessaro Circuit

More information

New Proof Methods for Attribute-Based Encryption: Achieving Full Security through Selective Techniques

New Proof Methods for Attribute-Based Encryption: Achieving Full Security through Selective Techniques New Proof Methods for Attribute-Based Encryption: Achieving Full Security through Selective Techniques Allison Lewko University of Texas at Austin alewko@cs.utexas.edu Brent Waters University of Texas

More information

2. Cryptography 2.5. ElGamal cryptosystems and Discrete logarithms

2. Cryptography 2.5. ElGamal cryptosystems and Discrete logarithms CRYPTOGRAPHY 19 Cryptography 5 ElGamal cryptosystems and Discrete logarithms Definition Let G be a cyclic group of order n and let α be a generator of G For each A G there exists an uniue 0 a n 1 such

More information

Single-Database Private Information Retrieval

Single-Database Private Information Retrieval MTAT.07.006 Research Seminar in Cryptography 07.11.2005 Tartu University a g@ut.ee 1 Overview of the Lecture CMS - first single database private information retrieval scheme Gentry-Ramzan PBR Lipmaa Oblivious

More information

Foundations. P =! NP oneway function signature schemes Trapdoor oneway function PKC, IBS IBE

Foundations. P =! NP oneway function signature schemes Trapdoor oneway function PKC, IBS IBE Foundations P =! NP oneway function signature schemes Trapdoor oneway function PKC, IBS IBE NP problems: IF, DL, Knapsack Hardness of these problems implies the security of cryptosytems? 2 Relations of

More information

Lecture 9 Julie Staub Avi Dalal Abheek Anand Gelareh Taban. 1 Introduction. 2 Background. CMSC 858K Advanced Topics in Cryptography February 24, 2004

Lecture 9 Julie Staub Avi Dalal Abheek Anand Gelareh Taban. 1 Introduction. 2 Background. CMSC 858K Advanced Topics in Cryptography February 24, 2004 CMSC 858K Advanced Topics in Cryptography February 24, 2004 Lecturer: Jonathan Katz Lecture 9 Scribe(s): Julie Staub Avi Dalal Abheek Anand Gelareh Taban 1 Introduction In previous lectures, we constructed

More information

L7. Diffie-Hellman (Key Exchange) Protocol. Rocky K. C. Chang, 5 March 2015

L7. Diffie-Hellman (Key Exchange) Protocol. Rocky K. C. Chang, 5 March 2015 L7. Diffie-Hellman (Key Exchange) Protocol Rocky K. C. Chang, 5 March 2015 1 Outline The basic foundation: multiplicative group modulo prime The basic Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol The discrete logarithm

More information

F O R SOCI AL WORK RESE ARCH

F O R SOCI AL WORK RESE ARCH 7 TH EUROPE AN CONFERENCE F O R SOCI AL WORK RESE ARCH C h a l l e n g e s i n s o c i a l w o r k r e s e a r c h c o n f l i c t s, b a r r i e r s a n d p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n r e l a t i o n

More information

Ideal Lattices and Ring-LWE: Overview and Open Problems. Chris Peikert Georgia Institute of Technology. ICERM 23 April 2015

Ideal Lattices and Ring-LWE: Overview and Open Problems. Chris Peikert Georgia Institute of Technology. ICERM 23 April 2015 Ideal Lattices and Ring-LWE: Overview and Open Problems Chris Peikert Georgia Institute of Technology ICERM 23 April 2015 1 / 16 Agenda 1 Ring-LWE and its hardness from ideal lattices 2 Open questions

More information

1 Number Theory Basics

1 Number Theory Basics ECS 289M (Franklin), Winter 2010, Crypto Review 1 Number Theory Basics This section has some basic facts about number theory, mostly taken (or adapted) from Dan Boneh s number theory fact sheets for his

