Shortest Paths from a Group Perspective - a Note on Selsh Routing Games with Cognitive Agents

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1 Shortest Paths from a Group Perspective - a Note on Selsh Routing Games with Cognitive Agents Johannes Scholz 1 1 Research Studios Austria, Studio ispace, Salzburg, Austria July 17, 2013 Abstract This paper elaborates on the eect of cognitive agents on selsh routing in trac networks with linear latency functions. Selsh routing occurs when each agent traveling in a network acts purely selsh, and thus the Braess Paradoxon is likely to occur. The Braess Paradoxon describes a situation where an additional low-latency edge is added to a given network, which leads to higher total latency in the system. By applying the concept of cognitive agents, each agent is able to make non-selsh decisions. In addition, each agent has to cope with uncertainty in terms of travel time information in the trac system - which is also true for real-world trac networks. This paper evaluates on the inuence of travel time uncertainty and non-selsh behavior of the agents and the eect on the overall latency. The results indicate that the both, non-selshness and uncertainty have an inuence on the latency. In addition, understanding the inuence of cognitive agents on latency can help to better plan and inuence trac ows resulting in "more optimal" ows with lower latency. 1 Introduction The shortest path problem is well studied in literature and is applied in several application contexts in the eld of Geographic Information Science and Technology. This is the foundation for applications in the context of personal and vehicle navigation. Hence, people tend to use navigation devices in order to nd their way in unfamiliar environments. In addition, cars are equipped with a built-in or mobile navigation systems that are capable of receiving (near) real-time trac information - e.g. closed roads or trac congestion. johannes.scholz@researchstudio.at 1

2 Currently, navigation comprises of the activities "waynding" (planning) and "locomotion" (execution of movements) (Montello 2005). Due to the fact, that (near) real-time information is integrated in the navigation process, the separation of "planning" and the "execution of movements" is diminishing. In literature, navigation is described in a way that the user selects a destination and a certain type of cost - e.g. time, fuel cost, travel distance - necessary for evaluating a route. Based on the chosen cost the navigation system responds with the minimum cost route from the current location to the destination. The planning procedure is valid for static situations neglecting temporal change, and not taking into account that trac is a "living" system that shows certain dynamics. This is due to a number of players in a road network whose decisions aect the state of the network in the future (e.g. travel time, topology). Hence, the network and according attributes are time-dependent and a deterministic prediction cannot be obtained. In order to nd shortest paths in a dynamic network several methods have been published (Kamburowski 1985; Kaufman and Smith 1993; Orda and Rom 1991; Ziliaskopoulos and Mahmassani 1993; Ding, Yu, and Qin 2008). These algorithms try to "react" to dynamic conditions in the road network, and result in one shortest path for exactly one agent navigating in the network in a given situation - i.e. network status within the time-frame of the shortest path traversal). From the literature it is evident, that route planning is tailored towards one single user, and thus does not elaborate on the relations of decisions of agents acting in an network. In order to simulate decisions of a group of agents game theory is employed in literature (e.g. Roughgarden 2005). Braess (1968) elaborates on a problem in trac modeling that is denoted as "Braess Paradoxon", describing a situation where a given set of players in a trac network try to nd the "best route" in a selsh manner. Due to the fact that an extra edge is added to the network, a layman could assume that the average travel time of the players is lower than the original network layout. In fact, the travel times are higher than the original travel times without the extra edge (Braess 1968; Roughgarden 2005) Roughgarden (2005) and Braess (1968) assume non-cooperative games in that respect, and assume selsh players in the system under investigation. In this paper the we apply the concept of cognitive agents to this problem. Hence, each player is aware of the situation in the network and thus is able to make decisions accordingly. In order to investigate on the eect of the behavior of cognitive agents the approach in this paper evaluates: varying probabilities of players to act in a non-selsh way - i.e. agents may act non-selsh. varying uncertainty of travel time information - i.e. the information on the network congestion-status for agents is fuzzy 2

3 in the context street networks. The research question in this respect is: "Which eect do cognitive agents with uncertain information on the network status have on the latency of all agents acting in the network?" The rationale behind the contribution is as follows. Due to the fact that selsh routing depends on selsh behavior of agents in a network, there is no fuzziness in the decisions involved. This holds true for situations in which agents have accurate information on the network status, and act purely selsh - which is true for machines and only partly for humans. In a transport network with cognitive agents, we apply the assumption that each agent has the ability to act non-selsh, and trac information are uncertain. The latter is inspired by the fuzzy information provided by any radio trac service. The driver is not able to evaluate the accuracy of the trac situation. Thus, either the provided trac information can be regarded as only partly accurate - the agent does not trust it, e.g. due to own experience - or the agent fully trusts the trac radio service although inaccurate (e.g. there is a delay from a trac incident to broadcasting trac information). Generally speaking, in real world situations any agent in a network does not necessarily have an accurate overview on the network status, which leads to a certain degree of uncertainty in his decisions. Hence, selsh routing with non-cooperative games does not include the uncertainty of agents in a network. The paper is organized as follows. In chapter two the relevant work is listed and analyzed, followed by a chapter on the methodology applied in this paper to evaluate the eect of cognitive agents on selsh routing. Chapter four presents the results and the analysis thereof, followed by a summary in chapter ve. 2 Shortest Paths, Network Flows, Routing Games and Selsh Routing This section elaborates on concepts of the shortest paths problem and relevant theory from routing games that are related to shortest paths. A combination thereof results in selsh routing - a concept where players in network behave strictly selsh. Although the shortest path problem has been widely covered in literature, some basic terminology is dened that is used throughout the paper. Routing games are "games" - in the sense of game theory (Myerson 1991) - that occur in non-cooperative situations, where several agents try to nd the best strategy that increases their own benet. Generally, agents alter their strategy to improve their own benet until they cannot increase the benet any further. This situation is described in literature as equilibrium state - the Nash equilibrium (Nash 1951). Selsh routing is a result of dierent agents acting in a network, trying to nd the best routing solution from a strictly personal viewpoint, regardless of the consequence for other agents. 3

