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5 W e e W e [ ] d ( ) + y + + < ( ) b a f f (a) ( a )

6 ( a ) p ( ) y ( ) ( a ) ( a ) ( + ) ( ( a ) ) ( ( a ) ) ( ) ( a ) ( a ) ( )+ by + Â p ( ) ( + a ) ( + ) + + ( ( a ) )+ ( ( a ) ) ( + ) + ( ) + ( a ) a ( a ) ( )

7 F Z ( a ) F + Z ( a ) F + Z ( ( a ) ( a )) F +( ) ( a ) a ( ) ( a ) Z ( a ) > F Z ( a ) ( a )) F R ( + )( y + ) ( a ) F R F ( a ) ( ( a ) > ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) F F

8 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) We e d e W( e) ( ) ( ) Z ( a ) ( a ) F ( + )( + ) Z ( a ) F Z ( a ) F +( + d) + ( ) F p F +( + ) ( + ) + + ( + )+ Z ( a ) F

9 Z + ( ( a ) ( a )) F ( + )( ) Z ( a ) F y

10 e d d (W e d ) W ( a ) ( a ) a ( a ) ( a + # + a # # p f (a) ( a ) (a + # + )

11 a a s a s a f ( s a ) f (s a ) r s f s a s r r s s a f p p (p ) 2 p ( p ) p ( p ) p ( p ) p p ( p ) p ( p ) p ( p ) p 6 4 p p p p p p p p p p p

12 p p p p p p p p ( ) g g l + c + c c g c l b a ( )

13 ( ) [ ]

14 τ Marginal ax rae T (y ax ) τ l y l y Taxable income y ax ( a ) ( a ) ( ) ( a ) ( a) ( a ) ( ( a )) e (g c ) c

15 y e g c (d W) (b l ) W W d b l

16

17

18 Fracion of Liquidiy Consrained Houseolds Age 8 1

19 ( a ) + ( ) ( a )

20 Cange in op 1% labor ax revenue (in %) 15 Presen Value Sor Run Long Run Top marginal ax rae + {z} ( ) {z }

21 s s

22 Y ( a ) ( a + Y ( a )) ( a ) Y ( a Y ) ( a ) Y Z Y ( a ) + F + m  + + Y  + + ( a ) + +

23 a

24 7 6 Aggregae Welfare -1% Earners Long-Run Welfare Welfare effecs Top marginal ax rae.9.95

25 Upper bend-poin Top marginal ax rae Boom marginal ax rae Top marginal ax rae

26 Canges in % of iniial equilbrium value Capial Privae Asses Public Deb Year of Transiion Canges in % of iniial equilbrium value Labor Supply Consumpion Oupu Year of Transiion In % of ime endowmen Labor Hours (oal) Labor Hours (op 1 %) Year of Transiion Ineres rae (in %) Ineres rae Wage rae Year of Transiion Wage rae (cange in %)

27 Canges in % of iniial equilbrium value Consumpion Tax -2 Earnings Tax Capial Income Tax Toal Revenue Year of Transiion Gini Index Labor Earnings Weal Year of Transiion

28 Welfare Effec (CEV) Welfare Effec (CEV) low skilled/low sock low skilled/ig sock ig skilled/low sock ig skilled/ig sock curren (-1% earners) curren (1% earners) fuure Coor Enry Year Coor Enry Year

29 1 8 Iniial Seady Sae Final Seady Sae 1 8 Iniial Seady Sae Final Seady Sae Marginal ax rae Average ax rae Fracion of median income Fracion of median income

30 Difference in marginal ax rae low skilled/low sock -2 low skilled/ig sock ig skilled/low sock ig skilled/ig sock Fracion of median income Difference in average ax rae low skilled/low sock low skilled/ig sock ig skilled/low sock ig skilled/ig sock Fracion of median income Difference in marginal ax rae low skilled/low sock -2 low skilled/ig sock ig skilled/low sock ig skilled/ig sock Fracion of median income Difference in average ax rae low skilled/low sock low skilled/ig sock ig skilled/low sock ig skilled/ig sock Fracion of median income