More information

Identity-based encryption

Identity-based encryption Identity-based encryption Michel Abdalla ENS & CNRS MPRI - Course 2-12-1 Michel Abdalla (ENS & CNRS) Identity-based encryption 1 / 43 Identity-based encryption (IBE) Goal: Allow senders to encrypt messages

More information

Lecture 7: ElGamal and Discrete Logarithms

Lecture 7: ElGamal and Discrete Logarithms Lecture 7: ElGamal and Discrete Logarithms Johan Håstad, transcribed by Johan Linde 2006-02-07 1 The discrete logarithm problem Recall that a generator g of a group G is an element of order n such that

More information

Multilinear Maps over the Integers From Design to Security. The Mathematics of Modern Cryptography Workshop, July 10th 2015

Multilinear Maps over the Integers From Design to Security. The Mathematics of Modern Cryptography Workshop, July 10th 2015 Multilinear Maps over the Integers From Design to Security Tancrède Lepoint CryptoExperts The Mathematics of Modern Cryptography Workshop, July 10th 2015 2 / 30 Timeline: The Hype Cycle of Multilinear

More information

Cryptography and Security Final Exam

Cryptography and Security Final Exam Cryptography and Security Final Exam Serge Vaudenay 17.1.2017 duration: 3h no documents allowed, except one 2-sided sheet of handwritten notes a pocket calculator is allowed communication devices are not

More information

Crypto math II. Alin Tomescu May 27, Abstract A quick overview on group theory from Ron Rivest s course in Spring 2015.

Crypto math II. Alin Tomescu May 27, Abstract A quick overview on group theory from Ron Rivest s course in Spring 2015. Crypto math II Alin Tomescu alinush@mit.edu May 7, 015 Abstract A quick overview on group theory from Ron Rivest s 6.857 course in Spring 015. 1 Overview Group theory review Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange

More information

Property Preserving Symmetric Encryption

Property Preserving Symmetric Encryption Property Preserving Symmetric Encryption Omkant Pandey Microsoft, Redmond Yannis Rouselakis University of Texas at Austin Traditional Cryptography Alice Bob Eve New Goal: Computations on Encrypted Data

More information

Public-Key Cryptography. Lecture 9 Public-Key Encryption Diffie-Hellman Key-Exchange

Public-Key Cryptography. Lecture 9 Public-Key Encryption Diffie-Hellman Key-Exchange Public-Key Cryptography Lecture 9 Public-Key Encryption Diffie-Hellman Key-Exchange Shared/Symmetric-Key Encryption (a.k.a. private-key encryption) SKE: Syntax KeyGen outputs K K E scheme E Syntax a.k.a.

More information

Lattice-Based Non-Interactive Arugment Systems

Lattice-Based Non-Interactive Arugment Systems Lattice-Based Non-Interactive Arugment Systems David Wu Stanford University Based on joint works with Dan Boneh, Yuval Ishai, Sam Kim, and Amit Sahai Soundness: x L, P Pr P, V (x) = accept = 0 No prover

More information

Introduction to Cryptography. Lecture 8

Introduction to Cryptography. Lecture 8 Introduction to Cryptography Lecture 8 Benny Pinkas page 1 1 Groups we will use Multiplication modulo a prime number p (G, ) = ({1,2,,p-1}, ) E.g., Z 7* = ( {1,2,3,4,5,6}, ) Z p * Z N * Multiplication

More information

Notes for Lecture Decision Diffie Hellman and Quadratic Residues

Notes for Lecture Decision Diffie Hellman and Quadratic Residues U.C. Berkeley CS276: Cryptography Handout N19 Luca Trevisan March 31, 2009 Notes for Lecture 19 Scribed by Cynthia Sturton, posted May 1, 2009 Summary Today we continue to discuss number-theoretic constructions

More information

Introduction to Elliptic Curve Cryptography

Introduction to Elliptic Curve Cryptography Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata May 19, 2017 ElGamal Public Key Cryptosystem, 1984 Key Generation: 1 Choose a suitable large prime p 2 Choose a generator g of the cyclic group IZ p 3 Choose a cyclic