4 2.1 Shortest Paths and Network Flows The shortest path problem is well studied in literature and applied in several contexts. Nevertheless, this section attempts to dene a basic set of terms that are used in this paper. Any network is a set of nodes and edges, where an edge is a connection of two nodes. Nodes represent e.g. intersections of roads, whereas edges represent e.g. road and/or segments thereof. Edges are assumed to be directed, i.e. each edge consists of an ordered pair of nodes. In the network a number of dierent paths exist that connect a source node with a sink node, where a path is an ordered sequence of edges. Additionally, each edge is assigned a cost function that represents the travel time to traverse the edge. In order to formally describe networks and shortest paths the following notation is used. A Graph G = (V, E) consists of a set V, of n vertices and a set E, of m edges. Additionally each edge has a cost function c e : R + R +. It is assumed that the cost function is nonnegative, continuous and non-decreasing, which avoids cycles with negative length avoiding a NP-hard problem. The length of a path is dened as the sum of all lengths of the edges in that path. The shortest path problem is distinguishable into three kinds of problems: one-to-one, one-to-all and all-to-all shortest paths. The one-to-one shortest path problem is to nd the shortest path between a source s and a sink t. The one-to-all shortest path problem is to generate a solution to shortest paths from one source to all other vertices. The all-to-all shortest path problem is dened as nding the shortest paths from all vertices to all other vertices. The one-to-one and the one-to-all shortest path problem is solved by the original Dijkstra algorithm (Dijkstra 1959) or variants of (see Ahuja, Magnanti, and Orlin (1993) for details) in at least O(n 2 ). The result of all-to-all shortest path is achieved by executing a shortest path algorithm repeatedly - as often as the number of nodes. Nevertheless, more ecient algorithms are described in literature (Ahuja, Magnanti, and Orlin 1993). Network ow problems are central issues in operations research and arise in a certain number of real world applications (Goldberg, Tardos, and Tarjan 1990). These problems are based on the existence of a ow network - i.e. a directed graph. A non-negative ow capacity c is assigned to each edge, dening the maximum ow on that edge, which is denoted as c u,v. A ow in a network is dened as a function f : E R + such that f(u, v) c(u, v) (u, v) E (Capacity Constraint) and Σ v V f(u, v) = Σ v V f(v, u), for u s, t (Flow Conservation). s, t denote source and sink of the network ow. With network ows it is possible to model problems from graph theory, which have practical relevance (Ahuja, Magnanti, and Orlin 1993). Wellknown is the max ow problem, which determines the maximum ow in a network between source and a sink, based on the dened ow capacities for each edge (Goldberg, Tardos, and Tarjan 1990; Papadimitriou and Steiglitz 1998). In comparison to selsh routing, the maximum ow problem does not 4

5 include a cost function for each edge. Hence, the maximum ow problem does not tackle the issue that higher amount of trac on a certain edge increases the cost of transportation (whatever the cost may be - e.g. increasing time to traverse the edge). 2.2 Routing Games and Selsh Routing Routing games are part of the eld of game theory (Myerson 1991) containing routing decisions in a network. Game theory deals with mathematical models - i.e. conict or cooperation - of decision making of intelligent rational decision makers (Myerson 1991). A well-known example of Game Theory is the Prisoners dilemma (Tucker 1950) where two players are having a cost of 4 in the Nash equilibrium, while both could only have a cost of 2 by coordinating. Hence, in non-cooperative situations, where several agents try to nd the best strategy to increase their own benet, the players have a payo for non-cooperating. This payo - regarded as the Price of Anarchy (Papadimitriou 2001) - measures the ineciency of the Nash equilibrium. Hence, it is dened as ratio between the worst objective function value and the value of the optimal one. For routing, an objective function may comprise of the total travel time - which has to be minimized accordingly. Such an ineciency - the Price of Anarchy - is also present in simple routing games. Consider Pigou's example (Pigou 1920) - depicted in gure 1 - where two edges connect a source s and target node t. Each edge is assigned a cost function, dening the cost (i.e. travel time in this example) for traversing the edge as a function of the amount of trac on the edge. One edge has a c(x) = 1, representing a long route whose travel time is immune to congestion. The other edges cost increases as the trac increases, due to the cost function c(x) = x. Hence, if less than one vehicle uses the lower edge with c(x) = x, then this edge is cheaper than the edge with c(x) = 1. Using this model in a routing game where a number of agents are applied, where each player chooses independently on the edge traversed from s to t. We assume that there is one unit of trac that represents a set of individual players. Additionally, it is assumed that each agent's objective is to minimize its cost. In the unique Nash equilibrium, all agents follow the strategy of traversing the edge with c(x) = x. Hence, each agent faces one unit if cost. An optimal outcome of this example - by dening an objective function "minimizing the average cost incurred by agents" - is that the trac is split between the two edges equally. This results in half of the agents have cost 1 and the other half incur only 1/2 units of cost. The average cost observed by the users results in 3/4 units. Hence the Price of Anarchy in this example is 4/3. Generally, selsh routing games occur in arbitrary complex networks G = (V, E) where a set of agents can independently choose between the strategies 5

