New Proof Techniques for DLIN-Based Adaptively Secure Attribute-Based Encryption

Transcription

1 New Proof Techniques for DLIN-Based daptively Secure ttribute-based Encryption Katsuyuki Takashima (Mitsubishi Electric) pril 8, 207 bstract Weproposeadaptively secure attribute-based encryption (BE) schemes for boolean formulas over large universe attributes from the decisional linear (DLIN) assumption, which allow attribute reuse in an available formula without the previously employed redundant multiple encoding technique Thus our KP-(resp CP-)BE has non-redundant ciphertexts (resp secret keys) For achieving the results, we develop a new encoding method for access policy matrix for BE, by decoupling linear secret sharing (LSS) into its matrix and randomness, and partially randomizing the LSS shares in simulation The new techniques are of independent interest and we expect it will find another application than BE Keywords: ttribute-based Encryption, Multi-se ttributes in Policy, daptive Security, Static ssumption Introduction Backgrounds ttribute-based encryption (BE) introduced by Sahai and Waters [22] presents an advanced vision for encryption and provides more flexible and fine-grained access control in sharing and distributing sensitive data than traditional symmetric and public-key encryption as well as recent identity-based encryption In BE systems, either one of the parameters for encryption and secret key is a set of attributes, and the other is an access policy (structure) over a universe of attributes, eg, a secret key for a user is associated with an access policy and a ciphertext is associated with a set of attributes secret key with a policy can decrypt a ciphertext associated with a set of attributes, iff the attribute set satisfies the policy If the access policy is for a secret key (resp for encryption), it is called key-policy BE (KP-BE) (resp ciphertext-policy BE (CP-BE)) ll the existing practical BE schemes have been constructed by (bilinear) pairing groups, and the largest class of relations supported by the BE schemes is (non-monotone or arithmetic) span programs [3, 4, 0, 3] (or (non-monotone) span programs with inner-product relations [9]) While general polynomial size circuits are supported [2, 9] recently, they are much less efficient than the pairing-based BE schemes and non-practical when the relations are limited to span programs Hereafter, we focus on pairing-based BE with span program n extended abstract of a preliminary version of this paper is presented at CISP 207, the 22nd ustralasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, July 3 5, 207, uckland, New Zealand This is the full version

2 access structures n example of such span program predicate over attributes is given by (Institute = niv ) ND ((Department = Biology) OR (Position = Professor)), which we simply denote by X (X 2 X 3 ) where X := niv, X 2 := Biology and X 3 := Professor We define attribute-multiplicity k forapredicate as the maximum number of appearances of attribute variables, ie, k = 2 for predicate (X X 2 ) (X X 3 ) (X 2 X 4 ) since X and X 2 appear twice and others appear just once While adaptive security for BE is the standard, realistic and desirable security notion, previously, either efficiency or security is sacrificed for achieving the multi-use property in adaptively secure BE See adaptively secure BE in Tables and 2 Our aim is to achieve short (ie, non-redundant) ciphertexts (resp keys) in adaptively secure multi-use KP-BE (resp CP-BE) from static assumptions In previous static assumption based schemes [5, 9, 0], for allowing reuse of attributes in a policy in the adaptive security setting, for example, in KP-BE, multiple ciphertext components whose number is linear in the product kn of the number n of attributes for the ciphertext and the attribute multiplicity k for available policies are necessary, which leads to a very long ciphertext More precisely, the same information representing attribute set Γ is duplicated over multiple ciphertext components depending linearly on the multiplicity k (See OT0 and CGW5 KP-BE schemes in Table ) Lewko-Waters [7] first constructed adaptively-secure CP-BE and KP-BE schemes for span programs with allowing reuse of attributes in a policy without the above redundant multiple encoding technique While Lewko-Waters s (CP- )BE scheme ([7] and subsequent work [2, 3] in Table ) shows an interesting approach to allowing reuse of attributes in a policy, the security is proven only based on q-type assumptions with q the maximum number of attributemultiplicities in access structures However, the assumptions (and also the associated schemes) suffered a special attack which was presented by Cheon [] at Eurocrypt 2006, which leads to inefficiency Consequently, it is very desirable that the q-type assumption should be replaced by a static (non-q type) assumption with keeping compact ciphertexts Moreover, we note that there exist no multi-use CP-BE scheme with short, ie, non-redundant, secret keys even in the selective security setting from a static assumption (Table 2) Now, an important open question is: Is there an adaptively secure KP-(resp CP-)BE scheme for span programs from a static (standard) assumption whose ciphertext (resp secret key)sizeisnotlinearinkn for the attribute number n in ciphertext (resp secret key) and the maximum attribute-multiplicity k of available policies? This work makes a significant step for addressing the problem 2 Our Results We obtain the following results 2

3 Table Comparison with the existing pairing-based multi-use KP-BE schemes, where PK, SK, CT stand for public key, secret key, ciphertext, respectively, and n represents the number of attributes in CT, n the max of n, l the number of rows in access matrix in SK, r the max of the number of columns in access matrix in SK, k (the max of) the attribute-multiplicity of an access matrix in SK, respectively The fourth row describes the warm-up scheme in Section 53 Security ssump PK size SK size CT size GPSW06[3] selective DBDH O(n) G O(l) G O(n ) G Tak4 [23] semi-adaptive DLIN O(n) G O(ln) G O() G (Warm-up) O(l) G O(n) G OT0[9] DLIN O(n) G O(l) G O(kn ) G LW2 [7] tt5 [2, 3] CGW5 [0] adaptive l-parallel BDHE (+α) EDHE3 & 4 parametrized by n, l, r s-lin for s O(n) G O(l) G O(n ) G O(n) G O(ln) G O() G O(n) G for s =2 O(l) G for s =2 O(kn ) G for s =2 Proposed adaptive DLIN O(n + r) G O(l) G O(n + r) G We propose an adaptively secure multi-use KP-BE construction for boolean formulas (or span programs) over large universe attribute matching predicates with non-redundant ciphertexts from the DLIN assumption (in Section 5) The size of a ciphertext for attributes is not linear in the product kn of the number of ciphertext attributes n and the attribute multiplicity k in available access structures, but has only a linear dependence on some size parameter r of access structures For comparison with existing ones, refer to Table We also propose an adaptively secure multi-use CP-BE construction for the same access structures as the above KP-BE with short (non-redundant) keys from DLIN The CP-BE scheme is obtained from the above KP-BE by the natural dual conversion, in particular, the key size is not linear in kn for the number n of key attributes and the attribute multiplicity k in available access structures We note that it is the first multi-use CP-BE construction with short keys from a static assumption even including the selective secure schemes (Table 2) For the concrete scheme, see ppendix E We used two techniques, decoupling of linear secret sharing (LSS) into two (dual) components, ie, span program matrix and randomness, and the partial randomization of LSS new sparse matrix machinery (Section 4) underlies them The techniques can be extended naturally to arithmetic span programs (SP), then, our results can be extended to SP based BE proposed by Ishai and Wee [4] 3

