Dynamics of Quality as a Strategic Variable in Complex Food Supply Chain Network Competition

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "Dynamics of Quality as a Strategic Variable in Complex Food Supply Chain Network Competition"

Transcription

1 Dynamics of Quality as a Strategic Variable in Complex Food Supply Chain Network Competition Anna Nagurney 1, Deniz Besik 1 and Min Yu 2 1 Department of Operations and Information Management Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA Pamplin School of Business Administration University of Portland University of Massachusetts Portland, Oregon NEDSI Conference in Providence, Rhode Island April 12-14, 2018

2 This presentation is based on the paper: Nagurney, A., Besik, D., and Yu M., Dynamics of Quality as a Strategic Variable in Complex Food Supply Chain Network Competition: The Case of Fresh Produce, to appear in the focus issue on Supply Network Dynamics in Chaos.

3 Background and Motivation Food supply chains, as noted in Yu and Nagurney (2013), are distinct from other product supply chains. Fresh produce is exposed to continuous and significant change in the quality of food products throughout the entire supply chain from the points of production/harvesting to points of demand/consumption. The quality of food products is decreasing with time, even with the use of advanced facilities and under the best processing, handling, storage, and shipment conditions (Sloof, Tijskens, and Wilkinson (1996) and Zhang, Habenicht, and Spieß (2003)).

4 Background and Motivation It has been discovered that the quality of fresh produce can be determined scientifically using chemical formulae, which include both time and temperature. The initial quality is also very important and food producers, such as farmers, have significant control over this important strategic variable at their production/harvesting sites. There are great opportunities for enhanced decision-making in this realm that can be supported by appropriate models and methodological tools.

5 Literature Review We note that early contributions focused on perishability and, in particular, on inventory management (see Ghare and Schrader (1963), Nahmias (1982, 2011) and Silver, Pyke, and Peterson (1998) for reviews). More recently, some studies have proposed integrating more than a single supply chain network activity (see, e.g., Zhang, Habenicht, and Spieß (2003), Widodo et al. (2006), Ahumada and Villalobos (2011), and Kopanos, Puigjaner, and Georgiadis (2012)). Yu and Nagurney (2013) have emphasized the need to bring greater realism to the underlying economics and competition on food supply chains. Monteiro (2007) studied the traceability in food supply chains theoretically. Additional modeling and methodological contributions in the food supply chain and quality domain have been made by Blackburn and Scudder (2009) and by Rong, Akkerman, and Grunow (2011). Besik and Nagurney (2017) formulate short fresh produce supply chains with the inclusion of the dynamics of quality, in the context of farmers markets.

6 Contribution We construct a competitive supply chain network model for fresh produce under oligopolistic competition among the food firms, who are profit-maximizers. The firms have, as their strategic variables, not only the product flows on the pathways of their supply chain networks from the production/harvesting locations to the ultimate points of demand, but also the initial quality of the produce that they grow at their production locations. The consumers at the retail outlets (demand points), differentiate the fresh produce from the distinct firms and reflect their preferences through the prices that they are willing to pay which depend on quantities of the produce as well as the average quality of the produce associated with the firm and retail outlet pair(s). Quality of the produce reaching a destination node depends on its initial quality and on the path that it took with each particular path consisting of specific links, with particular characteristics of physical features of time, temperature, etc.,.

7 Preliminaries on Quality Fresh foods deteriorate since they are biological products, and, therefore, lose quality over time. The rate of quality deterioration can be represented as a function of the microenvironment, the gas composition, the relative humidity, and the temperature (Taoukis and Labuza (1989)). Labuza (1984) demonstrated that the quality of a food attribute, Q, over time t, which can correspond, depending on the fruit or vegetable, to the color change, the moisture content, the amount of nutrition such as vitamin C, or the softening of the texture, can be formulated via the differential equation: Q t = kqn = Ae ( E/RT ) Q n. (1) In (1), k is the reaction rate and is defined by the Arrhenius formula, Ae ( E/RT ), A is a pre-exponential constant, T is the temperature, E is the activation energy, and R is the universal gas constant (cf. Arrhenius (1889)).

8 Preliminaries on Quality If the reaction order n is zero, that is, Q t = k, and the initial quality is denoted by Q 0, we can quantify the remaining quality Q t at time t (Tijskens and Polderdijk (1996)) according to: Q t = Q 0 kt. (2) Examples of fresh produce that follow a reaction order of zero include watermelons and spinach. If the reaction order is 1, known as a first order reaction, the quality decay function is then given by the expression: Q t = Q 0 e kt. (3) Popular fruits that follow first order kinetics include peaches, and strawberries, as well as vegetables such as: peas, beans, carrots, avocados, and tomatoes.

9 Network Topology M1 1 C1,1 1 C1,2 1 D1,1 1 Food Firm 1 Food Firm I 1 I Production/Harvesting M 1 n M M 1 I M I nm Shipment C 1 nc C1,1 I C I nc Processing C 1 nc C1,2 I C I nc Shipment D 1 nd D1,1 I D I nd Storage D1,2 1 D 1 nd D1,2 I D I nd Distribution Distribution R1 RnR Retail Outlets

10 Quality Over a Path We let L i denote the set of directed links in the supply chain network of food firm i; where i = 1,..., I, which consists of a set of production links, L i 1, and a set of post-harvest links, Li 2, that is, Li L i 1 Li 2. We allow for a distinct initial quality q0a i associated with each top-tiered production link a L i 1 ; i = 1,..., I, since distinct production sites of a firm may have different associated quality of the produce that is harvested because of soil conditions, investment in irrigation, types of pesticides, and fertilizers used, etc. We let β b denote the quality decay incurred on link b, for b L i 2, which is a factor that depends on the reaction order n, the reaction rate k b, and the time t b on link b, according to: k b t b,, if n = 0, b L i 2, i, β b (4) e k bt b, if n = 1, b L i 2, i. Here, the reaction rate is: k b = Ae ( E/RTb), b L i 2, i. (5)

11 Quality Over a Path We can have multiple paths from an origin node i to a destination node k, Pk i denotes the set of all paths that have origin i and destination k. The quality q p, over a path p, joining the origin node i, with a destination node k, with the incorporation of the quality deterioration of the fresh produce, is, hence: q i 0a + β b, if n = 0, p Pk i, i, k, b p L i 2 q p (6) q0a i β b, if n = 1, p Pk i, i, k. b p L i 2 Here, q0a i is the initial quality of the fresh produce on a top-most link a from an origin node i and in the path p under consideration.

12 The Competitive Fresh Produce Supply Chain Network Model with Quality Nonnegativity Constraint of the Path Flows For each path p, joining an origin node i with a destination node k, the following nonnegativity condition must hold: x p 0, p P i k; i = 1,..., I ; k = R 1,..., R nr. (7) Nonnegativity Constraint of the Initial Quality The initial quality of the fresh produce on the top-most links a of an origin node i, must be nonnegative, that is: Maximum Initial Quality q i 0a 0, a L i 1; i = 1,..., I. (8) We assume that the quality is bounded from above by a maximum value; hence, we have that: q i 0a q i 0a, a L i 1; i = 1,..., I. (9)

13 The Competitive Fresh Produce Supply Chain Network Model with Quality Link Flows The conservation of flow equations that relate the link flows of each food firm i; i = 1,..., I, to the path flows are given by: f l = p P x p δ lp, l L i ; i = 1,..., I, (10) where δ ap = 1, if link a is contained in path p, and 0, otherwise. Capacity over the Link Flows Link flows must satisfy capacity constraints, we have that: f l u l, l L. (11) Capacity over the Path Flows Observe that, in view of the conservation of flow equations (10), we can rewrite (11) in terms of path flows as: x p δ lp u l, l L. (12) p P

14 The Competitive Fresh Produce Supply Chain Network Model with Quality Average Quality The average quality product of firm i, at retail outlet k, is given by the expression: p P q k ˆq ik = i p x p, i = 1,..., I ; k = R 1,..., R nr. (13) x p p P i k Demand The demand for food firm i s fresh food product at retail outlet k is denoted by d ik and is equal to the sum of all the fresh produce flows on paths joining (i, k), so that: x p = d ik, i = 1,..., I ; k = R 1,..., R nr. (14) p P i k Demand Price Function We denote the demand price of food firm i s product at retail outlet k by: ρ ik = ρ ik (d, ˆq), i = 1,..., I ; k = R 1,..., R nr. (15)