6 Figure 1: Pigou's example. A cost function c(x) calculates the cost of an edge, as the amount of trac traversing the edge (graphics from Roughgarden 2005). to follow. In addition, each edge e is assigned a cost function c e that is nonnegative, continuous and non-decreasing. 3 Preliminaries and Methodology to Quantify the Impact of Cognitive Agents on a Collective of Players This section elaborates on the methodological approach to evaluate on the eects of cognitive agents in the context of a group. Based on the relevant work, presented in chapter 2 we propose an agent based approach to simulate the behavior of players in a network with linear congestion functions as costs, similar to the selsh routing examples given in (Braess 1968; Roughgarden 2005). Hence, a network with linear costs functions that model congestion is dened which serves as environment in which the agents act. The approach comprises of an experiment setting that analyzes dierent probability levels of non-selshness and levels uncertainty of travel time information with respect to cognitive agents. 3.1 Preliminaries: Network Denition and Selsh Routing Games In this section the network for the modeling the impact of cognitive agents on selsh routing are dened. In addition, the mathematical denitions relevant to understand and model the methodology are given. The network dened as a directed Graph G = (V, E) with linear cost functions c e : R + R + e.g. c e (x) = ax + b. The Graph G has k source and destination vertex pairs {s 1, t 1 },..., {s k, t k }. A set of simple s i t i is denoted as P i and P = i P i. Any ow is dened as a function f : P R +, and a xed ow f is dened as f e = P :e P i f P. In addition, a nite, positive rate r i is associated with each pair s i, t i, the ow amount with source s i and 6

7 destination t i. Generally, a ow is feasible if i P P i f P = r i. Each edge e E is given a load-dependent latency function that is denoted as l e ( ). The latency function is non-negative, dierentiable and non-decreasing. Hence, the triple (G, r, l) is called an instance. The latency of a path P with respect to a ow f is the sum of latencies of the edges in the path represented by l P (f) = e P l e(f e ). Consecutively, the cost C(f) of a ow f in G is the total latency incurred by f is dened by C(f) = P P l P (f)f P. (1) In order to create a "testbed" for selsh routing we dene an instance (G, r, l). First, a directed Graph G is created that is has four nodes and basically four edges with linear latency functions. The graph is depicted in gure 2 together with the latency functions l for each edge respectively. Two edges are assigned the latency functions l AB = l CD = x/100 and the others are assigned l BD = l AC = 45. In order to evaluate the eects of cognitive agents on the Braess Paradoxon, the "additional" edge is depicted with a dashed line from node B to node C. The extra edge is assigned a latency function of l BC = 1. Figure 2: Network to evaluate on the eect of cognitive agents, and suitable to show the Braess Paradox. By adding an edge - that should intuitively help - a negative impact on all users of a congested network can be observed. The latency function l of each edge with respect to the number of agents on the edge x is given accordingly. The Braess Paradoxon, introduced in section 3.2, in the context of the network given in gure 2 is tries to overcome latency in a congested network. Hence, an additional edge (e BC ) is added to the network, as the original (nondashed edges) are no high-capacity roads. In order to simulate trac on the network we assume 4000 agents traveling from node A to node D along 7

8 the given edges. Considering the original network without the additional edge e BC the players in the game would behave similar to a non-cooperative game. Hence, 2000 agents would take the path P 1 = {A, B, D} and the remaining 2000 agents choose path P 2 = {A, C, D} (see gure 3). The given result is a ow at Nash equilibrium (Friedman 2004; Roughgarden and Tardos 2002; Frank 1968; Steinberg and Zangwill 1983), which indicates that each agent is behaving "greedy", without regard of the overall cost. Hence, each player travels along the minimum latency path currently available, with respect to the ow created by other players. If a ow is at Nash equilibrium for an instance (G, r, l) assuming i {i,..., k} and P 1, P 2 P i with f P1 > 0, l P1 (f) l P2 (f) then all s i t i paths have equal latency. In the example, employed here, the overall latency (cost of ow) C(f) to be at units - equals to 65 units per agent. If the additional edge with high capacity - i.e. low latency l BC = 1 - is added to the network, a ow at Nash equilibrium exists (assuming a non-cooperative game). The ow results in the following situation: all 4000 agents take the path P 3 = {A, B, C, D} (see gure 3 - indicated by the red colored edges). The unique ow at equilibrium has total cost C(f) of units - equals to 81 units per agent (Roughgarden 2005; Roughgarden and Tardos 2002; Beckmann, McGuire, and Winsten 1956; Wardrop 1952). Figure 3: Nash ow and corresponding cost per agent C(f)/agent = 65 in the original network (left), and Nash ow after insertion of a high capacity edge. The total cost per agent C(f)/agent = 81 is higher than in the original network. 3.2 Methodology to Evaluate the Eects of Cognitive Agents To evaluate the eect of cognitive agents on the Braess Paradoxon and shortest paths of groups of agents, we rst introduce the concept of cognitive agents used in this work. Consecutively, the evaluation approach is highlighted that incorporates varying levels of selshness and uncertainty of 8