4 Table 2 Comparison with the existing pairing-based multi-use CP-BE schemes, where PK, SK, CT stand for public key, secret key, ciphertext, respectively, and n represents the number of attributes in SK, n the max of n, l the number of rows in access matrix in CT, r the max of the number of columns in access matrix in CT, k (the max of) the attribute-multiplicity of an access matrix in CT, respectively Wat[25] Scheme 2 Wat[25] Scheme 3 Security ssump PK size SK size CT size ν-bdhe O(n) G O(kn ) G O(l) G selective DBDH O(nr) G O(kn + r) G O(l 2 ) G HY5 parameterized [4] 2 O((nl) 2 λ) G O((nl) 4 λ 2 ) G O() G OT0 [9] DLIN O(n) G O(kn ) G O(l) G LW2 [7] CGW5 [0] adaptive l-parallel BDHE (+α) s-lin for s O(n) G O(n ) G O(l) G O(n) G for s =2 O(kn ) G for s =2 O(l) G for s =2 Proposed adaptive DLIN O(n + r) G O(n + r) G O(l) G 3 Key Techniques Our results are related to KP- and CP-BEs, however, for simplicity, we mainly treat on KP-BE ccording to a new framework introduced by ttrapadung, doubly selective security (ie, selective and co-selective) leads to achieving adaptive one Since selective security is easily obtained in KP-BE, we should concentrate on achieving co-selectively secure KP-BE below Based on the technique in [5, 23], we have DLIN-based, multi-use and semiadaptively secure KP-BE with short ciphertext size We give the underlying scheme (as a warm-up), and extend it to our adaptive one Here, access structure S is given by l r matrix M and each row M i Fq r of the matrix is associated to an attribute value by a map ρ, ie, labeled with attributes v i := ρ(i) n attribute set Γ satisfies S iff span M i v i Γ for a fixed special (allone) vector First, to achieve short ciphertexts in the underlying KP-BE, attributes Γ := {x j } j=,,n are encoded in an n-dimensional (with n n +) vector y := (y,,y n ) such that n j=0 y n jz j = z n n n j= (z x j) Each (non-zero) attribute value v i (for i =,,l) associated with a row of access structure matrix M (in S) is encoded as v i := (v n i,,v i, ), so y v i = v n n n i j= (v i x j ), and the value of inner product is equal to zero if and 2 Since k l, the size of secret keys of the HY5 scheme [4] is very large compared with others lso, in [], a selective-secure constant-size ciphertext, but, large secret keys CP-BE scheme was proposed, recently 4

5 Key Ciphertext Previous KP-BEs This work real part semi-func part informationtheoretical change decoupling decrypt ( pairing ) equivalent distribution such that Fig Decoupling of LSS matrix from randomness and partial LSS randomization in semi-functional parts Here, (M =(M i),ρ) is an access structure, uniformly random f Fq r, ξ, ξ,ξ i,θ i F q, y := (y,,y n) such that P n j=0 yn jzj = z Q n n n j= (z x j), and v i := (v n i,,v i, ) for v i := ρ(i) only if v i = x j for some j, ie, v i Γ Here, the relation between S and Γ is determined by the multiple inner product values y v i for one vector y which is equivalent to Γ s in previous works (eg, [5, 23]), a ciphertext element c is encoded with ω y (for random ω), and key elements ki are encoded with v i and shared secret values M i f (i =,,l) for a central secret f with uniformly random f, respectively We change the encoding method for our new proof method as indicated below Basic Idea: Decoupling of LSS matrix from randomness Secret keys in all previous KP-BE schemes contain shared secret values s 0 := f and s i := M i f, which means that randomness f is fixed at the key generation phase Moreover, since, for pre-challenge queried keys (in simulation), the challenge y is not yet revealed to the challenger, ie, simulator, at the query phase, we have never had a co-selective simulation strategy for achieving compact ciphertexts together with multi-use leaf attributes v i in the queried access matrix For addressing the problem, we change an encoding method of LSS (Fig ) First, we decouple LSS encoding into LSS matrix and randomness, and randomness is encoded on the ciphertext side (Then, the simulation of the randomness is delayed until the challenge phase) Precisely, in the secret key, concatenated V i := (θ i v i,ξm i ) Fq are encoded in the i-th component ki for i =,, l with random θ i,ξ We note that the key component ki has no randomness for LSS (except for connecting randomness ξ), instead, LSS matrix M := (M i ) l i= is 5

6 directly encoded in {ki } In ciphertext, Y := (ω y, f) Fq is encoded Hence, in decryption, inner-product values are Y V i = ωθ i ( y v i )+ξm i f = ωθ i ( y v i )+ξs i for i =,,l, therefore, if y v i = 0, secret share ξs i for central secret ξs 0 is obtained, and if y v i 0,s i is totally hidden from the decryptor since θ i is freshly random New Proof Techniques: Partial LSS randomization in simulation and new underlying lemma t the top level of strategy of the security proof, we follow the dual system encryption methodology proposed by Waters [24] The above change of encoding enables the simulator to simulate the randomness of LSS depending on both of the h-th queried access structure S := (M,ρ) and attributes Γ := {x t } (equivalently, vector y) We use the simulated randomness a h,whichisnot fully random in Fq r, but satisfies M i a h =0ifv i Γ and a h 0 Such a vector exists since Γ does not satisfy S, and it has been used for security in previous works, for example, in [3] In ciphertext, the concatenated is encoded in the semi-functional space nd, in the semi-functional space of the h-th queried key, V i := (θ i v i,ξ M i ) Fq are encoded in the i-th component ki for i =,, l Since V i is independent of Γ, it can be simulated for the pre-challenge key Then, vector Y := (ω y, a h ) F q { Y V i = ω θ i( y v i )+ξ 0 if y vi =0, M i a h = ω θ i ( y v i)+ξ M i a h if y v i 0, for i =,,l Here, if y v i 0,Y V i is uniformly random and independent from other variables since θ i are freshly random Let V i := (θ i v i,ξ i M i) Fq with uniformly random ξ i which are independent of each other for i =,,l { Y V i = ω θ i( y v i )+ξ im 0 if y vi =0, i a h = ω θ i ( y v i)+ξ i M i a h if y v i 0, for i =,,l gain, if y v i 0,Y V i is uniformly random and independent of other variables That is, Y V i and Y V i are equivalently distributed Therefore, we can conceptually change V i which contains variable ξ to V i with no ξ by using the pairwise independence lemma (Lemma 3) as in the previous dual system encryption proofs We stress that V i are also independent of the challenge attributes Γ, and then can be used in the pre-challenge key simulation In this way, we can sequentially eliminate the randomness ξ from all key components, ki for i =,, l, except for k 0, and finally, ξ remains only in the central element k0, and the inner-product of the semi-functional parts of k0 and the corresponding ciphertext component is uniformly random value ξ a h since a h 0 So, the proof proceeds successfully (See Section 55 for proof outline) We extend the sparse matrix technique on dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS) developed in [2, 23] for achieving compact ciphertexts Refer to Section 5 for the details 6