15 The Competitive Fresh Produce Supply Chain Network Model with Quality Cost of Production/Harvesting The cost of production/harvesting at firm i s production site a depends, in general, on the initial quality q i 0a, and the product flow on the production/harvesting link, that is: ẑ a = ẑ a (f a, q i 0a), a L i 1; i = 1,..., I. (16) Operational Cost Function We define the operational cost functions associated with the remaining links in the supply chain network as: ĉ b = ĉ b (f ), b L i 2; i = 1,..., I. (17) Vector of Path Flow Strategies The vector of path flows associated with firm i; i = 1,..., I is: X i {{x p } p P i }} R n P i +, P i k=r1...,rn R P i k. (18) Vector of Initial Quality Strategies the vector of initial quality levels, associated with firm i; i = 1,..., I is: q i 0 {{q i 0a} a L i 1}} R n L i 1 +. (19)

16 The Competitive Fresh Produce Supply Chain Network Model with Quality Utility Function The utility of firm i; i = 1,..., I, is expressed as: R nr U i = ρ ik (d, ˆq)d ik ( k=r 1 Rewritten Demand Price Functions In view of (6), (13), and (14), we can rewrite (15) as: a L i 1 ẑ a (f a, q i 0a) + b L i 2 ĉ b (f )). (20) ˆρ ik (x, q 0 ) ρ ik (d, ˆq), i = 1,..., I ; k = R 1,..., R nr. (21) Vector of the Profits We can define the vector of the profits of all the firms for all firms i; i = 1,..., I, with the I -dimensional vector Û, that is: Û = Û(X, q 0 ). (22)

17 Supply Chain Network Nash Equilibrium with Fresh Produce Quality A fresh produce path flow pattern and initial quality level (X, q 0 ) K = I i=1 K i constitutes a supply chain network Nash Equilibrium with fresh produce quality if for each food firm i; i = 1,..., I : Û i (X i, X i, q i 0, q i 0 ) Û i (X i, X i, q i 0, q i 0 ), (X i, q i 0) K i, (23) where X i (X1,..., X i 1, X i+1,..., X I ), q i 0 (q0 1,..., qi 1 0, q0 i+1,..., q I and K i {(X i, q0 i ) X i R n P i +, q0 i Rn Li 1 +, (9) and (12) hold for l L i }. 0 ) An equilibrium is established if no food firm can unilaterally improve upon its profit by altering its product flows and initial quality at production sites in its supply chain network, given the product flows and initial quality decisions of the other firms.

18 Variational Inequality Formulation of the Governing Equilibrium Conditions Assume that, for each food firm i; i = 1,..., I, the profit function Ûi(X, q 0 ) is concave with respect to the variables X i and q0 i, and is continuously differentiable. Then (X, q0 ) K is a supply chain network Nash Equilibrium with fresh produce quality according to Definition 1 if and only if it satisfies the variational inequality: I I Xi Û i (X, q0 ), X i Xi q i 0 Û i (X, q0 ), q0 q i 0 i 0, (X, q 0 ) K, i=1 i=1 where, denotes the inner product in the corresponding Euclidean space. (24)

19 Variational Inequality Formulation of the Governing Equilibrium Conditions Xi Û i (X, q 0 ) denotes the gradient of Û i (X, q 0 ) with respect to X i and q i 0 Û i (X, q 0 ) denotes the gradient of Ûi(X, q 0 ) with respect to q0 i. The solution of variational inequality (22), in turn, is equivalent to the solution of the variational inequality: determine (x, q0, λ, γ ) K 1 satisfying: + I R nr i=1 k=r 1 p Pk i [x p x p ] + I i=1 a L i 1 Ẑ i (x, q i 0 ) x p + Ĉ i (x ) x p R nr + γl δ lp ˆρ ik (x, q ˆρ ij(x, 0 ) q x p l L i j=r 1 I Ẑ i (x, q0 i ) R nr q0a i + λ ˆρ ij(x, a q q i j=r 1 0a i=1 a L i 1 [ q i 0a q i 0a] [λa λ a]+ 0 ) r P i j x r 0 ) r P i j [q i 0a q i 0a] [ I u l xr δ lr ] [γ l γl ] 0, (x, q 0, λ, γ) K 1. l L i r P (25) i=1 x r

20 Variational Inequality Formulation of the Governing Equilibrium Conditions We have K 1 {(x, q 0, λ, γ) x R+ np, q 0 R nl 1 +, λ R nl 1 +, γ R+ nl } and for each path p; p Pk i ; i = 1,..., I ; k = R1,..., RnR : Ẑ i (x, q0 i ) ẑ a(f a, q0a i ) δ ap, (26a) x p f a a L i 1 For each a; a L i 1 ; i = 1,..., I, ˆρ ij(x, q 0) x p Ĉ i (x) x p b L i 2 ( ρij(d, ˆq) ˆq ik ρij(d, ˆq) + d ik ˆρ ij(x, q 0) q i 0a Ẑ i (x, q0 i ) q0a i Rn R h=r1 s Ph i l L i ĉ b(f ) f l δ lp, (26b) ) q p r P q k i r x r x r ( r P x k i r ) 2. (26c) r P i k ẑa(fa, qi 0a ) q0a i, (26d) x s r Ph i x r ρ ij(d, ˆq) ˆq ih q s q0a i. (26e) qs In particular, if link a is not included in path s, = 0; if link a is included in path s, following (6), we have: q0a i 1, if n = 0, q s q0a i = β b, if n = 1. b s L i 2 (26f )

21 Variational Inequality Formulation of the Governing Equilibrium Conditions Proof: (22) follows directly from Gabay and Moulin (1980); see also Dafermos and Nagurney (1987). Under the imposed assumptions, (22) holds if and only if (see, e.g., Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis (1989)) the following holds: For each path p; p Pk i, we have that Ûi xp = [ RnR ρij(d, ˆq)dij ( j=r1 e L ẑe(fe, q i 0e i ) + 1 b L ĉb(f ))] i 2 xp = [ RnR ρij(d, ˆq)dij] j=r1 [ e L ẑe(fe, q i 0e i )] 1 xp xp Rn R [ ] [ρij(d, ˆq)dij] dik [ρij(d, ˆq)dij] ˆqik = + dik xp ˆqik xp j=r1 ĉb(f ) fl fl xp b L i l L 2 i [ Rn R ρij(d, ˆq) ρij(d, ˆq) =ρik(d, ˆq) + dij + dik ˆqik j=r1 ˆqik + [ [ )] r P i xr ] k r Pk i xr ] xp a L i 1 [ ( Rn R ρij(d, ˆq) ρij(d, ˆq) =ρik(d, ˆq) + + dik ˆqik j=r1 ẑa(fa, q0a i ) δap ĉb(f ) fa fl a L i 1 b L i l L 2 i [ b L ĉb(f )] i 2 xp a L i 1 ẑe(fe, q0e i ) fa e L i 1 fa xp ( ˆqik dij [ [ r P i qr xr ] k r Pk i qr xr ] xp ẑa(fa, q i 0a ) fa qp r Pk i δap ĉb(f ) δlp fl b L i l L 2 i )] xr r Pk i qr xr ( r Pk i xr ) 2 dij δlp. (27)

22 Variational Inequality Formulation of the Governing Equilibrium Conditions For each link a; a L i 1, we know that: Û i q i 0a = [ RnR ρ ij(d, ˆq)d j=r1 ij ( e L ẑ i e (f e, q0e i ) + 1 b L ĉ i b (f ))] 2 q0a i = [ RnR ρ ij(d, ˆq)d j=r1 ij ] [ e L ẑ i e (f e, q0e i )] 1 Rn R = Rn R h=r1 j=r1 Rn R = Rn R h=r1 j=r1 Rn R = Rn R h=r1 j=r1 Rn R = Rn R q i 0a q i 0a [ρ ij (d, ˆq)d ij ] ˆq ih ˆq ih q0a i ẑ a(f a, q0a i ) q0a i ρ ij (d, ˆq) ˆq ih d ij ˆq ih [ [ r P q i r x r ] h r P q h i r x r ] q0a i ρ ij (d, ˆq) 1 d ij ˆq ih r P x h i r s Ph i h=r1 j=r1 s Ph i x s r Ph i x r ρ ij (d, ˆq) ˆq ih q s q i 0a [ r P q h i r x r ] q s [ b L ĉ i b (f )] 2 q0a i ẑ a(f a, q i 0a ) q i 0a q s q i 0a ẑ a(f a, q i 0a ) q i 0a d ij ẑ a(f a, q0a i ) q0a i. (28)