9 travel times of the available paths from node A to D. Opposed to non-cooperative games, where agents are acting strictly selfish, the approach presented here comprises of cognitive agents. These agents are capable of making own decisions based on their perceptions of the environment they act in (Frank, Bittner, and Raubal 2001; Russel and Norvig 1995). The concept of cognitive agents has been applied to waynding in built environments (Raubal and Worboys 1999; Raubal and Egenhofer 1998), and thus seems appropriate for applying in trac situations. Hence, the agents in this work are able to make their own - eventually non-selsh - decisions while acting in the trac network. In this work the reason for an agent's decision is not a research focus, hence we just include simple cognitive abilities of the agent. Any agent is able to perceive the network status - i.e. congestion and latency - of a certain path. In addition, an agent can take action and choose a certain path to travel from node A to D. Thus, the behavior of an agent has an eect on the other agents in terms of latency (and travel time). Of importance for any decision of an agent is the fact, that a decision does not necessarily have to be purely selsh - i.e. an agent may choose a path with higher latency (longer travel time) - for what reason ever. Possible justications for that behavior could be in personal preferences regarding the route choice, toll roads/taxes (e.g. Cole, Dodis, and Roughgarden 2006), or assumptions the agent has regarding the behavior of other agents in terms of prospective memory (Abdalla and Frank 2011). In order to evaluate on the eect of non-selsh behavior of agents acting in the environment dierent levels of selshness are employed. Therefore the parameter non-selshness probability P NS is created. The values of the parameter can range from 0 to 100, where 0 indicates a strictly selsh behavior and 100 assumes purely non-selsh behavior of the agents. A P NS value of 50 means that there is a 50% probability that a decision of an agent will be non-selsh. Hence, the agent will not take the "obvious" faster path P 3 = {A, B, C, D}, but chooses one of the "slower" paths P 1 or P 2 respectively. In order to evaluate on the eect of non-selsh behavior of agent's probabilities of non-selshness from 0 to 100 in 5 unit steps - i.e. 0, 5, 10,..., 100 are under review. Due to the fact that agents in a trac environment do not necessarily have accurate information on the status of trac network we include uncertainty of travel times in our approach. The uncertainty can be justied by the fact that in real world situations radio trac services provide inaccurate information. An agent is not able to evaluate on the accuracy of the trac information provided, especially for road segments far ahead of the current position. In addition, any trac information can be regarded as only partly accurate in two ways: the agent does not trust trac information - e.g. due to own experiences 9

10 the agent fully trusts the trac radio service although the information is inaccurate (e.g. there is a delay from a trac incident to broadcasting trac information) Generally speaking, in real world situations any agent in a network does not necessarily have an accurate overview on the network status, which leads to a certain degree of uncertainty of the decisions. In order to evaluate the inuence of varying levels of uncertainty on the Braess Paradoxon and groups of agents, we added uncertainty in latency and travel time, denoted as t, to the path P 3 = {A, B, C, D} in the network. Hence, the total latency with uncertainty at P 3 is denoted as C (f). The calculation of C (f) is dened in equation 2, C (f) = l P (f)f P + l P (f)f P (1 + rand t /100) (2) P P 3 P {P 1,P 2 } where rand t is a randomized positive number of the closed interval [0, t ]. The t is assigned ranging from 0 to 100 in 10 unit steps - i.e. 0, 10, 20,..., 100, according to the level of uncertainty of applied in the specic test run. The evaluation of the impact of various levels of selshness and uncertainty of cognitive agents is carried out with several test runs of the problem instance as such. Generally speaking, for each combination of level of nonselshness P NS and uncertainty applied to latency of P 3 a number of 5000 simulation runs are performed (see gure 4). Thus, in every simulation run 4000 agents have to travel from node A to node D, where they have to make decisions on the route taken, due to their cognitive abilities. Overall, there are 231 combinations of P NS and t. Given the number of 5000 simulations for each distinct combination, there are single simulation runs. For each test run, we collect the following result variables: total latency C (f), number of agents traversing edge e AB, number of agents traversing edge e BD, number of agents traversing edge e AC, number of agents traversing edge e CD, number of agents traversing edge e BC, number of selsh and non-selsh decisions. For each distinct combination of t and P NS the variables collected in each of the 5000 simulation runs are statistically analyzed. Hence, the mean value, the standard deviation and variance of each result variable for each combination of t and P NS is calculated, and marked with e.g. C. 4 Experimental Results This section presents the results of the evaluation approach highlighted in section 3.2. The computational results are given in respective tables, elaborating on the eect of cognitive agents with respect to the experiment settings 10