7 4 Notations When is a random variable or distribution, y R denotes that y is randomly selected from according to its distribution When is a set, y denotes that y is uniformly selected from We denote the finite field of order q by F q,andf q \{0} by F q vector symbol denotes a vector representation over F q, eg, y denotes (y,,y n ) Fq n For two vectors y = (y,,y n )and v =(v,,v n ), y v denotes the inner-product n i= y iv i The vector 0 is abused as the zero vector in Fq n for any n X T denotes the transpose of matrix X bold face letter denotes an element of vector space V, eg, x V When b i V (i =,,n), span b,,b n V (resp span x,, x n ) denotes the subspace generated by b,,b n (resp x,, x n ) For bases B := (b,,b N )andb := (b,,b N ), (x,,x N ) B := N i= x ib i and (y,,y N ) B := N i= y ib i e j j j denotes the canonical basis vector ( 0 0,, 0 0) Fq for positive integers n and r GL(n, F q ) denotes the general linear group of degree n over F q 2 Dual Pairing Vector Spaces (DPVS) In this paper, for simplicity of description, we will present the proposed schemes on the symmetric version of dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS) [8] constructed using symmetric bilinear pairing groups given in Def Owing to the abstraction of DPVS, the presentation and the security proof of the proposed schemes are essentially the same as those on the asymmetric version of DPVS Definition Symmetric bilinear pairing groups (q, G, G T,G,e) are a tuple of a prime q, cyclic additive group G and multiplicative group G T of order q, G 0 G, and a polynomial-time computable nondegenerate bilinear pairing e : G G G T ie, e(sg, tg) =e(g, G) st and e(g, G) LetG bpg be an algorithm that takes input λ and outputs a description of bilinear pairing groups (q, G, G T,G,e) with security parameter λ Dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS) of dimension N byadirectproductof symmetric pairing groups (q, G, G T,G,e) are given by prime q, N-dimensional N vector space V := G G over F q,cyclicgroupg T of order q, and pairing e : V V G T The pairing is defined by e(x, y) := N i= e(g i,h i ) G T where x := (G,, G N ) V and y := (H,,H N ) V This is nondegenerate bilinear ie, e(sx,ty) =e(x, y) st and if e(x, y) =for all y V, then x = 0 3 Definition of KP-BE 3 Span Programs and ccess Structures Definition 2 (Span Programs [7]) ( {0, } )isauniverse,asetof attributes, which is expressed by a value of attribute, ie, v F q (:= F q \{0}) 7

8 span program over F q is a labeled matrix S := (M,ρ) where M is a (l r) matrix over F q and ρ is a labeling of the rows of M by literals from {v, v,} (every row is labeled by one literal), ie, ρ : {,,l} {v, v,} span program accepts or rejects an input by the following criterion Let Γ be a set of attributes, ie, Γ := {x j } j n (x j F q ) The span program S accepts Γ if and only if span (M i ) ρ(i)=vi Γ, ie, some linear combination of the rows (M i ) ρ(i) Γ gives the all one vector No row M i (i =,,l) of the matrix M is 0 We now construct a secretsharing scheme for a (monotone) span program Definition 3 secret-sharing scheme for span program S := (M,ρ) is: Let M be l r matrix Let column vector f := (f,,f r ) Fq r Then, s 0 := f = r k= f k is the secret to be shared, and s := (s,,s l ) T := M f T is the l shares of the secret s 0 and the share s i belongs to ρ(i) 2 If span program S := (M,ρ) accepts Γ, ie, span (M i ) ρ(i) Γ, there exist constants {α i F q i I} such that I {i {,,l} ρ(i) Γ } and i I α is i = s 0 Furthermore, these constants {α i } can be computed in time polynomial in the size of the matrix M 32 Key-Policy ttribute-based Encryption (KP-BE) In key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-BE), encryption (resp a secret key) is associated with attributes Γ (resp access structure S) Relation R for KP-BE is defined as R(S,Γ) = iff access structure S accepts Γ Definition 4 (Key-Policy ttribute-based Encryption: KP-BE) key-policy attribute-based encryption scheme consists of probabilistic polynomialtime algorithms Setup, KeyGen, Enc and Dec They are given as follows: Setup takes as input security parameter λ,aboundn on the number of attributes per ciphertext and a bound r on the number of columns of an access matrix in a secret key It outputs public parameters pk and master secret key sk KeyGen takes as input public parameters pk, master secret key sk, and access structure S := (M,ρ) It outputs a corresponding secret key sk S Enc takes as input public parameters pk, message m in some associated message space msg, and a set of attributes, Γ := {x j } n j= It outputs a ciphertext ct Γ Dec takes as input public parameters pk, secret key sk S for access structure S, and ciphertext ct Γ that was encrypted under a set of attributes Γ It outputs either m msg or the distinguished symbol KP-BE scheme should have the correctness: for all (pk, sk) R Setup( λ,n,r), R all access structures S, all secret keys sk S KeyGen(pk, sk, S), all messages m, R all attribute sets Γ, all ciphertexts ct Γ Enc(pk,m,Γ), it holds that m = Dec(pk, sk S, ct Γ )ifs accepts Γ Otherwise, it holds with negligible probability 8

9 Definition 5 (daptive Security) The model for defining the adaptively payload-hiding security of KP-BE under chosen plaintext attack is given by the following game: Setup In the adaptive security, the challenger runs the setup, (pk, sk) R Setup( λ,n,r), and gives public parameters pk to the adversary Phase The adversary is allowed to adaptively issue a polynomial number of R key queries, S, to the challenger The challenger gives sk S KeyGen(pk, sk, S) to the adversary Challenge The adversary submits two messages m (0),m (),andachallenge attribute set, Γ, provided that no S queried to the challenger in Phase accepts Γ The challenger flips a coin b {0, }, and computes ct (b) R Γ Enc(pk,m (b),γ) It gives ct (b) Γ to the adversary Phase 2 Phase is repeated with the restriction that no queried S accepts challenge Γ Guess The adversary outputs a guess b of b, and wins if b = b The advantage of adversary in the adaptive game is defined as dv KP-BE (λ) := Pr[ wins] /2 for any λ KP-BE scheme is adaptively payload-hiding secure if all poly-time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the game Remark The challenge Γ is declared by the adversary just before Phase (resp before Setup) in the semi-adaptive (resp selective) game, and the corresponding security notions are defined in the similar manner as above 4 Special Matrix Subgroups Let n 2 and ñ := n + r Lemmas 3 are key lemmas for the security proof for our KP- and CP-BE schemes We start by a motivational argument for introducing our new sparse matrix technique Previous sparse matrices in DPVS [2, 23] are given by the form in Eq (2) (in ppendix B2), whose diagonal element except for the first one is the same denoted by u For achieving our information theoretical change from (Y,V i )to(y,v i ) described in Section 3, we use one more randomness in diagonal elements, ie, two random u and u 2, as given in Eq () More precisely, random H(n, r, F q ) acts on Fq = Fq n Fq r by using different scalars u and u 2 on the first Fq n and the second Fq r respectively The new sparse matrix action is the key fact for proving Lemmas 3 and 8 For positive integers n and r, let u u 2 u u,u 2,u l F q H(n, r, F q ):= u n u u n+ u 2 u u 2 for l =,,n+ r, a blank element in the matrix denotes 0 F q, () 9

