Some Pleasant Development Economics Arithmetic

Transcription

1 Some Pleasant Development Economics Arithmetic Hugo Hopenhayn August 8, / 34

2 Introduction Recent literature emphasis on inter-firm distortions in the allocation of inputs Firm-specific wedges Understand mapping between distortions and aggregate productivity? On the inference from data The role of firm dynamics 2 / 34

3 Understanding firm level distortions: The undistorted economy Simplified Lucas style model Production function: y i = e i n α i N total labor endowment Optimal allocation: ( ) ln n i = a+ 1 1 α e i y i /n i should be equated across firms (TFPR in HK jargon) 3 / 34

4 Aggregation Aggregate production function Homogeneous of degree one in firms (given distribution) and labor y = AM 1 α N α ( 1 α A = Ee 1 i ) 1 α 4 / 34

5 The Distorted Economy y i /n i not equated across firms Two types of distortions: n i not equal for all firms with same e i (uncorrelated distortion) average ln n i (e) = a α ln e (correlated distortion) 5 / 34

6 Restuccia-Rogerson Let a firm s profits be (1 τ i ) y i wl i rk i,where τ i denotes a sales tax variance and covariance % Estab. taxed Uncorrelated Correlated τ t τ t % % % potentially large effects More when correlated 6 / 34

7 A measure of distortions Distortions result in deviations of output frome optimal: n (τ, e) = (1 τ) 1 n (e) Using θ = (1 τ) 1 distorted employment is θn (e). Definition 1. A feasible distortion is a conditional probability distribution P (θ e) such that N = n (e) θdp (θ e) dg(e). Using a change of variable on order of integration, can define Q (n θ) and F (dθ) define measure N (dθ) as follows: ˆ dn (θ) = df (θ) ndq (n θ) 7 / 34

8 A measure of distortions N (θ) is the measure of total original employment that was distorted with some θ θ. It is silent about the productivity of the firms underlying these distortions. Example: n 1 = 10, n 2 = 100. Suppose equal number (e.g. 20) of each. Distorting by θ half of the firms of type 1 and by 1/θ the remaing half gives the same measure as distorting 1/20th of the type 2 firms with θ and 1/20th with 1/θ. N (θ) : {(θ, 100), (1/θ, 100), (1, 2000)} It integrates to total employment N = ˆ dn (θ). 8 / 34

9 The measure of distortions and TFP First define total output: y = e (θn (e)) η dp (θ e) dg (e) Using n (e) = ae 1 for some constant a ˆ y = e = ˆ a η ( θae 1 ) η dp (θ e) dg (e) e 1 θ η dp (θ e) dg (e) = a η 1 ˆ n (e) θ η dp (θ e) dg (e). Since it is linear in n (e) we can use our measure: y = a η 1 ˆ θ η dn (θ). 9 / 34

10 TFP and the measure of distortions We obtained our formula: y = a η 1 ˆ θ η dn (θ). Undistorted economy has N (θ) mass point at one. y eff = a η 1 N It follows that: TFP = y = 1 TFP eff y eff N ˆ θ η dn (θ) The effect of distortions depends on η and the distribution of distortions. 10 / 34

11 TFP and the concentration of distortions TFP = y = 1 TFP eff y eff N ˆ θ η dn (θ) dn (θ) /N is a probability measure Mean preserving spreads in this measure reduce TFP/TFP eff And mean preserving spreads give rise to the same aggregate employment! ˆ N = θdn (θ) Mean preserving spreads more concentrated distortions. Lower η implies more risk aversion so larger effect of a mean preserving spread. 11 / 34

12 Examples of mean preserving spreads Uncorrelated taxes to larger firms are worse for productivity than for smaller firms (holding the number of firms affected constant) Increasing the variance of the θ s for large firms will put more employment at the tails than if done for small firms But might not be so when taking into account that there are more small firms. It all depends on the share of employment of small vs. large firms. 12 / 34

13 Examples of mean preserving spreads Increasing the share of firms taxed (while subsidizing others to keep employment constant) Let a share s of firms have θ t < 1 Then share (1 s) must have θ s = s 1 s θ t This corresponds to a mean preserving spread of the employment that was subsidized initially at a lower rate 13 / 34