23 Simple Illustrative Examples Food Firm 1 Food Firm Production/Harvesting 7 M1 1 M1 2 C 1 1,1 C 1 1,2 D 1 1,1 2 Shipment 8 C1,1 2 3 Processing 9 C1,2 2 4 Shipment 10 D1, Storage D1,2 1 D1,2 2 Distribution 6 12 R1 Retail Outlet

24 Simple Illustrative Examples The cost of production/harvesting is higher for Food Firm 1 since it uses better machinery and has invested more into the necessary chemicals to maintain the soil quality, with the top-tiered link cost functions being: ẑ 1 (f 1, q 1 01) = f f 1 + 3q 1 01, ẑ 7 (f 7, q 2 07) = f q There are ten additional links, belonging to the sets L 1 2 and L2 2, in the supply chain network and their total link cost functions are: ĉ 2 (f 2 ) = 5f f 2, ĉ 3 (f 3 ) = 2f 2 3, ĉ 4 (f 4 ) = 2f 2 4 +f 4, ĉ 5 (f 5 ) = 3f 2 5, ĉ 6 (f 6 ) = f 2 6 +f 6, ĉ 8 (f 8 ) = f f 8, ĉ 9 (f 9 ) = 3f f 9, ĉ 10 (f 10 ) = 2f 2 10, ĉ 11 (f 11 ) = 6f f 11, ĉ 12 (f 12 ) = 6f f 12. The total link cost functions are constructed according to the assumptions made for Food Firm 1, Food Firm 2, and Retail Outlet R 1.

25 Quality Decay for the Illustrative Examples Link b Hours Temperature (Celsius) β b (n = 0) β b (n = 1) The shipment time is longer for Food Firm 1 than for Food Firm 2 because of their respective distances to their processing facilities, which can be seen from the time difference between link 2 and link 8.

26 Example 1a: Linear Quality Decay (Zero Order Kinetics) Since there exists one path for each food firm: d 11 = x p 1, d 21 = x p 2. In a zero order quality decay function, the reaction order n = 0, and the quality q p over a path p can be determined by the appropriate formula for n = 0. The initial quality variables are q 1 01 and q2 07. The demand price functions are: ˆρ 11 (x, q 0 ) ρ 11 (d, ˆq) = 2x p1 x p2 + q p 1 x p1 x p and ˆρ 21 (x, q 0 ) ρ 21 (d, ˆq) = 3x p2 x p1 + q p 2 x p2 + 90, x p2 with the path quality q p for the two paths constructed according to zero order decay function, for n = 0 for i = 1, 2, given by: q p1 = q β 2 + β 3 + β 4 + β 5 + β 6 = q , q p2 = q β 8 + β 9 + β 10 + β 11 + β 12 = q

27 Example 1a: Linear Quality Decay (Zero Order Kinetics) In order to obtain the equilibrium path flows and the equilibrium initial quality levels that satisfy variational inequality (25), the following expressions must be equal to 0: Ẑ 1 (x, q 1 01 ) x p1 + Ĉ 1 (x ) x p1 ˆρ 11 (x, q 0 ) ˆρ 11(x, q 0 ) x p1 x p 1 = 0, (29) Ẑ 1 (x, q 1 01 ) q 1 01 ˆρ 11(x, q0 ) q01 1 xp 1 = 0, (30) Ẑ 2 (x, q 2 07 ) x p2 + Ĉ 2 (x ) x p2 ˆρ 21 (x, q 0 ) ˆρ 21(x, q 0 ) x p2 x p 2 = 0, (31) Ẑ 2 (x, q 2 07 ) q 2 07 ˆρ 21(x, q0 ) q07 2 xp 2 = 0. (32)

28 Example 1a: Linear Quality Decay (Zero Order Kinetics) Grouping the terms above corresponding to each equation (29) (32) we obtain the following system of equations: 32x p 1 + x p 2 q 1 01 = , 3 x p 1 = 0, with solution: x p x p 2 q 2 07 = , 3 x p 2 = 0, x p 1 = 3, x p 2 = 3, q 1 01 = , q 2 07 = The path quality levels are: q p1 = 19 and q p2 = 49, the demand prices are: ρ 11 = 110 and ρ 21 = 127, with Food Firm 1 enjoying a profit (in dollars) of Û 1 (X, q 0 ) = and Food Firm 2 a profit of Û2(X, q 0 ) =

29 Example 1b: Exponential Quality Decay (First Order Kinetics) The product now has an exponential quality decay with a reaction order n = 1. The quality levels of the paths are constructed and the β b values in Table 1, for n = 1 for i = 1, 2, yielding: q p1 = q 1 01 β 2 β 3 β 4 β 5 β 6 = (q 1 01)(0.7359), q p2 = q 2 07 β 8 β 9 β 10 β 11 β 12 = (q 2 07)(0.9418). We now proceed to solve the equations (29) (32) for this example, with the following terms for paths p 1 and p 2 presented for completeness and convenience: ˆρ 11 (x, q0 ) = 2x + x (q1 01 )(0.7359)(x ) p1 p1 p2 x 100 = 2x + x p1 p2 (q1 01 )(0.7359) 100, p1 ˆρ 11(x, q0 ) q01 1 x p1 = x, p1 ˆρ 21 (x, q0 ) = 3x + x (q2 07 )(0.9418)(x ) p2 p2 p1 x 90 = 3x + x p2 p1 (q2 07 )(0.9418) 90, p2 ˆρ 21(x, q0 ) q07 2 x p2 = x. p2

30 Example 1b: Exponential Quality Decay (First Order Kinetics) We obtain the following system of equations: 32x p1 + x p q1 01 = 80, x p1 = 0, x p1 + 44x p q2 07 = 86, x p2 = 0. Straightforward calculations yield the following equilibrium path flows and equilibrium initial quality levels: x p1 = , x p2 = , q1 01 = , q 2 07 = The path quality levels are, q p1 = and q p2 = We obtain the following equilibrium demand prices at the retail outlet for Food Firm 1 and Food Firm 2, respectively: ρ 11 = , ρ 21 = The profits of the food firms are calculated, in dollars, as: Û 1 (X, q 0) = , Û2(X, q 0 ) =

31 The Algorithm - Euler Method Euler method, which is induced by the general iterative scheme of Dupuis and Nagurney (1993) is a solution methodology of the Variational Inequality Problem. Specifically, iteration τ of the Euler method is given by: X τ+1 = P K (X τ a τ F (X τ )), (33) The Euler method, the sequence {a τ } must satisfy: τ=0 a τ =, a τ > 0, a τ 0, as τ.

32 The Euler Method Explicit Formulae For each path p Pj i, i, j, compute: x τ+1 p RnR = max{0, xp τ + ατ (ˆρ ik(x τ, q0 τ ) + j=r1 ˆρ ij (x τ, q τ 0 ) x p xr τ r P i j Ẑ i (x τ, q iτ 0 ) x p Ĉ i (x τ ) x p l L i γ τ l δ lp )}. (34) For each initial quality level a L i 1, i, in turn, compute: q iτ+1 0a Rn R = max{0, q0a iτ + α τ ( j=r1 ˆρ ij (x τ, q τ 0 ) q i 0a r P i j x τ r Ẑ i (x τ, q0 iτ ) q0a i λ τ a )}. (35) The Lagrange multiplier for each top-most link a L i 1 ; i = 1,..., I, associated with the initial quality bounds is computed as: λ τ+1 a = max{0, λ τ a + α τ (q iτ 0a q i 0a)}. (36) The Lagrange multiplier for each link l L i ; i = 1,..., I, associated with the link capacities is computed according to: γ τ+1 l = max{0, γl τ + α τ ( xr τ δ lr u l )}. (37) r P

33 A Case Study of Peaches We focus on the peach market in the United States, specifically in Western Massachusetts. It is noted that, in 2015, the United States peach production was 825,415 tons in volume, and 606 million dollars in worth (USDA NASS (2016), Zhao et al. (2017)). We selected two orchards from Western Massachusetts: Apex Orchards and Cold Spring Orchard, located, respectively, in Shelburne, MA and Belchertown, MA. The orchards sell their peaches to two retailers, Whole Foods, located in Hadley, MA, and Formaggio Kitchen, located in Cambridge, MA. The mode of transportation for both of the orchards is trucks. The color change attribute of peaches, in the form of browning, follows a first-order, that is, an exponential decay function.