10 and H(n, r, F q ) := H(n, r, F q ) GL(ñ, F q ) Lemma H(n, r, F q ) is a subgroup of GL(ñ, F q ),whereñ := n + r Lemma is directly verified from the definition of groups Let μ i,j, μ i,j,2 μ i,j, H(n, r, F q ) X i,j := μ i,j,n μ i,j, for i, j = μ i,j,n+ μ i,j,2,,5 μ i,j, μ i,j,2 (2) and using X i,j, we define X, X,5 L(5,n,r,F q ):= X := X i,j H(n, r, F q) GL(5ñ, Fq ) (3) for i, j =,,5 X 5, X 5,5 Lemma 2 L(5,n,r,F q ) isasubgroupofgl(5ñ, F q ) Lemma 2 is given in a similar manner as Lemma 2 in the full version of [2] For the proof, see ppendix B Next is a generalization of Lemma 6 in [2] j Lemma 3 Let e j := (0,,0, ˇ, 0,,0) Fq For all v =(v,,v n, 0,,0) span e,, e n \span e, κ = (0,,0,κ,,κ r ) span e n+,, e and π F q,let W v, κ,π := {( w, z) (span e, v, κ \span e ) (F q \ span e ) w z = π} For all ( v, κ, x) (span e,, e n \span e ) span e n+,, e ( Fq \ span e ), and H(n, r, F q ),Z := ( ) T, the pair (( v + κ), xz) is uniformly distributed in W v, κ, ( v+ κ) x except with negligible probability For the proof, see ppendix B2 5 daptively Secure Multi-se KP-BE Scheme with Short Ciphertexts 5 Key Ideas in Constructing the Proposed KP-BE Scheme We extend the techniques developed in [23], where the author presented a semiadaptively secure KP-BE with constant-size ciphertexts by using sparse matrix 0

11 DPVS approach n underlying construction of our proposed one is given in Section 53, which is a dual form of the scheme in [23] since the 5n 5n sparse basis matrix is used in a dual manner Hence, while [23] scheme has size O() ciphertexts and size O(ln) keys, the underlying one has size O(n) ciphertexts and size O(l) keys (Table ), where l, n are the number of rows in access structure matrix M and the max of the number of attributes in Γ, respectively In other words, the dual conversion of the scheme in [23] to the underlying scheme increases ciphertext size O(n)-times and then decreases key size O(n)-times s mentioned in Introduction, the top level idea of our construction is the decoupling technique of LSS encoding The underlying scheme has a usual encoding of LSS, ie, encoding a central secret s 0 and shares s i Therefore, the comprehension of the construction idea of the underlying one is necessary for understanding our proposed one In this section, we will explain key ideas of constructing the underlying and our KP-BE schemes First, we will show how size O(n) ciphertexts and size O(l) keys can be achieved in the underlying scheme, where the IPE scheme given in [2] is used as a building block Here, we will use a simplified (or toy) version of the underlying KP-BE scheme, for which the security is no more ensured in the standard model under the DLIN assumption ciphertext in the simplified KP-BE scheme consists of two vector elements, (c 0, c ) G 5 G n,andc T G T secret key consists of l + vector elements, (k0, k,,k l ) G5 (G n ) l for access structure S := (M,ρ), where the number of rows of M is l and ki with i corresponds to the i-th row Therefore, to achieve shorter secret keys, we have to compress ki G n to a constant size in n We now employ a special form of basis generation matrix, X := μ μ 2 μ H(n, 0, F q) of Eq () in Section 4, where μ μ n μ, μ,,μ n F q and a blank in the matrix denotes 0 F q The master secret key (DPVS basis) is B := b μ G := μ 2GμG Let the i-th b n μ ng μg component of a secret key associated with S := (M := (M i ) l i=, ρ) consists of ki := (θ i v n i + s i,θ i v n 2 i,,θ i v i,θ i ) B (( =(θ i v n i + s i )b + θ i (v n 2 i b 2 + +v i b n +b n)= θ i ( ) ) n j= vn j i μ j )+s iμ G, v n 2 i θ i μg,,θ i μg, where v i := ρ(i),θ i Fq, f F r q and s i := M i f Then, ki can be compressed to ( only two group elements (Ki, := θ i ( ) ) n j= vn j i μ j )+s iμ G, Ki,2 := θ iμg as well as v i, since ki can be obtained by (K i,,vn 2 i Ki,2,,v iki,2,k i,2 ) (note that v j i K i,2 = vj i θ iμg for j =0,,n 2) That is, the i-th component of a secret key (excluding v i ) can be just two group elements, or the size is constant in n, then (ki )l i=0 can be compressed into size O(l)

12 Let B := (b i ) be the dual orthonormal basis of B := (b i ), and B be the public key in the simplified KP-BE scheme We specify (c 0, k0,c T ) such that e(c 0, k0) = g ζ ξs0 T and c T := g ζ T m G T with s 0 is a center secret of shares {s i } i=,,l associated with access structure S, which are embedded into {ki } i=,,l as indicated above We also set a ciphertext for Γ := {x,,x n } as c := (ω y) B where y := (y,,y n ) such that n j=0 y n jz j = z n n n j= (z x j ), and ω F q From the dual orthonormality of B and B,ifSaccepts Γ, there exists a system of coefficients {α i } ρ(i) Γ such that e(c, k )=g ξs0 T, where k := ρ(i) Γ α iki Hence, a decryptor can compute gξs0 T if and only if S accepts Γ, ie, can obtain plaintext m We can extend the simplified KP-BE to a semi-adaptively secure KP-BE scheme under the DLIN assumption just by enlarging the dimension of the underlying vector space, which is shown in Section 53 The security proof is based on the Waters s dual system technique and given in a similar manner to [23] The provably secure scheme has the same asymptotic sizes of keys and ciphertexts, ie, O(l)-sized keys and O(n)-sized ciphertexts Our goal is to construct an adaptively secure KP-BE with a comparable asymptotic data sizes, ie, O(l)-sized keys and O(n + r)-sized ciphertexts, from the underlying one We use a decoupling technique of LSS matrix from randomness for achieving the goal First, we enlarge the space from O(n) to O(n + r) dimension s described in Fig, a uniformly random vector f F r q for LSS is encoded on the ciphertext component c In the simplified scheme, c := (ω y, f) B G where y F r q is defined as above For encoding each row M i of access matrix M on ki, the above matrix X is extended to a () () matrix in H(n, r, F q ) (Eq ()), then the master secret key is given by b μ G μ 2G μ G B := b n := μ ng μ G where μ,μ 2,μ,, b n+ μ n+g μ 2 G b μ G μ 2 G μ F q Here, note that two independent diagonal elements μ,μ 2 are used for the first n-dimension and the second r-dimension (Refer to the argument given in the beginning of Section 4) Hence, ki is given by ki := (θ i v i,ξm i ) B We note ki is compressed to three group elements as before, ie, Ki, := ( θ i ( n l= vn l i μ l )+ξ( r l= M i,lμ n+l )) G, Ki,2 := θ iμ G, Ki,3 := ξμ 2G for i =,, l, and the secret key size is O(l) The pairing value of c and ki is e(c, ki f )=gωθi y vi+ξmi T = g ωθi y vi+ξsi T where s i := M i f These values are equivalent to the previous underlying scheme Therefore, the decryption algorithm is the same as before We then explain how our full KP-BE scheme is constructed on the abovementioned simplified KP-BE scheme The target of designing the full KP-BE 2