14 Inference from the size distribution of firms Size distribution of firms vary a lot across economies "missing middle" of underdeveloped economies 14 / 34

15 Size distribution and distortions What inferences can be made by comparing size distributions? Nothing in general: distortions might not be revealed in size distribution Can generate the efficient distribution by taxing all efficient firms out of the market and a distribution of taxes across the most inefficient ones that replicates the efficient size distribution. Special case: Both economies with same underlying G (de) One of the economies with no distortions Can easily calculate lower bound on distortions for other economy. 15 / 34

16 A lower bound on distortions Take efficient distribution of firm sizes with cdf F (n) Distorted economy with cdf D (n) Class of candidate distortions P (θ, n) such that: ˆ D (n) = P ( θ, n ) df (n) θn n This is a large class 16 / 34

17 Lower bound on distortions Objectivie: minimize spread Two key principles: P (θ n) should be concentrated at one point for each n Preserve ordering: n 2 n 1 iff θ 2 n 2 θn 1 Identifies unique solution function θ (n) defined implictly by: TFP TFP eff F (n) = D (θn) = 1 n ˆ θ (n) η ndf (n) TFP India/TFP US = 0.4 (Hsieh-Klenow report 0.38) 17 / 34

18 Wedges, curvature and productivity HK use η = 0.5 others η = How does curvature affect the impact of distortions? Relationship subtle Curvature affects the underlying efficient employment at different levels of e TFP 0 = [ e 1 i 1 (1 τ i ) η ei (1 τ i ) 1 ] η If η = 0, interfirm elasticity of substitution is zero, no effect. If η = 1, interfirm elasticity is infinite: no effect for uncorrelated taxes, large for correlated. Non-monotonic relationship. 18 / 34

19 Measuring distortions (H-K) Measure y i, n i, k i Compute e i and wedges. Counterfactual experiments. TFP gains of 30-50% in China and 40-60% in India 19 / 34

20 Dispersion in ln MP US (97) China (98) India (94) 1 τ ln AP ln AP 25 1 τ 75 China/US ln AP India/US 1 τ 25 1 τ 75 1 τ 25 1 τ 75 SD % % % % ratio (1 τ 25 ) / (1 τ 75 ). : e.g. assuming the decile 75 corresponded to no taxes in China, decile 25 would have a subsidy of 160% 20 / 34

21 The role of curvature in HK Distribution of productivities depends on η Implicit distortions also vary with η Data: (n 1, y 1, n 2, y 2,..., n M y M ) Production function y i = e i n η i Given parameter η, solve for e i and do counterfactuals. 21 / 34

22 TFP gains Aggregate TFP in economy: TFP = y n η ( Efficient: TFP e = e 1 i ) Substitute measured e i TFP e = ( y i n η i ) 1 TFP e TFP = y i n η i y n η 1 = n i n ( yi n i y n ) 1 22 / 34

23 TFP gains TFP e TFP = ( ) ni n (LPR i) 1 where LPR i = y i/n i y/n ( ) 1 TFPe = TFP n i n (LPR 1i) 1 Proposition. TFP e /TFP is the certainty equivalent of the lottery { n i N, LPR i} with CRRA η. It is thus incresing in η. Extreme: equal to one when η = / 34

24 Example: sensitivity to curvature Suppose n 1 /n = n 2 /n = 1/2 relative y i /n i η / 34

25 The role of entry and firm dynamics These models abstract from entry/exit margin How do results change when this margin can adjust? Constrained social planner and entry Potential role of distortions to entry 25 / 34

26 The dynamic economy firms productivitiesl cdf F (ds ; s). Exogenous death rate 1 δ. sequence of entries of firms {m 0,..., m t } M t = δ t m 0 + δ t 1 m δm t 1 + m t firms producing in period t with probability distribution µ t = M 1 t ( m t µ 0 + δm t 1 t 1 µ δ t m 0 µ t ). (1) aggregationy t = ( e 1 dµ t (e)) M t N η. 26 / 34