34 Network Topology of the Case Study Apex Orchards Cold Spring Orchard 1 2 Production/Harvesting M1 1 M2 1 M Shipment 8 C1,1 1 C2,1 1 C1, Processing C1,2 1 C2,2 1 C1, Shipment D1,1 1 D2,1 1 D1, Storage D1,2 1 D2,2 1 D1,1 2 Distribution R1 R2 Whole Foods Formaggio Kitchen

35 Parameters for the Calculation of Quality Decay Link b Hours Temperature (Celsius) β b (n = 1)

36 Cost Functions, Capacities and Upper Bounds for the Numerical Examples Table: Total Production / Harvesting Cost Functions, Link Capacities, and Upper Bounds on Initial Quality Link a ẑa(fa, q0a i ) ua qi 0a 1.002f (q1 01 ) f (q1 02 ) f (q1 03 ) Table: Total Operational Link Cost Functions and Link Capacities Link b ĉb(f ) ub 4.001f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f We report the total production / harvesting cost functions, the upper bounds on the initial quality, the total operational cost functions, and the link flow capacities. The Euler method is implemented in FORTRAN and a Linux system at the University of Massachusetts used for the computations. The data is gathered from Sumner and Murdock (2017) and Dris and Jain (2007), in which the authors made a sample cost analysis. The time horizon, under consideration, is that of a week. The Euler method is implemented in FORTRAN and a Linux system at the University of Massachusetts used for the computations. The sequence is, a τ = {1, 1 2, 1 2, 1 3,...}, with the convergence tolerance being 10 7.

37 Example 1 - Baseline It is known that both retailers sell high quality food products, with Formaggio Kitchen selling peaches at a higher price due to its emphasis on quality. Through conversations at the retailers, we concluded that Apex Orchards sell their peaches at a higher price. Demand Price Functions of Apex Orchards: ρ 11 =.02d 11.01d ˆq , ρ 12 =.02d 12.01d ˆq Demand Price Functions of Cold Spring Orchard: ρ 21 =.02d d ˆq , ρ 22 =.02d d ˆq

38 Equilibrium Flows, Equilibrium Initial Quality, and the Equilibrium Lagrange Multipliers Table: Equilibrium Link Flows and the Equilibrium Link Lagrange Multipliers Link a fa q0a i γa λ a Table: Equilibrium Link Flows, Equilibrium Initial Quality, and the Equilibrium Production Site Lagrange Multipliers Link b fb γb

39 Equilibrium Prices, Demands, Average Quality and Profits Equilibrium prices at the demand markets: ρ 11 = 17.67, ρ 12 = 19.00, ρ 21 = 15.47, ρ 22 = Equilibrium demands: d11 = , d 12 = , d21 = 47.80, d22 = Average Quality: ˆq 11 = 93.40, ˆq 12 = 92.56, ˆq 21 = 46.60, ˆq 22 = Profits: U 1 = 3, , U 2 =

40 Example 2 - Disruption Scenario 1 We now consider a disruption scenario in which a natural disaster has significantly affected the capacity of the orchard production sites of both orchards. Such an incident occurred in 2016 in the Northeast of the United States when extreme weather in terms of cold temperatures decimated the peach crop. We now have the following capacities on the production/harvesting links: Link a u 1 = 100, u 2 = 150, u 3 = 80. f a q i 0a γ a λ a Table: Equilibrium Link Flows, Equilibrium Initial Quality, and the Equilibrium Production Site Lagrange Multipliers

41 Equilibrium Link Flows and the Equilibrium Link Lagrange Multipliers Link b γb f b

42 Equilibrium Prices, Demands, Average Quality and Profits Equilibrium prices at the demand markets: ρ 11 = 18.12, ρ 12 = 19.40, ρ 21 = 15.74, ρ 22 = Equilibrium demands: d11 = , d 12 = , d21 = 37.67, d22 = Average Quality: ˆq 11 = 73.42, ˆq 12 = 72.68, ˆq 21 = 7.83, ˆq 22 = Profits: U 1 = 2, , U 2 =

43 Example 3 - Disruption Scenario 2 We consider a disruption that affects transportation in that the links 5 and 6 associated with the supply chain network of Apex Orchards are no longer available. This can occur and has occurred in western Massachusetts as a result of flooding. We now have the following capacities on the production/harvesting links: u 5 = 0, u 6 = 0. Link a f a q i 0a γ a λ a Table: Equilibrium Link Flows, Equilibrium Initial Quality, and the Equilibrium Production Site Lagrange Multipliers

44 Equilibrium Link Flows and the Equilibrium Link Lagrange Multipliers Link b γb f b

45 Equilibrium Prices, Demands, Average Quality and Profits Equilibrium prices at the demand markets: ρ 11 = 17.89, ρ 12 = 19.19, ρ 21 = 15.69, ρ 22 = Equilibrium demands: d11 = , d 12 = , d21 = 47.86, d22 = Average Quality: ˆq 11 = 82.32, ˆq 12 = 81.46, ˆq 21 = 46.59, ˆq 22 = Profits: U 1 = 3, , U 2 =

46 Conclusions We constructed a general framework for the modeling, analysis, and computation of solutions to competitive fresh produce supply chain networks in which food firm owners seek to maximize their profits while determining both the initial quality of the fresh produce with associated costs as well as the fresh produce flows along pathways of their supply chain network through the various activities of harvesting, processing, storage, and distribution. We utilize explicit formulae associated with quality deterioration on the supply chain network links which are a function of physical characteristics, including temperature and time. The governing Nash Equilibrium conditions are stated and alternative variational inequality formulations provided, along with existence results. Stylistic examples are provided to illustrate the framework and a case study on peaches, consisting of numerical examples under status quo and disruption scenarios, is then presented, along with the computed equilibrium patterns.

47 Some References Ahumada, O., Villalobos, J. R., A tactical model for planning the production and distribution of fresh produce. Annals of Operations Research 190, Besik, D., Nagurney, A., Quality in fresh produce supply chains with application to farmers markets. Socio-Economic Planning Sciences 60, Blackburn, J., Scudder, G., Supply chain strategies for perishable products: The case of fresh produce. Production and Operations Management 18(2), Ghare, P., Schrader, G., A model for an exponentially decaying inventory. Journal of Industrial Engineering 14, Kopanos, G.M., Puigjaner, L., Georgiadis, M.C., Simultaneous production and logistics operations planning in semicontinuous food industries. Omega 40, Monteiro, D.M.S., Theoretical and empirical analysis of the economics of traceability adoption in food supply chains. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Amherst, MA. Nahmias, S., Perishable inventory theory: A review. Operations Research 30(4), Nahmias, S., Perishable Inventory Systems. Springer, New York. Silver, E.A., Pyke, D.F., Peterson, R., Inventory Management and Production Planning and Scheduling, third edition. John Wiley & Sons, New York. Sloof, M., Tijskens, L.M.M., Wilkinson, E.C., Concepts for modelling the quality of perishable products. Trends in Food Science & Technology 7(5), Widodo, K.H., Nagasawa, H., Morizawa, K., Ota, M., A periodical flowering-harvesting model for delivering agricultural fresh products. European Journal of Operational Research 170, Yu M, Nagurney A. Competitive food supply chain networks with application to fresh produce. European Journal of Operational Research 2013; 224(2): Zhang, G., Habenicht, W., Spieß, W.E.L., Improving the structure of deep frozen and chilled food chain with tabu search procedure. Journal of Food Engineering 60,

48 THANK YOU! For more information: Nagurney, Besik and Yu (UMass) Quality in Food Supply Chain Networks NEDSI 2018

Quality in Fresh Produce Supply Chains. with Application to Farmers Markets

Quality in Fresh Produce Supply Chains. with Application to Farmers Markets Quality in Competitive Fresh Produce Supply Chains with Application to Farmers Markets Deniz Besik 1 and Anna Nagurney 2 1,2 Department of Operations and Information Management Isenberg School of Management

More information

Perishable Product Supply Chains

Perishable Product Supply Chains Perishable Product Supply Chains John F. Smith Memorial Professor Director Virtual Center for Supernetworks Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst Lancaster University, England,