13 scheme is to achieve the adaptive security under the DLIN assumption Here, we adopt and extend a strategy initiated in [9], in which the dual system encryption methodology is employed in a modular or hierarchical manner That is, three top level assumptions, the security of Problems 3, are directly used in the dual system encryption methodology and the assumptions are reduced to a primitive assumption, the DLIN assumption To meet the requirements for applying to the dual system encryption methodology and reducing to the DLIN assumption, the underlying vector space is five times greater than that of the above-mentioned simplified scheme For example, ki := ( θ i v i, ξm i, 0 2n+2r, ψ i v i, η i M i, 0 ) B for ρ(i) =v i, c = X, X,5 ( ω y, f, 0 2n+2r, 0, ϕ ) B with ϕ F q,andx := X 5, X 5,5 L(5,n,r,F q ) of Eq (3) in Section 4, where each X i,j is of the form of X H(n, r, F q ) in the simplified scheme The vector space consists of four orthogonal subspaces, ie, real encoding part, hidden part, secret key randomness part, and ciphertext randomness part The simplified KP-BE scheme corresponds to the first real encoding part key fact in the security reduction is that L(5,n,r,F q )isasubgroup of GL(5(n + r), F q ) (Lemma 2), which enables a random-self-reducibility argument for reducing the intractability of Problems 3 to the DLIN assumption For the reduction, see [2] We employ a new simulation technique in dual system encryption using random vector f in c For the details, refer to the proof outline in Section Dual Orthonormal Basis Generator We describe random dual orthonormal basis generator Gob KP below, which is used as a subroutine in the proposed KP-BE scheme G KP ob (λ, 5, (n, r)) : param G := (q, G, G T,G,e) R G bpg ( λ ), N 0 := 5, N := 5(n + r), param Vt := (q, V t, G T, t,e):=g dpvs ( λ,n t, param G ) for t =0,, ψ F q,g T := e(g, G) ψ, param (n,r) := ((n, r), {param Vt } t=0,,g T ), X 0 := (χ 0,i,j ) i,j=,,5 GL(N0, F q ),X L(5,n,r,Fq ), hereafter, {μ i,j,ι,μ i,j,l} i,j=,,5;ι=,2 l=,, denotes non-zero entries of X as in Eq (2), b 0,i := (χ 0,i,,, χ 0,i,5 ) = 5 j= χ 0,i,ja j for i =,, 5, B 0 := (b 0,,, b 0,5), Bi,j,ι := μ i,j,ι G, B i,j,l := μ i,j,lg for i, j =,,5; ι =, 2; l =,,n+ r, for t =0,, (ϑ t,i,j ) i,j=,,nt := ψ (Xt T ), b t,i := (ϑ t,i,,, ϑ t,i,nt ) = N t j= ϑ t,i,ja j for i =,, N t, B t := (b t,,, b t,nt ), return (param (n,r), B 0, B 0, B, {Bi,j,ι,B i,j,l} i,j=,,5;ι=,2 l=,, ) 3

14 Remark 2 Let sparse block matrix b,(i )()+ := (X i, G X i,5 G) for i =,,5, b,i() and B := (b,,,b,5() ), (4) where X i,j G means the componentwise multiplication B is the dual orthonormal basis of B, ie, e(b,i, b,i )=g T and e(b,i, b,j )=for i j 5(n + r) 53 Warm-p: nderlying Semi-adaptively Secure Construction s a warm-up, we describe a semi-adaptively secure KP-BE scheme, which is a dual construction of [23] whose secret keys are compressed by using a sparse matrix while [23] scheme has compressed ciphertexts Namely, we use the sparse matrix in a dual manner of [23] We refer to Section 4 for notations on DPVS Setup( λ,n):/ N 0 := 5, N := 5n / (param n, B 0, B 0, B, {Bi,j,ι,B i,j,l} i,j=,,5; ι=,2 l=,,n ) G R ob KP ( λ, 5, (n, 0)), B 0 := (b 0,, b 0,2, b 0,5 ), B 0 := (b 0,, b 0,2, b 0,4), B := (b,,, b,n, b,4n+,, b,5n ), return pk := ( λ, param n, { B t } t=0, ), sk := ( B 0, {Bi,j,ι,B i,j,l} i=,4;j=,,5 ι=,2; l=,,n ) KeyGen(pk, sk, S := (M,ρ)) : f F r q,s 0 := f, η 0 Fq, k0 := (, s 0, 0, η 0, 0) B 0, for i =,,l, if ρ(i) =v i, v i := (v i,l ) n l= := (v n i,, v i, ), s i := M i f, θ i,ψ i,η i Fq, for j =,,5, Ki,,j := n l= v i,l(θ i B,j,l + ψ ib 5,j,l )+s ib,j, + η ib 5,j,, Ki,2,j := θ ib,j, + ψ ib5,j,, return sk S := (S, k0, {Ki,,j,K i,2,j} i=,,l;j=,,5 ) Enc(pk, m,γ:= {x,,x n x j F q,n n }) : y := (y,,y n ) such that n j=0 y n jz j = z n n n j= (z x j), ω, ϕ 0,ζ F q, ϕ F n q, c 0 := (ζ, ω, 0, 0, ϕ 0 ) B0, n 2n n n c := ( ω y, 0 2n, 0 n, ϕ ) B c T := g ζ T m, ct Γ := (Γ, c 0, c,c T ), return ct Γ Dec(pk, sk S := (S, k0, {Ki,,j,K i,3,j} i=,,l j=,,5 ), ct Γ := (Γ, c 0, c,c T )) : If S := (M,ρ) accepts Γ, then compute I and {α i } i I such that = i I α im i, where M i is the i-th row of M, and 4