More information

New Techniques for Dual System Encryption and Fully Secure HIBE with Short Ciphertexts

New Techniques for Dual System Encryption and Fully Secure HIBE with Short Ciphertexts New Techniques for Dual System Encryption and Fully Secure HIBE with Short Ciphertexts Allison Lewko University of Texas at Austin alewko@cs.utexas.edu Brent Waters University of Texas at Austin bwaters@cs.utexas.edu

More information

Public-Key Encryption: ElGamal, RSA, Rabin

Public-Key Encryption: ElGamal, RSA, Rabin Public-Key Encryption: ElGamal, RSA, Rabin Introduction to Modern Cryptography Benny Applebaum Tel-Aviv University Fall Semester, 2011 12 Public-Key Encryption Syntax Encryption algorithm: E. Decryption

More information

Cryptographic Multilinear Maps. Craig Gentry and Shai Halevi

Cryptographic Multilinear Maps. Craig Gentry and Shai Halevi Cryptographic Multilinear Maps Craig Gentry and Shai Halevi China Summer School on Lattices and Cryptography, June 2014 Multilinear Maps (MMAPs) A Technical Tool A primitive for building applications,

More information

Lecture 19: Public-key Cryptography (Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange & ElGamal Encryption) Public-key Cryptography

Lecture 19: Public-key Cryptography (Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange & ElGamal Encryption) Public-key Cryptography Lecture 19: (Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange & ElGamal Encryption) Recall In private-key cryptography the secret-key sk is always established ahead of time The secrecy of the private-key cryptography relies

More information

Introduction to Modern Cryptography. Benny Chor

Introduction to Modern Cryptography. Benny Chor Introduction to Modern Cryptography Benny Chor RSA Public Key Encryption Factoring Algorithms Lecture 7 Tel-Aviv University Revised March 1st, 2008 Reminder: The Prime Number Theorem Let π(x) denote the

More information

Lecture 8 Alvaro A. Cardenas Nicholas Sze Yinian Mao Kavitha Swaminathan. 1 Introduction. 2 The Dolev-Dwork-Naor (DDN) Scheme [1]

Lecture 8 Alvaro A. Cardenas Nicholas Sze Yinian Mao Kavitha Swaminathan. 1 Introduction. 2 The Dolev-Dwork-Naor (DDN) Scheme [1] CMSC 858K Advanced Topics in Cryptography February 19, 2004 Lecturer: Jonathan Katz Lecture 8 Scribe(s): Alvaro A. Cardenas Nicholas Sze Yinian Mao Kavitha Swaminathan 1 Introduction Last time we introduced

More information

New Lower Bounds on Predicate Entropy for Function Private Public-Key Predicate Encryption

New Lower Bounds on Predicate Entropy for Function Private Public-Key Predicate Encryption New Lower Bounds on Predicate Entropy for Function Private Public-Key Predicate Encryption Sikhar Patranabis and Debdeep Mukhopadhyay Department of Computer Science and Engineering Indian Institute of

More information

TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITEIT EINDHOVEN Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science Exam Cryptology, Friday 25 January 2019

TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITEIT EINDHOVEN Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science Exam Cryptology, Friday 25 January 2019 Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science Exam Cryptology, Friday 25 January 2019 Name : TU/e student number : Exercise 1 2 3 4 5 total points Notes: Please hand in all sheets at the end of the exam.

More information

CS 355: Topics in Cryptography Spring Problem Set 5.