11 Figure 4: Overview of the methodology to quantify the impact of cognitive agents, levels of selshness and uncertainty on routing for a group of agents. Here the detailed variable names for total latency C (f) values at various levels of non-selshness and travel time uncertainty are depicted - e.g. C (f) 10NS100 denotes total latency value at uncertainty level 10 and non-selshness probability 100. C (f) 0NS0, marked with ( 1), denotes C(f) of the Nash ow with the additional edge BC, whereas C (f) 0NS100, marked with ( 2), denotes C(f) of the ow at Nash equilibrium without edge BC. 11

12 described in section 3.2. In addition, the numerical results are discussed in detail. Hence, this part focuses on an interpretation and critical evaluation of the results achieved. Furthermore, global aspects of this research work are discussed with regard Geographic Information Science in general. Given the evaluation approach proposed in chapter 3, the evaluation starts with the calculation of C(f) of the Nash ow of the original network - i.e. without extra edge - and C e (f) of the Nash ow of the extended network - i.e. with edge BC. Based on these "anchors", highlighted with asterisks in gure 4, the concept of uncertainty of travel times and probability of nonselshness was included. The calculation of C(f) and C e (f) is done according to the methodology mentioned in chapter 3.1. Hence, a non-cooperative game is created and evaluated until no agent can improve the individual situation by changing the behavior. Hence, C(f) results in a number of 65 latency units per agent traveling from A to D, where 2000 agents traverse the edges AB-BD and the other 2000 agents choose AC-CD. For he network with the extra edge BC - having low latency - C e (f) results in a number of 81 units of latency per agent. In this case all 4000 agents traverse the edge AB-BC-CD. This paradoxon - of higher latency values due to an extra high capacity edge - is described in literature as Braess Paradoxon (e.g. Braess 1968). In table 5 the average latency values (i.e. total travel time) per agent are given for dierent levels of travel time uncertainty and probability of non-selshness. The results indicate that the higher the level of uncertainty in terms of travel time t is, the lower is the latency per agent (given a xed probability of non-selshness P (NS) ). This is depicted in gure 5 and table 5. Generally, the prior statement holds true unless for a set of latency times highlighted in orange in table 3. The highlighted C (f) values at a given P (NS) level increase with increasing t. This is due to the denition of the latency functions of the edges in this paper respectively. In gure 6 the behavior of latency values for varying P (NS) with given t is depicted (see table 5 for numerical values). There the latency values for t values 0, 30, 60, 100 are depicted, showing decreasing latency values per agent with increasing P (NS). This monotonically decreasing behavior is present from P (NS) levels 0 to 80 (at least - see table 4), which is justied by the denition of the latency function of the edges in this paper. Both "anomalies" describe the fact that, if all agents would follow the Nash ow without the edge BC - i.e. with latency C(f) - and only a few agents choose to traverse edge BC. Thus, the agents act purely selsh by avoiding the edge BD with latency 45, which reduces latency for the agents (65 units vs (20 + x)/100 where x denotes the number of agents traversing edge BC). Hence, in this particular experiment setting a small number of agents traversing the edge BC can reduce the average latency per agent, which is depicted in gures 5 and 6 and tables 3 and 4. In order to justify the latency values of table 5 the results showing the 12

13 number of agents traversing the respective edges are given in table 7 for edges AB and CD, in table 8 for edges BD and AC. Table 9 lists the number of agents traversing edge BC. These numbers are the basis for calculating the latency values given in table 5 in conjunction with the latency functions given in chapter 3.1. In order to evaluate on the numerical stability of number of agents traversing a certain edge the absolute standard deviation values and variation coecients are given. Table 10 depicts the standard deviation of agents traversing edge AB and CD and the corresponding variation coecient is given in table 11. The standard deviation of agents traversing edge BD and AC is given in table 10. The variation coecient is presented in 11. Table 14 shows the standard deviation of the agents traversing edge BC, whereas table 13 presents the corresponding variation coecient. The variation coecient for edges AB and CD is between 0% and 31%, showing the highest variation coecients at P (NS) values from 50 to 65 across all t levels. In contrast to those numbers, the variation coecients for edges BD and AC are in the range between 8% and 395%, having decreasing variation coecients with higher P (NS) levels - except for P (NS) = 0. Hence, within the conducted test runs the standard deviation of edges BD and AC show higher values in comparison to AB and CD especially at low P (NS) and t. This is due to the fact that at low P (NS) and t edges BD and AC are not traversed by many agents, as most follow the path P 3 = {A, B, C, D}. The variation coecients for edge BC are ranging between 0% and 401% showing high inuence of P (NS) levels - i.e. increasing P (NS) leads to increasing variation coecients. The relationship of variation coecients and t does non seem to be of strong nature, given the numerical values in table 15. In general, the variation coecient reveal situations - i.e. distinct combinations of t and P (NS) - which are volatile. Volatility in this context indicates test runs with high standard deviations, which are in turn unstable in terms of the number of traversing agents. Hence, a forecast or simulation of such given situations is only hardly possible, due to the variability of the system itself. In the experiment setting in this paper the edges AB and CD have an average variation coecient of 16% which is lower than the average variation coecient of edges BD and AC having 53%. Hence, we can assume that the number of traversing agents of AB and CD are considered more stable than on AC and BD. Especially in low t and P (NS) levels variation coecients of AC and BD show high volatility due to the fact that the number of agents traversing these edges is low. The edge BC shows unstable behavior in the test runs where the path P 3 is seldom traversed. The inuence of the two variables t and P (NS) on the average travel time per agent is worth evaluating. In general both variables have an inuence on C (f) per agent, while P (NS) has a greater impact on C (f) per agent, than t. This is justied by the numerical values given in table 5, and by 13