15 I {i {,,l} [ρ(i) =v i v i Γ ] } for i I, if ρ(i) =v i, v i := (v i,l ) n l= := (v n i,,v i, ), n n k i := ( K i,,,v i,2k i,2,,, v i,nk i,2,, K i,,5,v i,2k i,2,5,, v i,nk i,2,5 ), n 2n n n that is, ki := ( θ i v i + s i e, 0 2n, ψ i v i + η i e, 0 n ) B, k := i I α iki, K := e(c 0, k0) e(c, k ), return m := c T /K [Correctness] If S := (M,ρ) accepts Γ, K = e(c 0, k 0) e(c, k )= g ωs0+ζ T g ω T P i I αisi = g ζ T where s 0 := f, s i := M i f for i =,,l We note that secret key sk S consists of 5l + 5 group elements and ciphertext ct Γ consists of 5n + 5 group elements (and one G T element) The standard DLIN assumption is defined in ppendix Theorem The proposed multi-use KP-BE scheme is semi-adaptively payloadhiding against chosen plaintext attacks under the DLIN assumption Theorem is proven in a similar manner as in [23] In the semi-adaptive security model, the challenge attribute set Γ is declared by the adversary at the start of the game, but after receiving the public key pk from the challenger Therefore, for each key query S := (M,ρ), the challenger can determine whether ρ(i) Γ or not for i =,,l The challenger in the security proof makes use of this information to simulate a component ki of a queried key for each i =,,l in a refined dual system encryption proof The main part of the game sequence is similar (but not equal) to the Game 3 sequence in the proof of Theorem 2 below 54 Proposed daptively Secure Construction By decoupling LSS coefficients s i := M i f F q to M i Fq r in the key side and f Fq r in the ciphertext side of the underlying scheme, we obtain our proposed adaptively secure KP-BE scheme Setup( λ, (n, r)) : / N 0 := 5, N := 5(n + r) / (param (n,r), B 0, B 0, B, {Bi,j,ι,B i,j,l} i,j=,,5; ι=,2 l=,, ) G R ob KP ( λ, 5, (n, r)), B 0 := (b 0,, b 0,2, b 0,5 ), B 0 := (b 0,, b 0,2, b 0,4), B := (b,,, b,, b,4()+,, b,5() ), return pk := ( λ, param (n,r), { B t } t=0, ), sk := ( B 0, {Bi,j,ι,B i,j,l} i=,4;j=,,5 ι=,2; l=,, ) KeyGen(pk, sk, S := (M,ρ)) : ξ,η 0 Fq, k0 := (, ξ, 0, η 0, 0) B 0, for i =,,l, for j =,,5, if ρ(i) =v i, v i := (v i,l ) n l= := (v n i,, v i, ), θ i,ψ i,η i Fq, 5

16 Ki,,j := n l= v i,l(θ i B,j,l + ψ ib 5,j,l )+ r l= M i,l(ξb,j,n+l + η ib 5,j,n+l ), Ki,2,j := θ ib,j, + ψ ib5,j,, K i,3,j := ξb,j,2 + η ib5,j,2, return sk S := (S, k0, {Ki,,j,K i,2,j,k i,3,j} i=,,l;j=,,5 ) Enc(pk, m,γ:= {x,,x n x j F q,n n }) : y := (y,,y n ) such that n j=0 y n jz j = z n n n j= (z x j), f Fq r,ω,ϕ 0,ζ F q, ϕ F q, c 0 := (ζ, f, 0, 0, ϕ 0 ) B0, 2n+2r c := ( ω y, f, 0 2n+2r, 0, ϕ ) B c T := g ζ T m, ct Γ := (Γ, c 0, c,c T ), return ct Γ Dec(pk, sk S := (S, k0, {Ki,,j,K i,2,j,k i,3,j} i=,,l j=,,5 ), ct Γ := (Γ, c 0, c,c T )) : If S := (M,ρ) accepts Γ, then compute I and {α i } i I such that = i I α im i, where M i is the i-th row of M, and I {i {,,l} [ρ(i) =v i v i Γ ] } for i I, if ρ(i) =v i, v i := (v i,l ) n l= := (v n i,,v i, ), ki := ( K i,,,v i,2ki,2,,, v i,nki,2,,m i,ki,3,,, M i,rki,3,, Ki,,5,v i,2ki,2,5,, v i,nki,2,5,m i,ki,3,5,, M i,rki,3,5 ), 2n+2r that is, ki := ( θ i v i,ξm i, 0 2n+2r, ψ i v i,η i M i, 0 ) B, k := i I α iki, K := e(c 0, k0) e(c, k ), return m := c T /K [Correctness] If S := (M,ρ) accepts Γ, K = e(c 0, k0) e(c, k )= g ξs0+ζ T g ξ P i I αisi T = g ζ T where s 0 := f, s i := M i f for i =,,l We note that secret key sk S consists of 5l + 5 group elements and ciphertext ct Γ consists of 5(n + r) + 5 group elements (and one G T element) While our adaptively secure KP- and CP-BE schemes have the maximum of size r as one of public parameters, they allow several useful class of access structures ccording to the explicit construction of span programs from boolean formulas (eg, ppendix of [6]), while appending ND gate gets r (and l) larger, appending OR gate gets only l larger Therefore, for example, available access structures for our adaptive BE include any r-cnf formula with any arbitrarily long disjunctions (for a bounded r), ie, length r conjunctions of arb long length t,,t r disjunctions for arbitrarily large t,,t r like (X arb long X t ) (Z Z tr ), where unbounded multi-use of attributes for X,,X t,,z,,z tr is allowed The j-th column of the LSS matrix M P j ι= tι t j is given by ( 0,,0,,,, 0,,0) T with length l = r ι= t ι for j =,,r when the target is all vector Fq r 6

17 55 Security of the Proposed KP-BE The standard DLIN assumption is defined in ppendix Theorem 2 The proposed multi-use KP-BE scheme is adaptively payloadhiding against chosen plaintext attacks under the DLIN assumption Let ν (resp ν 2 ) be (the maximum of) the number of pre-challenge (resp postchallenge) key queries, and ν := ν + ν 2 the total number of key queries l is the maximum of the number of rows in access matrices (of key queries) Outline of the Proof of Theorem 2 t the top level strategy of the security proof, the dual system encryption by Waters [24] is employed, where ciphertexts and secret keys have two forms, normal and semi-functional The real system uses only normal ciphertexts and normal secret keys, and semi-functional ciphertexts and keys are used only in subsequent security games for the security proof To prove this theorem, we employ Game 0 (original adaptive security game) through Game 4 Games proceed as follows: Game 0 for h =,,ν, /* Game sequence */ Game -h- Game -h-2 for p =,,l, /* Game -h-3 sequence */ Game -h-3-p- Game -h-3-p-2 Game -h-3-p-3 Game -h-4 Game 2 for h = ν +,,ν(= ν + ν 2 ), /* Game 3 sequence */ Game 3-h- for p =,,l, /* Game 3-h-2 sequence */ Game 3-h-2-p- Game 3-h-2-p-2 Game 3-h-2-p-3 Game 3-h-3 Game 3-h-4 Game 4 The security games consist of two main parts, Game sequence for pre-challenge keys and Game 3 sequence for post-challenge keys We follow the approach initiated by Lewko-Waters [7] and extended by ttrapadung [2, 3], namely, two different semi-functional forms for keys and ciphertexts are used in the two respective sequences, called selective-policy semi-functional and selective-attributes semi-functional Normal forms are given by Eq (7) for ciphertexts and Eqs (5) and (6) for keys Notable properties of these forms are: LSS matrix M := (M i ) is directly encoded in keys {ki }l i= and randomness for the LSS, f, is encoded in ciphertext c Game sequence (for pre-challenge keys) The Game sequence is parametrized by the pre-challenge key index h =,,ν The simulator is first given access structure S := (M,ρ) for the h-th key query from the adversary, then given attributes Γ := {x t } for the challenge query The 7