31 Mean Consumpion (w/o Top Socks) Iniial Seady Sae Period 1 of Transiion Final Seady Sae Age Mean Labor Hours (w/o Top Socks) Iniial Seady Sae Period 1 of Transiion Final Seady Sae Age

32 Variance log(consumpion) (w/o Top Socks) Iniial Seady Sae Period 1 of Transiion Final Seady Sae Age Variance log(labor Hours) (w/o Top Socks) Iniial Seady Sae Period 1 of Transiion Final Seady Sae Age Mean Consumpion Iniial Seady Sae Period 1 of Transiion Final Seady Sae Age Mean Labor Hours Iniial Seady Sae Period 1 of Transiion Final Seady Sae Age Variance log(consumpion) Iniial Seady Sae Period 1 of Transiion Final Seady Sae Variance log(labor Hours) Iniial Seady Sae Period 1 of Transiion Final Seady Sae Age Age

33 Cange in op 1% labor ax revenue (in %) Presen Value Sor Run Long Run Top marginal ax rae Welfare effecs Aggregae Welfare - 1% Earners Long-run Welfare Top marginal ax rae

34

35 3.5 3 Frisc elasiciy.25 Frisc elasiciy.6 (Bencmark) Frisc elasiciy 1.5 Aggregae Welfare Top marginal ax rae.9.95 g g g g Cange in Top 1% Tax Revenue γ 2 (Bencmark) γ 1 Aggregae Welfare γ 2 (Bencmark) γ Top marginal ax rae Top marginal ax rae g g

36

37 Cange in Top 1% Tax Revenue Bencmark Permanen Higes Sock Top marginal ax rae Aggregae Welfare Bencmark Permanen Higes Sock Top marginal ax rae

38

39

40

41 ( a ) s a + s a [ ] ( a ) s a + s a ( + ) ( + ) > + ( a ) ( + ) + ( a ) + ( a )

42 ( a ) ( a ) [ ( a )] g g ( a ) ( a ) + g g a + c + c + by + Â p ( ) ( + a ) ( + a ) ( + ) + + ( ( a ) )+ ( ( a ) ) ( + ) + ( ) + ( a ) g [l ( + )] a c l ( a ) ( ( a ) ) ( ( a ) ) l by + ( + )( + ) Â ( + a g ) ( a ) l

43 l ( a ) ( a ) ( a ) + ( + ) ( a )+ + ( ( a ) )+ i ( ( a ) ) ( ) ( a ) ( a ) ( a ) [ ( a )] g ( a ) g a[ ( a )] + c + c + by + Â + by + Â p ( ) ( + a ) p ( ) ( + a ) n n o ( a ) ( a ) o ( a ) ( a ) n n o ( a ) ( a ) o ( a ) ( a ) ( a ) ( a ) ( a ) ( a ) ( a ) > g l + a c l ( a ) ( ( a ) ) ( ( a ) ) ( + ) ( ) + ( a ) ( ( a ) ) ( ( a ) ) [( g) ] ( g) [( + c) ] ( + c)

44 ( w) + w ( w) + w w w < # # # ( a + Y ( a )) ( a )

45 ( a Y ) ( a ) + {z} ( ) {z } R R F F ( ) ( a ) F ( ) ( ) ( )+ ( a ) ( a ) ( a ) ( a ) ( ( )) ( a ) [ ( a ) ( a )] ( a ) ( a )

46 R ( a ) F R F ( ) ( ) ( )+ ( a ) ( a ) ( a ) [ ( a ) ( a )] ( ) ( a ) ( a ) R ( a ) F R F m m y m + m m  i m i ( a ) f f f f (a) F ( a ) m f f (a)

47 > F ( + a ) y + p ( ) + Z ( a ) F ( a ) Z ( a ) F ( a ) ( a ) ( a ) ( ) ( )

48 8 >< ( a ) ( ) >: + ( ) < + ( ) + ( ) < W d a

49 ( ) ( )

50

Cooperative Ph.D. Program in School of Economic Sciences and Finance QUALIFYING EXAMINATION IN MACROECONOMICS. August 8, :45 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.

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