More information

Topic 7: Perishable Product Supply Chains

Topic 7: Perishable Product Supply Chains Topic 7: Perishable Product Supply Chains John F. Smith Memorial Professor Director Virtual Center for Supernetworks Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst Advances in Variational

More information

Supply Chain Network Sustainability. Competition and Frequencies of Activities from Production to Distribution

Supply Chain Network Sustainability. Competition and Frequencies of Activities from Production to Distribution Under Competition and Frequencies of Activities from Production to Distribution Anna Nagurney 1,2, Min Yu 3, and Jonas Floden 2 1 Department of Operations and Information Management Isenberg School of

More information

Sustainable Fashion Supply Chain Management Under Oligopolistic Competition and Brand Differentiation

Sustainable Fashion Supply Chain Management Under Oligopolistic Competition and Brand Differentiation Under Oligopolistic Competition and Brand Differentiation Anna Nagurney John F. Smith Memorial Professor and Min Yu Doctoral Student Department of Finance and Operations Management Isenberg School of Management

More information

A Dynamic Network Oligopoly Model with Transportation Costs, Product Differentiation, and Quality Competition

A Dynamic Network Oligopoly Model with Transportation Costs, Product Differentiation, and Quality Competition A Dynamic Network Oligopoly Model with Transportation Costs, Product Differentiation, and Quality Competition Anna Nagurney John F. Smith Memorial Professor and Dong Li Doctoral Student Department of Finance

More information

A Supply Chain Network Game Theory Model with Product Differentiation, Outsourcing of Production and Distribution, and Quality and Price Competition

A Supply Chain Network Game Theory Model with Product Differentiation, Outsourcing of Production and Distribution, and Quality and Price Competition A Supply Chain Network Game Theory Model with Product Differentiation, Outsourcing of Production and Distribution, and Quality and Price Competition Anna Nagurney John F. Smith Memorial Professor and Dr.

More information

Supply Chain Network Design for Critical Needs with Outsourcing

Supply Chain Network Design for Critical Needs with Outsourcing with Outsourcing Anna Nagurney 1 Min Yu 1 Qiang Qiang 2 1 Department of Finance and Operations Management Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, Massachusetts 01003 2 Management

More information

Supply Chain Network Design for Critical Needs with Outsourcing

Supply Chain Network Design for Critical Needs with Outsourcing with Outsourcing 1 Min Yu 1 Qiang Qiang 2 1 Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, Massachusetts 01003 2 Management Division Pennsylvania State University Great Valley School

More information

Competition for Blood Donations: A Nash Equilibrium Network Framework

Competition for Blood Donations: A Nash Equilibrium Network Framework Competition for Blood Donations: A Nash Equilibrium Network Framework Anna Nagurney and Pritha Dutta Department of Operations and Information Management Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts

More information

A Network Economic Model of a Service-Oriented Internet with Choices and Quality Competition

A Network Economic Model of a Service-Oriented Internet with Choices and Quality Competition A Network Economic Model of a Service-Oriented Internet with Choices and Quality Competition Anna Nagurney John F. Smith Memorial Professor Dong Michelle Li PhD candidate Tilman Wolf Professor of Electrical

More information

Supernetworks in Healthcare and Humanitarian Operations

Supernetworks in Healthcare and Humanitarian Operations in Healthcare and Humanitarian Operations Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, Massachusetts 01003 2011 IEEE Conference on and System Management May 29-30, 2011, Shanghai,

More information

Securing the Sustainability of Medical Nuclear Supply Chains. Through Economic Cost Recovery, Risk Management, and Optimization

Securing the Sustainability of Medical Nuclear Supply Chains. Through Economic Cost Recovery, Risk Management, and Optimization Securing the Sustainability of Global Medical Nuclear Supply Chains Through Economic Cost Recovery, Risk Management, and Optimization Anna Nagurney 1, Ladimer S. Nagurney 2, and Dong Li 1 1 Isenberg School

More information

Lecture 10: Critical Needs Supply Chains Under Disruptions

Lecture 10: Critical Needs Supply Chains Under Disruptions Lecture 10: Critical Needs Supply Chains Under Disruptions John F. Smith Memorial Professor Director Virtual Center for Supernetworks Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst,

More information

Transportation Network Equilibrium Reformulations of Electric Power Supply Chain Networks with Computations

Transportation Network Equilibrium Reformulations of Electric Power Supply Chain Networks with Computations Transportation Network Equilibrium Reformulations of Electric Power Supply Chain Networks with Computations Anna Nagurney Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study Harvard University 34 Concord Avenue Cambridge,

More information

Supply Chain Network Competition in Price and Quality with Multiple Manufacturers and Freight Service Providers

Supply Chain Network Competition in Price and Quality with Multiple Manufacturers and Freight Service Providers Supply Chain Network Competition in Price and Quality with Multiple Manufacturers and Freight Service Providers Anna Nagurney Sara Saberi Department of Operations and Information Management University

More information

Supply Chain Supernetworks with Random Demands

Supply Chain Supernetworks with Random Demands Supply Chain Supernetworks with Random Demands June Dong and Ding Zhang Department of Marketing and Management School of Business State University of New York at Oswego Oswego, New York 13126 Anna Nagurney

More information

Tradable Permits for System-Optimized Networks. Anna Nagurney Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003

Tradable Permits for System-Optimized Networks. Anna Nagurney Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003 Tradable Permits for System-Optimized Networks Anna Nagurney Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003 c 2002 Introduction In this lecture, I return to the policy mechanism

More information

Topic 5: Oligopolies and Game Theory

Topic 5: Oligopolies and Game Theory Topic 5: Oligopolies and Game Theory John F. Smith Memorial Professor and Director Virtual Center for Supernetworks Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, Massachusetts 01003

More information

Supply Chain Network Design of a Sustainable Blood Banking System

Supply Chain Network Design of a Sustainable Blood Banking System Supply Chain Network Design of a Sustainable Blood Banking System Anna Nagurney John F. Smith Memorial Professor and Amir H. Masoumi Doctoral Candidate Department of Finance and Operations Management Isenberg

More information

Dynamics of Global Supply Chain and Electric Power Networks: Models, Pricing Analysis, and Computations

Dynamics of Global Supply Chain and Electric Power Networks: Models, Pricing Analysis, and Computations Dynamics of Global Supply Chain and Electric Power Networks: Models, Pricing Analysis, and Computations A Presented by Department of Finance and Operations Management Isenberg School of Management University

More information

Management of Knowledge Intensive Systems as Supernetworks: Modeling, Analysis, Computations, and Applications

Management of Knowledge Intensive Systems as Supernetworks: Modeling, Analysis, Computations, and Applications Management of Knowledge Intensive Systems as Supernetworks: Modeling, Analysis, Computations, and Applications Anna Nagurney Department of Finance and Operations Management Isenberg School of Management

More information

Topic 6: Projected Dynamical Systems

Topic 6: Projected Dynamical Systems Topic 6: Projected Dynamical Systems John F. Smith Memorial Professor and Director Virtual Center for Supernetworks Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, Massachusetts 01003

More information

Collaborative Network Formation in Spatial Oligopolies

Collaborative Network Formation in Spatial Oligopolies Collaborative Network Formation in Spatial Oligopolies 1 Shaun Lichter, Terry Friesz, and Christopher Griffin arxiv:1108.4114v1 [math.oc] 20 Aug 2011 Abstract Recently, it has been shown that networks

More information

Kai Wu Department of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering University of Massachusetts Amherst, Massachusetts 01003

Kai Wu Department of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering University of Massachusetts Amherst, Massachusetts 01003 Modeling Generator Power Plant Portfolios and Pollution Taxes in Electric Power Supply Chain Networks: A Transportation Network Equilibrium Transformation Kai Wu Department of Mechanical and Industrial

More information

A Game Theory Model for a Differentiated. Service-Oriented Internet with Contract Duration. Contracts

A Game Theory Model for a Differentiated. Service-Oriented Internet with Contract Duration. Contracts A Game Theory Model for a Differentiated Service-Oriented Internet with Duration-Based Contracts Anna Nagurney 1,2 John F. Smith Memorial Professor Sara Saberi 1,2 PhD Candidate Tilman Wolf 2 Professor

More information

Viable and Sustainable Transportation Networks. Anna Nagurney Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003

Viable and Sustainable Transportation Networks. Anna Nagurney Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003 Viable and Sustainable Transportation Networks Anna Nagurney Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003 c 2002 Viability and Sustainability In this lecture, the fundamental