CS 355: Topics in Cryptography Spring Problem Set 5. CS 355: Topics in Cryptography Spring 2018 Problem Set 5 Due: June 8, 2018 at 5pm (submit via Gradescope) Instructions: You must typeset your solution in LaTeX using the provided template: https://crypto.stanford.edu/cs355/homework.tex

More information

Public Key Cryptography

Public Key Cryptography Public Key Cryptography Introduction Public Key Cryptography Unlike symmetric key, there is no need for Alice and Bob to share a common secret Alice can convey her public key to Bob in a public communication:

More information

6.080/6.089 GITCS Apr 15, Lecture 17

6.080/6.089 GITCS Apr 15, Lecture 17 6.080/6.089 GITCS pr 15, 2008 Lecturer: Scott aronson Lecture 17 Scribe: dam Rogal 1 Recap 1.1 Pseudorandom Generators We will begin with a recap of pseudorandom generators (PRGs). s we discussed before

More information

during transmission safeguard information Cryptography: used to CRYPTOGRAPHY BACKGROUND OF THE MATHEMATICAL

during transmission safeguard information Cryptography: used to CRYPTOGRAPHY BACKGROUND OF THE MATHEMATICAL THE MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND OF CRYPTOGRAPHY Cryptography: used to safeguard information during transmission (e.g., credit card number for internet shopping) as opposed to Coding Theory: used to transmit

More information

On the (Im)possibility of Projecting Property in Prime-Order Setting

On the (Im)possibility of Projecting Property in Prime-Order Setting On the (Im)possibility of Projecting Property in Prime-Order Setting Jae Hong Seo Department of Mathematics, Myongji University, Yongin, Republic of Korea jaehongseo@mju.ac.r Abstract. Projecting bilinear

More information

Lattice Cryptography

Lattice Cryptography CSE 206A: Lattice Algorithms and Applications Winter 2016 Lattice Cryptography Instructor: Daniele Micciancio UCSD CSE Lattice cryptography studies the construction of cryptographic functions whose security

More information

Introduction to Modern Cryptography. Lecture RSA Public Key CryptoSystem 2. One way Trapdoor Functions

Introduction to Modern Cryptography. Lecture RSA Public Key CryptoSystem 2. One way Trapdoor Functions Introduction to Modern Cryptography Lecture 7 1. RSA Public Key CryptoSystem 2. One way Trapdoor Functions Diffie and Hellman (76) New Directions in Cryptography Split the Bob s secret key K to two parts:

More information

10 Concrete candidates for public key crypto

10 Concrete candidates for public key crypto 10 Concrete candidates for public key crypto In the previous lecture we talked about public key cryptography and saw the Diffie Hellman system and the DSA signature scheme. In this lecture, we will see

More information

Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge from Homomorphic Encryption. Ivan Damgård (Aarhus Universitet) Nelly Fazio, Antonio Nicolosi (NYU)

Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge from Homomorphic Encryption. Ivan Damgård (Aarhus Universitet) Nelly Fazio, Antonio Nicolosi (NYU) Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge from Homomorphic Encryption Ivan Damgård (Aarhus Universitet) Nelly Fazio, Antonio Nicolosi (NYU) January 27th, 2006 NYU Crypto Reading Group Zero-Knowledge and Interaction

More information

Lecture 15 & 16: Trapdoor Permutations, RSA, Signatures

Lecture 15 & 16: Trapdoor Permutations, RSA, Signatures CS 7810 Graduate Cryptography October 30, 2017 Lecture 15 & 16: Trapdoor Permutations, RSA, Signatures Lecturer: Daniel Wichs Scribe: Willy Quach & Giorgos Zirdelis 1 Topic Covered. Trapdoor Permutations.

More information

8 Elliptic Curve Cryptography

8 Elliptic Curve Cryptography 8 Elliptic Curve Cryptography 8.1 Elliptic Curves over a Finite Field For the purposes of cryptography, we want to consider an elliptic curve defined over a finite field F p = Z/pZ for p a prime. Given

More information

Déjà Q: Using Dual Systems to Revisit q-type Assumptions

Déjà Q: Using Dual Systems to Revisit q-type Assumptions Déjà Q: Using Dual Systems to Revisit q-type Assumptions Melissa Chase Microsoft Research Redmond melissac@microsoft.com Sarah Meiklejohn UC San Diego smeiklej@cs.ucsd.edu Abstract After more than a decade