18 key task of the simulator is to embed S := (M,ρ), ie, encoded vector v i and rows M i of M, into the challenge ciphertext appropriately Since the policy S is first revealed to the simulator, we use selective-policy semi-functional keys and ciphertext in the sequence selective-policy semi-functional ciphertext is given by Eq (8) and selectivepolicy semi-functional key is given by Eqs (9) and (6) Temporary form keys are given by Eqs (0) (3) Notable properties of these forms are: selective-policy semi-functional key given by Eqs (9) and (6) and all temporary form keys in the Game sequence, Eqs (0) (3), are all independent from the challenge attribute set Γ (Partial) randomness for LSS matrix, a h, in the challenge ciphertext is selected depending on access structure S := (M,ρ) intheh-th queried key (and challenge attributes Γ ) such that a h { ah Fq r M i a h = 0 if v i := ρ(i) Γ for all i =,,l,and a h 0} Randomness ξ in Eq (9) for k0 and {ξ p} p= l in Eqs (2) and (3) for {kp} are independently and uniformly distributed in F q Moreover, the variable ξ is independent from all the other variables, and this is the goal of the Game sequence Game 3 sequence (for post-challenge keys) The Game 3 sequence is parametrized by the post-challenge key index h = ν +,,ν The simulator is first given attributes Γ := {x t } for the challenge query from the adversary, then given access structure S := (M,ρ) for the h-th key query The key task of the simulator is to embed Γ := {x t }, ie, encoded vector y, into the reply to the h-th key query, appropriately Since the attributes Γ are first revealed to the simulator, we use selective-attributes semi-functional keys and ciphertext in the sequence selective-attributes semi-functional ciphertext is given by Eqs (4) and (5), and selective-attributes semi-functional key is given by Eqs (8) and (6) Temporary form ciphertext is given by Eq (7) Notable properties of these forms are: selective-attributes semi-functional cipheretxt given by Eqs (4) and (5) and the temporal form cipheretxt, Eq (7), are all independent from the h-th (and all) queried key policy S Only key components kp in the h-th queried key with v p := ρ(p) Γ are additionally randomized by using a new θ p F q (in Game 3-h-2-p-3), which is determined by the h-th access structure S and challenge attributes Γ niformly distributed randomness ξ F q in Eq (8) for k 0 is independent from all the other variables, and this is the goal of the Game 3 sequence In Game 4, the challenge ciphertext is changed to non-functional form, component c T is independently distributed from other components (c 0, c ) In the final game, the advantage of the adversary is zero s usual, we prove that the advantage gaps between neighboring games are negligible, using computational problems, Problems 3 and information-theoretical game changes We 8

19 have shown that the intractability of (complicated) Problems 3 is reduced to that of the DLIN Problem through several intermediate steps, or intermediate problems, as in [9, 2, 23] Proof of Theorem 2 To prove Theorem 2, we consider the following (3l + 3)(ν + ν 2 ) + 3 games In Game 0, a part framed by a box indicates positions of coefficients to be changed in a subsequent game In the other games, a part framed by a box indicates coefficients which were changed in a game from the previous game Game0: Original game That is, the reply to a key query for S := (M,ρ) with l r matrix M =(M i )is: k 0 := (, ξ, 0,η 0, 0) B 0, (5) for i =,,l, k i := ( θ i v i,ξm i, 0 2n+2r,ψ i v i,η i M i, 0 ) B, (6) where v i := (v n i,, v i, ) if ρ(i) =v i, ξ,η 0,η i,θ i,ψ i Fq The challenge ciphertext for plaintexts (m (0),m () )andγ := {x,, x n x j F q,n n } is: c 0 := ( ζ, f, } 0, 0, ϕ 0 ) B0, c T := g ζ T m(b), (7) c := ( ω y, f, 0 2n+2r, 0, ϕ ) B, where y := (y,,y n ) such that n j=0 y n jz j = z n n n j= (z x j), and b {0, }; ζ,ω,ϕ 0 Fq, f Fq r, ϕ F q Game -h- (h =,,ν ) : Game -0-4 is Game 0 Same as Game -(h )-4 except that c 0 and c in the challenge ciphertexts for Γ := {x t } are c 0 := ( ζ, f, a h, 0, ϕ 0 ) B0, (8) c := ( ω y, f, ω y, a h,ω y, a h, 0, ϕ ) B, where ω Fq,theh-th key query is for S := (M,ρ) with l r matrix M =(M i ) and a h { ah Fq r M i a h =0if v i y = 0 for all i =,,l,and a h 0}, and all the other variables are generated as in Game -(h )-4 Game -h-2 (h =,,ν ): Game -h-2 is the same as Game -h- except all ki in the h-th queried key for S := (M,ρ) with l r matrix M =(M i)are: k 0 := (, ξ, ξ,η 0, 0) B 0, (9) for i =,, l, k i := ( θ i v i,ξm i, θ i v i,ξ M i, 0,ψ i v i,η i M i, 0 ) B, (0) where θ i,ξ Fq and all the other variables are generated as in Game -h- Game -h-3-p- (h =,,ν ; p =,,l): Game -h is Game -h-2 Game -h-3-p- is the same as Game -h-3-(p )-3 except kp in the h-th 9