More information

Variational Inequalities. Anna Nagurney Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003

Variational Inequalities. Anna Nagurney Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003 Variational Inequalities Anna Nagurney Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003 c 2002 Background Equilibrium is a central concept in numerous disciplines including economics,

More information

Environmental and Cost Synergy in Supply Chain Network Integration in Mergers and Acquisitions

Environmental and Cost Synergy in Supply Chain Network Integration in Mergers and Acquisitions Environmental and Cost Synergy in Supply Chain Network Integration in Mergers and Acquisitions Anna Nagurney John F. Smith Memorial Professor and Trisha Woolley Isenberg School of Mangement University

More information

Modeling of Supply Chain Risk under Disruptions with Performance Measurement and Robustness Analysis

Modeling of Supply Chain Risk under Disruptions with Performance Measurement and Robustness Analysis Modeling of Supply Chain Risk under Disruptions with Performance Measurement and Robustness Analysis Professor Qiang Patrick Qiang John F. Smith Memorial Professor Anna Nagurney Professor June Qiong Dong

More information

Modeling of Electric Power Supply Chain Networks with Fuel Suppliers via Variational Inequalities

Modeling of Electric Power Supply Chain Networks with Fuel Suppliers via Variational Inequalities Modeling of Electric Power Supply Chain Networks with Fuel Suppliers via Variational Inequalities Anna Nagurney Zugang Liu Faculty of Economics and Business, The University of Sydney Radcliffe Institute

More information

Cybersecurity Investments with Nonlinear Budget Constraints: Analysis of the Marginal Expected Utilities

Cybersecurity Investments with Nonlinear Budget Constraints: Analysis of the Marginal Expected Utilities Cybersecurity Investments with Nonlinear Budget Constraints: Analysis of the Marginal Expected Utilities Patrizia Daniele Department of Mathematics and Computer Science University of Catania, Italy Antonino

More information

Supply Chain Network Operations Management and Design of A Sustainable Blood Banking System

Supply Chain Network Operations Management and Design of A Sustainable Blood Banking System Supply Chain Network Operations Management and Design of A Sustainable Blood Banking System Amir Masoumi SCHMGT 597LG - Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, Massachusetts

More information

DYNAMICS OF ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY CHAIN NETWORKS UNDER RISK AND UNCERTAINTY

DYNAMICS OF ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY CHAIN NETWORKS UNDER RISK AND UNCERTAINTY DYNAMICS OF ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY CHAIN NETWORKS UNDER RISK AND UNCERTAINTY Dmytro Matsypura and Anna Nagurney International Conference on Computational Management Science, March 31 - April 3, 2005 University

More information

International Financial Networks with Intermediation: Modeling, Analysis, and Computations

International Financial Networks with Intermediation: Modeling, Analysis, and Computations International Financial Networks with Intermediation: Modeling, Analysis, and Computations Anna Nagurney and Jose Cruz Department of Finance and Operations Management Isenberg School of Management University

More information

Deterministic Operations Research, ME 366Q and ORI 391 Chapter 2: Homework #2 Solutions

Deterministic Operations Research, ME 366Q and ORI 391 Chapter 2: Homework #2 Solutions Deterministic Operations Research, ME 366Q and ORI 391 Chapter 2: Homework #2 Solutions 11. Consider the following linear program. Maximize z = 6x 1 + 3x 2 subject to x 1 + 2x 2 2x 1 + x 2 20 x 1 x 2 x

More information

Topic 4: Supply Chain Performance Assessment

Topic 4: Supply Chain Performance Assessment Topic 4: Supply Chain Performance Assessment John F. Smith Memorial Professor Director Virtual Center for Supernetworks Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst Advances in Variational

More information

Pharmaceutical Supply Chain Networks with Outsourcing. Under Price and Quality Competition

Pharmaceutical Supply Chain Networks with Outsourcing. Under Price and Quality Competition Pharmaceutical Supply Chain Networks with Outsourcing Under Price and Quality Competition Anna Nagurney 1, Dong (Michelle) Li 1, and Ladimer S. Nagurney 2 1 Isenberg School of Management University of

More information

Lecture 12 The Spatial Price Equilibrium Problem

Lecture 12 The Spatial Price Equilibrium Problem Lecture 12 The Spatial Price Equilibrium Problem Dr. Anna Nagurney John F. Smith Memorial Professor Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, Massachusetts 01003 c 2009 Parallel

More information

Dynamic Electric Power Supply Chains and Transportation Networks: an Evolutionary Variational Inequality Formulation

Dynamic Electric Power Supply Chains and Transportation Networks: an Evolutionary Variational Inequality Formulation Dynamic Electric Power Supply Chains and Transportation Networks: an Evolutionary Variational Inequality Formulation (To appear in Transportation Research E) Anna Nagurney Radcliffe Institute for Advanced

More information

Medical Nuclear Supply Chain Design: A Tractable Network Model and Computational Approach

Medical Nuclear Supply Chain Design: A Tractable Network Model and Computational Approach : A Tractable Network Model and Computational Approach Anna Nagurney 1 and Ladimer S. Nagurney 2 1 John F. Smith Memorial Professor - Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts - Amherst,

More information

An Integrated Disaster Relief Supply Chain Network Model. Time Targets and Demand Uncertainty

An Integrated Disaster Relief Supply Chain Network Model. Time Targets and Demand Uncertainty An Integrated Disaster Relief Supply Chain Network Model with Time Targets and Demand Uncertainty Anna Nagurney 1, Amir H. Masoumi 2, Min Yu 3 1 - Department of Operations and Information Management Isenberg

More information

Dynamic Electric Power Supply Chains and Transportation Networks: An Evolutionary Variational Inequality Formulation

Dynamic Electric Power Supply Chains and Transportation Networks: An Evolutionary Variational Inequality Formulation Dynamic Electric Power Supply Chains and Transportation Networks: An Evolutionary Variational Inequality Formulation Anna Nagurney Radcliffe Institute Fellow Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study 34 Concord

More information

Lecture 10 The Extended Model

Lecture 10 The Extended Model Lecture 10 The Extended Model Dr. Anna Nagurney John F. Smith Memorial Professor and Director Virtual Center for Supernetworks Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, Massachusetts

More information

Stochastic Equilibrium Problems arising in the energy industry

Stochastic Equilibrium Problems arising in the energy industry Stochastic Equilibrium Problems arising in the energy industry Claudia Sagastizábal (visiting researcher IMPA) mailto:sagastiz@impa.br http://www.impa.br/~sagastiz ENEC workshop, IPAM, Los Angeles, January

More information

Static and Dynamic Transportation Network Equilibrium Reformulations of Electric Power Supply Chain Networks with Known Demands Anna Nagurney

Static and Dynamic Transportation Network Equilibrium Reformulations of Electric Power Supply Chain Networks with Known Demands Anna Nagurney Static and Dynamic Transportation Network Equilibrium Reformulations of Electric Power Supply Chain Networks with Known Demands Anna Nagurney Radcliffe Institute Fellow Radcliffe Institute for Advanced

More information

Lecture 9: Game Theory and Disaster Relief

Lecture 9: Game Theory and Disaster Relief Lecture 9: Game Theory and Disaster Relief John F. Smith Memorial Professor and Director Virtual Center for Supernetworks Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, Massachusetts

More information

Solving Large Sustainable Supply Chain Networks using Variational Inequalities

Solving Large Sustainable Supply Chain Networks using Variational Inequalities Solving Large Sustainable Supply Chain Networks using Variational Inequalities Ian Gemp and Sridhar Mahadevan School of Computer Science University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003 (imgemp,mahadeva)@cs.umass.edu

More information

Multicriteria Spatial Price Networks: Statics and Dynamics

Multicriteria Spatial Price Networks: Statics and Dynamics Multicriteria Spatial Price Networks: Statics and Dynamics Anna Nagurney Department of Finance and Operations Management Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, Massachusetts

More information

A Network Economic Game Theory Model of a Service-Oriented Internet with Price and Quality Competition in Both Content and Network Provision

A Network Economic Game Theory Model of a Service-Oriented Internet with Price and Quality Competition in Both Content and Network Provision A Network Economic Game Theory Model of a Service-Oriented Internet with Price and Quality Competition in Both Content and Network Provision Sara Saberi 1, Anna Nagurney 1,2, and Tilman Wolf 3 1 Department