More information

How to Use Short Basis : Trapdoors for Hard Lattices and new Cryptographic Constructions

How to Use Short Basis : Trapdoors for Hard Lattices and new Cryptographic Constructions Presentation Article presentation, for the ENS Lattice Based Crypto Workgroup http://www.di.ens.fr/~pnguyen/lbc.html, 30 September 2009 How to Use Short Basis : Trapdoors for http://www.cc.gatech.edu/~cpeikert/pubs/trap_lattice.pdf

More information

DATA PRIVACY AND SECURITY

DATA PRIVACY AND SECURITY DATA PRIVACY AND SECURITY Instructor: Daniele Venturi Master Degree in Data Science Sapienza University of Rome Academic Year 2018-2019 Interlude: Number Theory Cubum autem in duos cubos, aut quadratoquadratum

More information

Number theory (Chapter 4)

Number theory (Chapter 4) EECS 203 Spring 2016 Lecture 12 Page 1 of 8 Number theory (Chapter 4) Review Compute 6 11 mod 13 in an efficient way What is the prime factorization of 100? 138? What is gcd(100, 138)? What is lcm(100,138)?

More information

G Advanced Cryptography April 10th, Lecture 11

G Advanced Cryptography April 10th, Lecture 11 G.30-001 Advanced Cryptography April 10th, 007 Lecturer: Victor Shoup Lecture 11 Scribe: Kristiyan Haralambiev We continue the discussion of public key encryption. Last time, we studied Hash Proof Systems

More information

Shorter IBE and Signatures via Asymmetric Pairings

Shorter IBE and Signatures via Asymmetric Pairings Shorter IBE and Signatures via symmetric Pairings Jie Chen, Hoon Wei Lim, San Ling, Huaxiong Wang, and Hoeteck Wee 2, Division of Mathematical Sciences School of Physical & Mathematical Sciences Nanyang

More information

Dual System Framework in Multilinear Settings and Applications to Fully Secure (Compact) ABE for Unbounded-Size Circuits

Dual System Framework in Multilinear Settings and Applications to Fully Secure (Compact) ABE for Unbounded-Size Circuits Dual System Framework in Multilinear Settings and pplications to Fully Secure Compact BE for Unbounded-Size Circuits Nuttapong ttrapadung National Institute of dvanced Industrial Science and Technology

More information

Lattice Cryptography

Lattice Cryptography CSE 06A: Lattice Algorithms and Applications Winter 01 Instructor: Daniele Micciancio Lattice Cryptography UCSD CSE Many problems on point lattices are computationally hard. One of the most important hard

More information

1 Secure two-party computation

1 Secure two-party computation CSCI 5440: Cryptography Lecture 7 The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Spring 2018 26 and 27 February 2018 In the first half of the course we covered the basic cryptographic primitives that enable secure

More information

Pairing-Based Cryptography An Introduction

Pairing-Based Cryptography An Introduction ECRYPT Summer School Samos 1 Pairing-Based Cryptography An Introduction Kenny Paterson kenny.paterson@rhul.ac.uk May 4th 2007 ECRYPT Summer School Samos 2 The Pairings Explosion Pairings originally used

More information

1 What are Physical Attacks. 2 Physical Attacks on RSA. Today:

1 What are Physical Attacks. 2 Physical Attacks on RSA. Today: Today: Introduction to the class. Examples of concrete physical attacks on RSA A computational approach to cryptography Pseudorandomness 1 What are Physical Attacks Tampering/Leakage attacks Issue of how

More information

Lecture 7: CPA Security, MACs, OWFs

Lecture 7: CPA Security, MACs, OWFs CS 7810 Graduate Cryptography September 27, 2017 Lecturer: Daniel Wichs Lecture 7: CPA Security, MACs, OWFs Scribe: Eysa Lee 1 Topic Covered Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA) MACs One Way Functions (OWFs)

More information

Introduction to Cybersecurity Cryptography (Part 4)