14 the correlation coecients given in table 1 and table 2. In the tables the dependence of the latency values on the variables t and P (NS) is given, where table 2 indicates that P (NS) has higher impact on the C (f) values due to higher correlation coecients in comparison to table 1. Table 1: Correlation ϱ between C (f) for given t levels and P (NS), which indicates the dependence of C (f) on t. ϱ t P (NS) 1 1 t = 0-0,947 t = 10-0,947 t = 20-0,944 t = 30-0,941 t = 40-0,936 t = 50-0,926 t = 60-0,918 t = 70-0,911 t = 80-0,902 t = 90-0,890 t = 100-0,880 On a global level the results reveal that the fastest route for an individual (i.e. shortest path in terms of travel time) does not necessarily have to be the fastest route for a group of people and for the individual itself, with respect to a dened network with latency functions. This is due to the behavior of other agents of the group and the latency due to trac on each edge, which is mentioned in (Roughgarden 2005). Roughgarden and Tardos (2002) and Braess (1968) assume that each agent in the routing game acts strictly selsh, which results in the Braess Paradoxon. Hence, if any player in a trac situation would be equipped with a navigation system and would strictly follow the instructions of the navigation device the Breass Paradoxon is likely to occur. Thus each member of the group travels with higher latency than without an extra high-capacity road present in the network. Roughgarden (2005) mentions that this Price of Anarchy in networks with linear latency functions is at most 4/3. Of particular interest is that individual shortest paths do not necessarily lead to an "optimal" ow in the network if everyone acts selsh. Nevertheless, if we consider real-world situations where agents in a network have uncertain information on a network status the network and agents can act in the network the situation is dierent. Hence, agents may act nonselsh and take the longer path in terms of latency due to their preferences or their assumptions on the trac situation. Hence, this behavior reduces the latency in the network to a certain degree, which is depicted in table 5. In addition, in certain situations where a small amount of agents travel on P 3 the travel latency per agent is lower than in the network without the extra edge (see gures 5, 6 and tables 5, 4). 14

15 Table 2: Correlation ϱ between C (f) for given P (NS) levels and t, which indicates the dependence of C (f) on P (NS). ϱ P(NS) t 1 P (NS) = 0-0,980 P (NS) = 5-0,980 P (NS) = 10-0,982 P (NS) = 15-0,982 P (NS) = 20-0,981 P (NS) = 25-0,980 P (NS) = 30-0,981 P (NS) = 35-0,981 P (NS) = 40-0,982 P (NS) = 45-0,982 P (NS) = 50-0,979 P (NS) = 55-0,982 P (NS) = 60-0,982 P (NS) = 65-0,982 P (NS) = 70-0,978 P (NS) = 75-0,972 P (NS) = 80-0,956 P (NS) = 85-0,746 P (NS) = 90 0,963 P (NS) = 95 0,984 P (NS) = 100 N/A In that context there is a possible impact on Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), that tries to inuence the decisions of agents resulting in an "optimal" ow. This could be realized by edge removal or with taxes applied to high-capacity roads (see Cole, Dodis, and Roughgarden (2006)) or with "recommendations" for agents delivered by present navigation system. In addition, an agent could get rewards for taking detours (i.e. the longer path in terms of travel time). Cole, Dodis, and Roughgarden (2006) argue that the maximum benet of taxes in networks with linear latency functions is 4/3 and with arbitrary latency functions is n/2, where n denotes the number of nodes in the network. An approach to provide the agents acting in a trac network with recommendations for the "optimal" paths in terms of global trac latency, could comprise the communication with navigation systems in real-time (e.g. by utilizing the trac message channel). 5 Conclusion and Future Work This paper elaborates on the eect of cognitive agents on selsh routing in the context of street networks with latency functions. In contrast to the concept of selsh routing which assumes non-cooperative games and strictly selsh agents (Roughgarden and Tardos 2002; Roughgarden 2005), we consider cognitive enabled agents that act in an environment with given uncertainty 15

16 Figure 5: Diagram showing the latency values per agent for given nonselshness probabilities over varying travel time uncertainty values t. Figure 6: Diagram showing the latency values per agent for given level of travel time uncertainty t over varying probabilities of non-selshness P (NS). 16