More information

Price and Capacity Competition

Price and Capacity Competition Price and Capacity Competition Daron Acemoglu, Kostas Bimpikis, and Asuman Ozdaglar October 9, 2007 Abstract We study the efficiency of oligopoly equilibria in a model where firms compete over capacities

More information

Dynamics and Equilibria of Ecological Predator-Prey Networks as Nature s Supply Chains

Dynamics and Equilibria of Ecological Predator-Prey Networks as Nature s Supply Chains Dynamics and Equilibria of Ecological Predator-Prey Networks as Nature s Supply Chains Anna Nagurney Department of Finance and Operations Management Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts

More information

A Network Equilibrium Framework for Internet Advertising: Models, Qualitative Analysis, and Algorithms Abstract:

A Network Equilibrium Framework for Internet Advertising: Models, Qualitative Analysis, and Algorithms Abstract: A Network Equilibrium Framework for Internet Advertising: Models, Qualitative Analysis, and Algorithms Lan Zhao Department of Mathematics and Computer Information Sciences SUNY at Old Westbury Old Westbury,

More information

Using Markov Chains To Model Human Migration in a Network Equilibrium Framework

Using Markov Chains To Model Human Migration in a Network Equilibrium Framework Using Markov Chains To Model Human Migration in a Network Equilibrium Framework Jie Pan Department of Mathematics and Computer Science Saint Joseph s University Philadelphia, PA 19131 Anna Nagurney School

More information

Network Equilibrium. Professor Anna Nagurney

Network Equilibrium. Professor Anna Nagurney Network Equilibrium John F. Smith Memorial Professor Director Virtual Center for Supernetworks Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst Lancaster University, England, Spring 2018

More information

Topic 4: Spatial Price Equilibrium

Topic 4: Spatial Price Equilibrium Topic 4: Spatial Price Equilibrium John F. Smith Memorial Professor and Director Virtual Center for Supernetworks Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, Massachusetts 01003

More information

Hospital Competition in Prices and Quality: A Variational Inequality Framework

Hospital Competition in Prices and Quality: A Variational Inequality Framework Hospital Competition in Prices and Quality: A Variational Inequality Framework Anna Nagurney and Karen Li Department of Operations and Information Management Isenberg School of Management University of

More information

LINEAR PROGRAMMING MODULE Part 1 - Model Formulation INTRODUCTION

LINEAR PROGRAMMING MODULE Part 1 - Model Formulation INTRODUCTION Name: LINEAR PROGRAMMING MODULE Part 1 - Model Formulation INTRODUCTION In general, a mathematical model is either deterministic or probabilistic. For example, the models and algorithms shown in the Graph-Optimization

More information

Cournot and Bertrand Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly with Endogenous Technology Adoption *

Cournot and Bertrand Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly with Endogenous Technology Adoption * ANNALS OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 16-1, 231 253 (2015) Cournot and Bertrand Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly with Endogenous Technology Adoption * Hongkun Ma School of Economics, Shandong University,

More information

A VARIATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM FORMULATION FOR HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS UNDER COMPETITION. Patrizia DANIELE

A VARIATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM FORMULATION FOR HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS UNDER COMPETITION. Patrizia DANIELE A VARIATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM FORMULATION FOR HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS UNDER COMPETITION Patrizia DANIELE University of Catania - Italy Joint paper with A. Nagurney - E. Alvarez Flores - V. Caruso in Dynamics

More information

MS-E2140. Lecture 1. (course book chapters )

MS-E2140. Lecture 1. (course book chapters ) Linear Programming MS-E2140 Motivations and background Lecture 1 (course book chapters 1.1-1.4) Linear programming problems and examples Problem manipulations and standard form Graphical representation

More information

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES PRICE AND CAPACITY COMPETITION. Daron Acemoglu Kostas Bimpikis Asuman Ozdaglar

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES PRICE AND CAPACITY COMPETITION. Daron Acemoglu Kostas Bimpikis Asuman Ozdaglar NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES PRICE AND CAPACITY COMPETITION Daron Acemoglu Kostas Bimpikis Asuman Ozdaglar Working Paper 12804 http://www.nber.org/papers/w12804 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts

More information

July 2004; updated February 2005 Appears in Computational Economics 27 (2006), pp

July 2004; updated February 2005 Appears in Computational Economics 27 (2006), pp The Evolution and Emergence of Integrated Social and Financial Networks with Electronic Transactions: A Dynamic Supernetwork Theory for the Modeling, Analysis, and Computation of Financial Flows and Relationship

More information

A technical appendix for multihoming and compatibility

A technical appendix for multihoming and compatibility A technical appendix for multihoming and compatibility Toker Doganoglu and Julian Wright July 19, 2005 We would like to thank two anonymous referees and our editor, Simon Anderson, for their very helpful

More information

Simplex tableau CE 377K. April 2, 2015

Simplex tableau CE 377K. April 2, 2015 CE 377K April 2, 2015 Review Reduced costs Basic and nonbasic variables OUTLINE Review by example: simplex method demonstration Outline Example You own a small firm producing construction materials for

More information

Game Theory Network Models for Disaster Relief

Game Theory Network Models for Disaster Relief Game Theory Network Models for Disaster Relief John F. Smith Memorial Professor Director Virtual Center for Supernetworks Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst Lancaster University,

More information

Solving Dual Problems

Solving Dual Problems Lecture 20 Solving Dual Problems We consider a constrained problem where, in addition to the constraint set X, there are also inequality and linear equality constraints. Specifically the minimization problem

More information

Gabriella Colajanni a, Patrizia Daniele a, Sofia Giuffrè b and Anna Nagurney c. Abstract. 1. Introduction

Gabriella Colajanni a, Patrizia Daniele a, Sofia Giuffrè b and Anna Nagurney c. Abstract. 1. Introduction Intl. Trans. in Op. Res. xx (2017) 1 24 DOI: xx.xxxx/itor.xxxxx INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN OPERATIONAL RESEARCH Cybersecurity Investments with Nonlinear Budget Constraints and Conservation Laws: Variational

More information

Designing the Distribution Network for an Integrated Supply Chain

Designing the Distribution Network for an Integrated Supply Chain Designing the Distribution Network for an Integrated Supply Chain Jia Shu and Jie Sun Abstract We consider an integrated distribution network design problem in which all the retailers face uncertain demand.

More information

A Primal-Dual Algorithm for Computing a Cost Allocation in the. Core of Economic Lot-Sizing Games

A Primal-Dual Algorithm for Computing a Cost Allocation in the. Core of Economic Lot-Sizing Games 1 2 A Primal-Dual Algorithm for Computing a Cost Allocation in the Core of Economic Lot-Sizing Games 3 Mohan Gopaladesikan Nelson A. Uhan Jikai Zou 4 October 2011 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Abstract We consider

More information

MS-E2140. Lecture 1. (course book chapters )

MS-E2140. Lecture 1. (course book chapters ) Linear Programming MS-E2140 Motivations and background Lecture 1 (course book chapters 1.1-1.4) Linear programming problems and examples Problem manipulations and standard form problems Graphical representation

More information

7.1 INTRODUCTION. In this era of extreme competition, each subsystem in different

7.1 INTRODUCTION. In this era of extreme competition, each subsystem in different 7.1 INTRODUCTION In this era of extreme competition, each subsystem in different echelons of integrated model thrives to improve their operations, reduce costs and increase profitability. Currently, the

More information

MATH 445/545 Homework 1: Due February 11th, 2016

MATH 445/545 Homework 1: Due February 11th, 2016 MATH 445/545 Homework 1: Due February 11th, 2016 Answer the following questions Please type your solutions and include the questions and all graphics if needed with the solution 1 A business executive

More information

Network Economics and the Internet

Network Economics and the Internet John F. Smith Memorial Professor of Operations Management Director Virtual Center for Supernetworks Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachusetts 01003 and Visiting

More information

Topic 2: Algorithms. Professor Anna Nagurney

Topic 2: Algorithms. Professor Anna Nagurney Topic 2: Algorithms John F. Smith Memorial Professor and Director Virtual Center for Supernetworks Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, Massachusetts 01003 SCH-MGMT 825 Management

More information

Inventory optimization of distribution networks with discrete-event processes by vendor-managed policies

Inventory optimization of distribution networks with discrete-event processes by vendor-managed policies Inventory optimization of distribution networks with discrete-event processes by vendor-managed policies Simona Sacone and Silvia Siri Department of Communications, Computer and Systems Science University