Introduction to Cybersecurity Cryptography (Part 4) Introduction to Cybersecurity Cryptography (Part 4) Review of Last Lecture Blockciphers Review of DES Attacks on Blockciphers Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Modes of Operation MACs and Hashes Message

More information

ASYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION

ASYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION ASYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION 1 / 1 Recommended Book Steven Levy. Crypto. Penguin books. 2001. A non-technical account of the history of public-key cryptography and the colorful characters involved. 2 / 1 Recall

More information

Fully Homomorphic Encryption. Zvika Brakerski Weizmann Institute of Science

Fully Homomorphic Encryption. Zvika Brakerski Weizmann Institute of Science Fully Homomorphic Encryption Zvika Brakerski Weizmann Institute of Science AWSCS, March 2015 Outsourcing Computation x x f f(x) Email, web-search, navigation, social networking What if x is private? Search

More information

CRYPTANALYSIS OF COMPACT-LWE

CRYPTANALYSIS OF COMPACT-LWE SESSION ID: CRYP-T10 CRYPTANALYSIS OF COMPACT-LWE Jonathan Bootle, Mehdi Tibouchi, Keita Xagawa Background Information Lattice-based cryptographic assumption Based on the learning-with-errors (LWE) assumption

More information

Shorter Identity-Based Encryption via Asymmetric Pairings

Shorter Identity-Based Encryption via Asymmetric Pairings Shorter Identity-Based Encryption via symmetric Pairings Jie Chen, Hoon Wei Lim, San Ling, Huaxiong Wang, and Hoeteck Wee 2, Division of Mathematical Sciences School of Physical & Mathematical Sciences

More information

PUBLIC KEY EXCHANGE USING MATRICES OVER GROUP RINGS

PUBLIC KEY EXCHANGE USING MATRICES OVER GROUP RINGS PUBLIC KEY EXCHANGE USING MATRICES OVER GROUP RINGS DELARAM KAHROBAEI, CHARALAMBOS KOUPPARIS, AND VLADIMIR SHPILRAIN Abstract. We offer a public key exchange protocol in the spirit of Diffie-Hellman, but

More information

Notes for Lecture 9. Last time, we introduced zero knowledge proofs and showed how interactive zero knowledge proofs could be constructed from OWFs.

Notes for Lecture 9. Last time, we introduced zero knowledge proofs and showed how interactive zero knowledge proofs could be constructed from OWFs. COS 533: Advanced Cryptography Lecture 9 (October 11, 2017) Lecturer: Mark Zhandry Princeton University Scribe: Udaya Ghai Notes for Lecture 9 1 Last Time Last time, we introduced zero knowledge proofs

More information

Public Key Cryptography

Public Key Cryptography Public Key Cryptography Ali El Kaafarani 1 Mathematical Institute 2 PQShield Ltd. 1 of 44 Outline 1 Public Key Encryption: security notions 2 RSA Encryption Scheme 2 of 44 Course main reference 3 of 44

More information

Practical Bootstrapping in Quasilinear Time

Practical Bootstrapping in Quasilinear Time Practical Bootstrapping in Quasilinear Time Jacob Alperin-Sheriff Chris Peikert School of Computer Science Georgia Tech UC San Diego 29 April 2013 1 / 21 Fully Homomorphic Encryption [RAD 78,Gen 09] FHE

More information

CIS 551 / TCOM 401 Computer and Network Security

CIS 551 / TCOM 401 Computer and Network Security CIS 551 / TCOM 401 Computer and Network Security Spring 2008 Lecture 15 3/20/08 CIS/TCOM 551 1 Announcements Project 3 available on the web. Get the handout in class today. Project 3 is due April 4th It

More information

Question: Total Points: Score:

Question: Total Points: Score: University of California, Irvine COMPSCI 134: Elements of Cryptography and Computer and Network Security Midterm Exam (Fall 2016) Duration: 90 minutes November 2, 2016, 7pm-8:30pm Name (First, Last): Please

More information