17 Table 3: Increasing average latency times C (f) for varying t (rows) are marked with orange colored numbers. Latency C (f) t P (NS) per agent travel time uncertainty t P (NS) ,00 80,55 78,40 76,58 75,05 73,88 72,86 72,02 71,29 70,80 70, ,00 64,99 64,96 64,92 64,88 64,84 64,83 64,81 64,80 64,80 64, ,85 64,85 64,84 64,82 64,81 64,80 64,80 64,80 64,81 64,81 64, ,80 64,80 64,80 64,80 64,81 64,81 64,82 64,83 64,84 64,85 64, ,86 64,85 64,86 64,86 64,87 64,88 64,89 64,90 64,91 64,92 64, ,00 65,00 65,00 65,00 65,00 65,00 65,00 65,00 65,00 65,00 65,00 Table 4: Increasing average latency times C (f) for varying P (NS) (columns) are marked with orange colored numbers. Latency C (f) t P (NS) per agent travel time uncertainty t P (NS) ,00 80,55 78,40 76,58 75,05 73,88 72,86 72,02 71,29 70,80 70, ,00 64,99 64,96 64,92 64,88 64,84 64,83 64,81 64,80 64,80 64, ,85 64,85 64,84 64,82 64,81 64,80 64,80 64,80 64,81 64,81 64, ,80 64,80 64,80 64,80 64,81 64,81 64,82 64,83 64,84 64,85 64, ,86 64,85 64,86 64,86 64,87 64,88 64,89 64,90 64,91 64,92 64, ,00 65,00 65,00 65,00 65,00 65,00 65,00 65,00 65,00 65,00 65,00 17

18 Table 5: Result of average latency times C (f) of test runs for given values of t and PNS. Latency C (f) tp (NS) per agent travel time uncertainty t P (NS) ,00 80,55 78,40 76,58 75,05 73,88 72,86 72,02 71,29 70,80 70, ,25 78,91 76,95 75,19 73,88 72,75 71,81 71,09 70,39 69,81 69, ,78 77,19 75,50 73,99 72,75 71,75 70,86 70,23 69,48 69,04 68, ,17 75,75 74,33 72,76 71,72 70,72 69,95 69,37 68,87 68,28 67, ,66 74,37 73,01 71,78 70,84 69,79 69,14 68,67 68,09 67,68 67, ,33 73,02 71,84 70,70 69,77 69,04 68,40 67,87 67,49 67,16 66, ,20 71,82 70,64 69,79 68,99 68,39 67,76 67,41 66,99 66,66 66, ,78 70,64 69,73 68,92 68,35 67,63 67,21 66,86 66,57 66,28 66, ,82 69,57 68,83 68,21 67,63 67,11 66,74 66,45 66,15 65,93 65, ,76 68,75 68,08 67,56 67,06 66,70 66,30 66,04 65,82 65,65 65, ,97 67,95 67,34 66,93 66,55 66,21 65,91 65,72 65,55 65,41 65, ,24 67,20 66,77 66,42 66,17 65,86 65,64 65,49 65,33 65,21 65, ,61 66,59 66,28 66,06 65,80 65,55 65,41 65,26 65,15 65,07 65, ,02 66,03 65,85 65,66 65,48 65,31 65,19 65,08 65,01 64,95 64, ,58 65,59 65,47 65,33 65,20 65,10 65,01 64,95 64,90 64,87 64, ,25 65,24 65,16 65,09 65,00 64,94 64,89 64,86 64,83 64,82 64, ,00 64,99 64,96 64,92 64,88 64,84 64,83 64,81 64,80 64,80 64, ,85 64,85 64,84 64,82 64,81 64,80 64,80 64,80 64,81 64,81 64, ,80 64,80 64,80 64,80 64,81 64,81 64,82 64,83 64,84 64,85 64, ,86 64,85 64,86 64,86 64,87 64,88 64,89 64,90 64,91 64,92 64, ,00 65,00 65,00 65,00 65,00 65,00 65,00 65,00 65,00 65,00 65,00 18

19 Table 6: Result showing the average number of non-selsh Decisions of agents of test runs for given values of t and PNS. Mean Values of non-selsh Decisions of agents for given values of t and PNS. travel time uncertainty t P (NS) ,00 50,39 301,69 530,49 735,91 904, , , , , , ,86 240,11 482,64 717,28 904, , , , , , , ,91 451,61 673,93 889, , , , , , , , ,84 640,19 838, , , , , , , , , ,86 833, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,00 19

20 Table 7: Average number of agents traversing edge AB and CD for given values of t and PNS. Agents traversing edge AB and CD travel time uncertainty t P (NS) , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,00 20

21 Table 8: Average number of agents traversing edge BD and AC for given values of t and PNS. Agents traversing edge BD and AC travel time uncertainty t P (NS) ,00 25,20 150,85 265,25 367,96 452,39 530,65 598,17 660,47 705,00 758, ,93 120,06 241,32 358,65 452,26 538,91 615,76 678,64 742,88 799,45 837, ,96 225,81 336,97 444,62 539,27 620,64 699,24 757,69 832,29 879,08 926, ,92 320,09 419,22 538,40 623,30 712,27 784,74 844,47 898,08 966, , ,93 416,84 518,42 618,52 701,13 800,90 867,97 920,00 989, , , ,18 517,94 613,63 713,82 803,47 879,08 951, , , , , ,68 615,29 719,14 800,99 884,09 953, , , , , , ,97 719,16 807,40 892,60 957, , , , , , , ,08 823,16 902,42 974, , , , , , , , ,13 911,42 990, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,00 21