More information

A three-level MILP model for generation and transmission expansion planning

A three-level MILP model for generation and transmission expansion planning A three-level MILP model for generation and transmission expansion planning David Pozo Cámara (UCLM) Enzo E. Sauma Santís (PUC) Javier Contreras Sanz (UCLM) Contents 1. Introduction 2. Aims and contributions

More information

Statics and Dynamics of Global Supply Chain Networks with Environmental Decision-Making

Statics and Dynamics of Global Supply Chain Networks with Environmental Decision-Making Statics and Dynamics of Global Supply Chain Networks with Environmental Decision-Making Anna Nagurney, Jose Cruz, Fuminori Toyasaki Department of Finance and Operations Management Isenberg School of Management

More information

Problem 1 (30 points)

Problem 1 (30 points) Problem (30 points) Prof. Robert King Consider an economy in which there is one period and there are many, identical households. Each household derives utility from consumption (c), leisure (l) and a public

More information

An Uncertain Bilevel Newsboy Model with a Budget Constraint

An Uncertain Bilevel Newsboy Model with a Budget Constraint Journal of Uncertain Systems Vol.12, No.2, pp.83-9, 218 Online at: www.jus.org.uk An Uncertain Bilevel Newsboy Model with a Budget Constraint Chunliu Zhu, Faquan Qi, Jinwu Gao School of Information, Renmin

More information

Oligopoly. Molly W. Dahl Georgetown University Econ 101 Spring 2009

Oligopoly. Molly W. Dahl Georgetown University Econ 101 Spring 2009 Oligopoly Molly W. Dahl Georgetown University Econ 101 Spring 2009 1 Oligopoly A monopoly is an industry consisting a single firm. A duopoly is an industry consisting of two firms. An oligopoly is an industry

More information

Lecture 3 Cost Structure

Lecture 3 Cost Structure Lecture 3 Dr. Anna Nagurney John F. Smith Memorial Professor Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, Massachusetts 01003 c 2009 Cost is a disutility - Cost is a function of travel

More information

Optimization, constrained optimization and applications of integrals.

Optimization, constrained optimization and applications of integrals. ams 11b Study Guide econ 11b Optimization, constrained optimization and applications of integrals. (*) In all the constrained optimization problems below, you may assume that the critical values you find

More information

Answer Key: Problem Set 3

Answer Key: Problem Set 3 Answer Key: Problem Set Econ 409 018 Fall Question 1 a This is a standard monopoly problem; using MR = a 4Q, let MR = MC and solve: Q M = a c 4, P M = a + c, πm = (a c) 8 The Lerner index is then L M P

More information

Global Supply Chain Network Dynamics with Multicriteria Decision-Making Under Risk and Uncertainty

Global Supply Chain Network Dynamics with Multicriteria Decision-Making Under Risk and Uncertainty Global Supply Chain Network Dynamics with Multicriteria Decision-Making Under Risk and Uncertainty Anna Nagurney and Dmytro Matsypura Department of Finance and Operations Management Isenberg School of

More information

April 23rd, By Jack Scoville

April 23rd, By Jack Scoville April 23rd, 2018 By Jack Scoville Wheat: Wheat markets were lower as weather and demand remained the dominant factors in the market. Some rains are in the forecast for western parts of the Great Plains,

More information

Technology and Network Design Issues. Anna Nagurney Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003

Technology and Network Design Issues. Anna Nagurney Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003 Technology and Network Design Issues Anna Nagurney Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst, MA 01003 c 2002 Introduction In this lecture, I explore technology and network design

More information

Getting to page 31 in Galí (2008)

Getting to page 31 in Galí (2008) Getting to page 31 in Galí 2008) H J Department of Economics University of Copenhagen December 4 2012 Abstract This note shows in detail how to compute the solutions for output inflation and the nominal

More information

An Integrated Electric Power Supply Chain and Fuel Market Network Framework: Theoretical Modeling with Empirical Analysis for New England

An Integrated Electric Power Supply Chain and Fuel Market Network Framework: Theoretical Modeling with Empirical Analysis for New England An Integrated Electric Power Supply Chain and Fuel Market Network Framework: Theoretical Modeling with Empirical Analysis for New England Zugang Liu and Anna Nagurney Penn State University Hazleton John

More information

3.10 Lagrangian relaxation

3.10 Lagrangian relaxation 3.10 Lagrangian relaxation Consider a generic ILP problem min {c t x : Ax b, Dx d, x Z n } with integer coefficients. Suppose Dx d are the complicating constraints. Often the linear relaxation and the

More information

Motivation. Lecture 2 Topics from Optimization and Duality. network utility maximization (NUM) problem:

Motivation. Lecture 2 Topics from Optimization and Duality. network utility maximization (NUM) problem: CDS270 Maryam Fazel Lecture 2 Topics from Optimization and Duality Motivation network utility maximization (NUM) problem: consider a network with S sources (users), each sending one flow at rate x s, through

More information

A Hierarchy of Suboptimal Policies for the Multi-period, Multi-echelon, Robust Inventory Problem

A Hierarchy of Suboptimal Policies for the Multi-period, Multi-echelon, Robust Inventory Problem A Hierarchy of Suboptimal Policies for the Multi-period, Multi-echelon, Robust Inventory Problem Dimitris J. Bertsimas Dan A. Iancu Pablo A. Parrilo Sloan School of Management and Operations Research Center,

More information

Multi level inventory management decisions with transportation cost consideration in fuzzy environment. W. Ritha, S.

Multi level inventory management decisions with transportation cost consideration in fuzzy environment. W. Ritha, S. Annals of Fuzzy Mathematics and Informatics Volume 2, No. 2, October 2011, pp. 171-181 ISSN 2093 9310 http://www.afmi.or.kr @FMI c Kyung Moon Sa Co. http://www.kyungmoon.com Multi level inventory management

More information

Financial Networks with Intermediation: Risk Management with Variable Weights

Financial Networks with Intermediation: Risk Management with Variable Weights Financial Networks with Intermediation: Risk Management with Variable Weights Anna Nagurney Department of Finance and Operations Management Isenberg School of Management University of Massachusetts Amherst,

More information

An Integrated Disaster Relief Supply Chain Network Model. With Time Targets and Demand Uncertainty

An Integrated Disaster Relief Supply Chain Network Model. With Time Targets and Demand Uncertainty An Integrated Disaster Relief Supply Chain Network Model With Time Targets and Demand Uncertainty Anna Nagurney 1 John F. Smith Memorial Professor Amir H. Masoumi 2 Assistant Professor Min Yu 3 Assistant

More information

A Mathematical (Mixed-Integer) Programming Formulation for. Microbrewery. Spyros A. Reveliotis. Spring 2001

A Mathematical (Mixed-Integer) Programming Formulation for. Microbrewery. Spyros A. Reveliotis. Spring 2001 A Mathematical (Mixed-Integer) Programming Formulation for the Production Scheduling Problem in the McGuinness & Co. Microbrewery Spyros A. Reveliotis Spring 2001 This document provides an analytical formulation

More information

2. Linear Programming Problem

2. Linear Programming Problem . Linear Programming Problem. Introduction to Linear Programming Problem (LPP). When to apply LPP or Requirement for a LPP.3 General form of LPP. Assumptions in LPP. Applications of Linear Programming.6

More information

Biological Variance in Agricultural Products Experimental Examples

Biological Variance in Agricultural Products Experimental Examples Biological Variance in Agricultural Products Experimental Examples L.M.M. Tijskens, P. Konopacki 2 and M. Simčič 3 ATO, P.O.Box 7, 6700 AA Wageningen, the Netherlands, E-mail: L.M.M.Tijskens@ato.wag-ur.nl

More information

Department of Agricultural Economics. PhD Qualifier Examination. May 2009

Department of Agricultural Economics. PhD Qualifier Examination. May 2009 Department of Agricultural Economics PhD Qualifier Examination May 009 Instructions: The exam consists of six questions. You must answer all questions. If you need an assumption to complete a question,

More information

Oligopoly Theory. This might be revision in parts, but (if so) it is good stu to be reminded of...

Oligopoly Theory. This might be revision in parts, but (if so) it is good stu to be reminded of... This might be revision in parts, but (if so) it is good stu to be reminded of... John Asker Econ 170 Industrial Organization January 23, 2017 1 / 1 We will cover the following topics: with Sequential Moves

More information