20 queried key for S := (M,ρ) with l r matrix M =(M i )is: k p := ( θ p v p,ξm p, 0,θ p v p,ξ M p,ψ p v p,η p M p, 0 ) B, () where all the variables are generated as in Game -h-3-(p )-3 Game -h-3-p-2 (h =,,ν ; p =,,l): Game -h-3-p-2 is the same as Game -h-3-p- except kp in the the h-th queried key for S := (M,ρ) with l r matrix M =(M i )is: k p := ( θ p v p,ξm p, 0,θ p v p, ξ pm p,ψ p v p,η p M p, 0 ) B, (2) where ξ p F q and all the other variables are generated as in Game -h-3-p- Game -h-3-p-3 (h =,,ν ; p =,,l): Game -h-3-p-3 is the same as Game -h-3-p-2 except kp in the h-th queried key for S := (M,ρ) with l r matrix M =(M i )is: k p := ( θ p v p,ξm p, θ p v p,ξ pm p, 0,ψ p v p,η p M p, 0 ) B, (3) where all the variables are generated as in Game -h-3-p-2 Note that in Game -h-3-l-3, the uniformly distributed variable ξ in k0 (Eq (9)) is independent from all the other variables Game -h-4 (h =,,ν ): Game -h-4 is the same as Game -h-3-l-3 except k i (i =,,l)intheh-th queried key for S := (M,ρ) with l r matrix M =(M i )are: for i =,,l, ki := ( θ i v i,ξm i, 0, 0,ψ i v i,η i M i, 0 ) B, (= Eq (6)) where all the variables are generated as in Game -h-3-l-3 Game 2 : Game 2 is the same as Game -ν -4 except the challenge ciphertext is: c 0 := ( ζ, f, f, 0, ϕ 0 ) B0, (4) c := ( ω y, f, ω y, f,ω y, f, 0, ϕ ) B, (5) where f F r q and all the other variables are generated as in Game -ν -4 Game 3-h- (h = ν +,,ν): Game 3-ν -4 is Game 2 Game 3-h- is the same as Game 3-(h )-4 except that all the h-th queried key for S := (M,ρ) with l r matrix M =(M i )is: k 0 := (, ξ, ξ,η 0, 0) B 0, for i =,, l, k i := ( θ i v i,ξm i, θ i v i,ξ M i, 0,ψ i v i,η i M i, 0 ) B, 20

21 where ξ,θ i F q, and all the other variables are generated as in Game 3-(h )- 4 Game 3-h-2-p- (h = ν +,,ν; p =,,l): Game 3-h is Game 3-h- Game 3-h-2-p- is the same as Game 3-h-2-(p )-3 except kp in the reply to the h-th key query for S := (M,ρ) with l r matrix M =(M i )is: if v p y 0, k p := ( θ p v p,ξm p, 0,θ p v p,ξ M p,ψ p v p,η p M p, 0 ) B, where all the variables are generated as in Game 3-h-2-(p )-3 Game 3-h-2-p-2 (h = ν +,,ν; p =,,l): Game 3-h-2-p-2 is the same as Game 3-h-2-p- except kp in the reply to the h-th key query for S := (M,ρ) with l r matrix M =(M i )is: if v p y 0, kp := ( θ p v p,ξm p, 0, θ p,θ p v p 2,ξ M p,ψ p v p,η p M p, 0 ) B, where θ p F q, v p 2 := (vp n 2,,v p, ) Fq n is the last n entriesof v p for v p = ρ(p), and all the other variables are generated as in Game 3-h-2-p- Game 3-h-2-p-3 (h = ν +,,ν; p =,,l): Game 3-h-2-p-3 is the same as Game 3-h-2-p-2 except kp in the reply to the h-th key query for S := (M,ρ) with l r matrix M =(M i )is: if v p y 0, k p := ( θ p v p,ξm p, θ p,θ p v 2 p,ξ M p, 0,ψ p v p,η p M p, 0 ) B, (6) where all the variables are generated as in Game 3-h-2-p-2 Game 3-h-3 (h = ν +,,ν): Game 3-h-3 is the same as Game 3-h-2-l-3 except that c in the challenge ciphertext for Γ := {x t }, and (ki )i=0 l in the reply to the h-th key query for S := (M,ρ) with l r matrix M =(M i )are: c := ( ω y, f, ω, 0, z, 0, ϕ ) B, (7) k0 := (, ξ, ξ, 0, ϕ 0 ) B 0, (8) for i =,,l, if v i y =0, k i := (θ i v i,ξm i, ξ ω M i f,θ i v 2 i,ξ M i, 0,ψ i v i,η i M i, 0 ) B, (9) where ξ Fq, z Fq and all the other variables are generated as in Game 3-h-2-l-3 Game 3-h-4 (h = ν +,,ν): Game 3-h-4 is the same as Game 3-h-3 except that c in the challenge ciphertext for Γ := {x t }, and (ki )l i= in the reply to the h-th key query for S := (M,ρ) with l r matrix M =(M i )are: c := ( ω y, f, ω y, f,ω y, f, 0, ϕ ) B, (= Eq (5)) for i =,,l, ki := ( θ i v i,ξm i, 0, 0,ψ i v i,η i M i, 0 ) B, (= Eq (6)) 2

22 where all the variables are generated as in Game 3-h-3 Game 4 : Game 4 is the same as Game 3-ν-4 except that c 0 in the challenge ciphertext for S := (M,ρ) with l r matrix is: c 0 := ( ζ, f, f,η 0, 0) B0, where ζ Fq (ie, independent from all the other variables, in particular, from ζ F q ), and all the other variables are generated as in Game 3-ν-4 We show lemmas that evaluate the gaps between pairs of the advantages of neighboring games This completes the proof of Theorem 2 Lemmas We will show lemmas for evaluating advantage gaps between neighboring games Intermediate problems, Problems 3, whose intractability is reduced to that of DLIN (Lemmas 22 24), are used below Problem (resp 2) is a standard decisional subspace problem for ciphertexts (resp keys) side [9] and Problem 3 swaps coefficients in the 2ñ-dimensional semi-functional space (ie, Problem 2 in [23]) ll the problems are given in ppendix C Proofs of several key lemmas are given in ppendix D In particular, informationtheoretical changes treated in proofs of Lemmas 8 and 4 are based on our new Lemma 3 in crucial manners, respectively, and the proof of Lemma 6 uses an interesting proof technique given in (the full version of) [20] Lemma 4 For any adversary, there exists a probabilistic machine B, whose running time is essentially the same as that of, such that for any security parameter λ, dv (0) (λ) dv(--) (λ) dv P B (λ)+ɛ(λ), where ɛ(λ) is a negligible function Proof Lemma 4 is proven in a similar manner to Lemma 4 in [9] by using a Problem instance In Game 0, all the queried keys are normal s in a usual dual system encryption proof, we can transform a normal ciphertext to a semifunctional form Eq (8) by using Problem It is because, since all the queried keys are normal, a non-zero coefficient vector of the semi-functional part in the challenge ciphertext can be changed information-theoretically to any non-zero vector by using a random base change except with negligible probability Full proof of Lemma 4 is given in ppendix D Lemma 5 For any adversary, for any security parameter λ, dv (-(h )-4) (λ) dv (-h-) (λ) ɛ(λ) for 2 h ν,whereɛ(λ) is a negligible function Proof In Game -(h )-4, semi-functional parts of all key components k0 are uniformly random or zero and ki for i are zero Therefore, the semifunctional part of the challenge cipheretxt c 0, c can be conceptually changed to any vector except for negligible probability Therefore, we obtain c 0, c as in Eq (8) Full proof of Lemma 5 is given in ppendix D2 22