22 Table 9: Average number of agents traversing edge BC for given values of t and PNS. Agents traversing edge BC travel time uncertainty t P (NS) , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,52 970,60 919, , , , , , , , ,02 930,60 865,28 803, , , , , , ,24 957,87 873,18 808,16 751,88 696, , , , ,97 965,78 886,51 810,15 743,02 681,62 631,00 582, ,51 994,29 938,55 883,07 804,62 732,79 672,03 619,96 564,24 520,66 483, ,19 789,24 761,99 707,13 647,15 585,46 546,57 500,70 444,28 410,66 383, ,49 590,96 580,69 534,98 484,10 448,19 411,77 368,68 332,51 307,92 283, ,65 404,18 388,46 349,16 316,83 300,73 263,34 236,75 222,32 201,45 183, ,59 208,09 184,43 172,87 163,55 144,35 131,74 118,52 109,41 96,15 87, ,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 22

23 Table 10: Standard deviation of number of agents traversing edge AB and CD for given values of t and PNS. Std Dev of agents traversing edge AB and CD travel time uncertainty t P (NS) ,00 40,14 133,09 194,22 234,04 268,17 291,68 309,07 325,06 331,07 348, ,34 328,58 334,82 343,68 326,67 351,16 353,28 345,43 362,36 365,86 352, ,22 473,70 438,29 421,16 409,38 384,26 391,84 369,97 384,96 365,95 363, ,08 551,10 499,30 484,06 419,77 431,11 396,64 375,38 364,96 381,92 374, ,71 615,78 563,34 515,94 449,02 460,51 431,31 388,27 400,07 379,71 359, ,73 667,45 569,48 559,98 505,45 479,00 457,27 433,56 408,01 393,71 381, ,50 708,19 642,72 578,99 529,14 486,76 462,22 427,57 413,41 399,06 376, ,98 728,47 654,84 590,25 526,57 503,25 464,07 438,30 412,94 395,10 371, ,65 761,18 680,37 616,29 558,42 510,65 481,63 447,58 425,05 406,13 388, ,94 760,49 698,91 642,98 571,10 521,81 491,76 463,80 432,15 408,34 395, ,18 776,00 714,22 644,76 577,88 531,10 500,00 463,39 430,94 415,94 397, ,50 776,34 707,10 636,88 573,08 526,03 491,63 451,99 428,15 408,61 381, ,83 739,72 684,81 614,20 565,17 518,92 475,19 445,21 422,54 396,43 378, ,98 711,48 665,84 608,19 547,36 504,57 466,71 436,87 409,08 384,77 365, ,86 689,64 656,47 591,50 533,50 490,19 455,23 419,24 395,76 373,47 351, ,88 665,88 623,37 561,54 514,60 468,80 432,27 396,21 374,95 349,10 327, ,45 609,21 577,41 524,28 475,79 433,98 400,11 370,63 346,14 323,54 300, ,73 544,88 515,58 474,54 424,76 390,81 358,21 329,52 308,39 285,88 267, ,15 476,76 445,73 402,26 362,49 333,99 302,28 279,70 259,10 240,33 224, ,07 351,72 318,22 296,95 268,96 241,96 220,44 202,94 190,88 171,13 159,

24 Table 11: Variation coecient vc of number of agents traversing edge AB and CD for given values of t and PNS. vc of agents traversing edge AB and CD travel time uncertainty t P (NS) % 1% 3% 5% 6% 8% 8% 9% 10% 10% 11% 5 10% 8% 9% 9% 9% 10% 10% 10% 11% 11% 11% 10 13% 13% 12% 12% 12% 11% 12% 11% 12% 12% 12% 15 17% 15% 14% 14% 12% 13% 12% 12% 12% 13% 13% 20 19% 17% 16% 15% 14% 14% 14% 13% 13% 13% 12% 25 22% 19% 17% 17% 16% 15% 15% 15% 14% 14% 13% 30 24% 21% 20% 18% 17% 16% 16% 15% 14% 14% 14% 35 26% 22% 21% 19% 17% 17% 16% 15% 15% 14% 14% 40 27% 24% 22% 20% 19% 18% 17% 16% 16% 15% 15% 45 29% 25% 23% 22% 20% 19% 18% 17% 16% 16% 15% 50 30% 26% 25% 23% 21% 19% 19% 18% 17% 16% 16% 55 31% 27% 25% 23% 21% 20% 19% 18% 17% 16% 16% 60 31% 26% 25% 23% 21% 20% 19% 18% 17% 16% 16% 65 31% 26% 25% 23% 21% 20% 19% 18% 17% 16% 16% 70 31% 27% 26% 23% 21% 20% 19% 18% 17% 16% 15% 75 31% 27% 25% 23% 21% 20% 19% 17% 16% 15% 15% 80 30% 25% 24% 22% 20% 19% 18% 16% 16% 15% 14% 85 27% 24% 23% 21% 19% 18% 16% 15% 14% 13% 12% 90 24% 22% 20% 18% 17% 16% 14% 13% 12% 11% 11% 95 18% 17% 15% 14% 13% 12% 11% 10% 9% 8% 8% 100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 24

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