27 Competitive equilibrium v t (e; w) value for a firm at time t for a given sequence of wages w = {w s } s=0.v t (e; w) = max n en η w t n + βδev t+1 (e ; w e). v e t = v t (e; w) dg (e) w t c e expected value for an entrant. Definition 2. A competitive equilibrium is a sequence {m t, n t (e), v t } and wages {w t } that satisfy the following conditions: 1. Employment decisions are optimal given wages 2. The value functions are as defined above 3. v e t 0 and m tv e t = 0 4. m t c e + n t (e) µ t (de) = N 27 / 34

28 The distorted economy Firm specific output taxes τ i From firm s point of view, same as productivity shock (1 τ i ) e i r i = (1 τ i ) y i = (1 τ i ) e i n η i = α (e i (1 τ i )) 1, Joint distribution of (e, τ) for each age cohort: µ s (e, τ) ˆ r s = e 1 (1 τ) 1 d µ s (e, τ) ("distorted" social planner) revenue-value of sequence [m 0,..., m t, m t+1,...], ( ) t β t (N c e m t ) η δ t s m s r s t=0 s=0 28 / 34

29 Equilibrium entry First order conditions for m t at steady state m: N c e m = ηc e (1 η) s=0 δs r s s=0 βs δ s r s m is increasing in: s=0 βs δ s r s s=0 δs r s equilibrium m depends on the age-structure of distortions (Fattal-Jaef, Hopenhayn) m is independent of distortions either if δ = 0 or β = 1. m is independent of distortions if r s /r s is independent of s 29 / 34

30 Equilibrium entry - comparison Definition 3. The sequence {δ s r s } dominates (is dominated by) the sequence {δ s r s } if and only if t s=0 δs r s ( ) t s=0 δs r s s=0 δs r s s=0 δs r s for all t. Proposition 4. Suppose {δ s r s } dominates (is dominated by) {δ s r s }Then m ( )m 0. dominates if distortions tend to be higher for older firms sufficient condition r s/ r s decreasing in s Fattal-Jaef (2010) shows accounting for the response of entry to wedges can lead to substantively different values. 30 / 34

31 Equilibrium and Optimal entry private vs. social value of a cohort: ˆ r s = e 1 (1 τ) 1 d µ s (e, τ) ˆ ỹ s = e 1 (1 τ) η d µ s (e, τ) Social planner s objective: ( ) t max m t β t m t s δ s r ( s (N c e m t ) η t s=0 m t s δ s ) ỹ s s=0 t s=0 m t sδ s r s }{{}}{{} D P t (m 0,m 1,...) t (m 0,m 1,...) P t stands for private return and D t for distortion First order conditions: s t β s P s m t D s + β s D s m t P s 31 / 34

32 The planner and distortions β s P s D s + s t m t β s D s P s m t ( ) Proposition 5. In a steady state β s D s m t P s has sign of: s=0 βs δ s ỹ s δ s ỹ s δs r s δ s r s Negative if δ s r s is dominated by δ s ỹ s Sufficient condition r s /ỹ s decreasing in s r s ỹ s = ( ) (1 τ) y (e, τ) d µs (e, τ) y (e, τ) d µ s (e, τ) Larger in less distorted cohorts If distortions are higher (lower) or more (less) correlated with output for younger cohorts then planner wants more (less) entry than equilibrium. 32 / 34

33 Intuition Take economy where older firms are more distored than younger firms (e.g.taxes positively correlated with age/size) In that economy, there will be more entry: entrants are "less taxed" than typical incument Entry will be excessive: at the equilibrium, the marginal social value of an entrant is less than the marginal social value of an incumbent. Conjecture: If distortions are size/age related and older firms are larger, planner would want less entry than in the undistored equilibrium. Optimal entry at distorted economy < Optimal entry at undistorted economy < equilibrium entry at distored economy. 33 / 34

34 Final remarks What matters for aggregate TFP is the concentration of distortions Correlation with size/efficiency not as important Effects of distortions sensitive to curvature In HK effects increase with curvature Dichotomy between distortions and the productivity of firms Distortions and entry/exit 34 / 34