Redistributive Taxation in a Partial Insurance Economy
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1 Redistributive Taxation in a Partial Insurance Economy Jonathan Heathcote Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Kjetil Storesletten Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, and Oslo University Gianluca Violante New York University EIEF, June 4th, 2013
2 Redistributive Taxation How progressive should earnings taxation be?
3 Redistributive Taxation How progressive should earnings taxation be? Arguments in favor of progressivity: 1. Social insurance of privately-uninsurable shocks 2. Redistribution from high to low innate ability
4 Redistributive Taxation How progressive should earnings taxation be? Arguments in favor of progressivity: 1. Social insurance of privately-uninsurable shocks 2. Redistribution from high to low innate ability Arguments against progressivity: 1. Discourages labor supply 2. Discourages human capital investment 3. Redistribution from low to high taste for leisure 4. Complicates financing of govt. spending
5 Ramsey Approach Planner takes policy instruments and market structure as given, and chooses the CE that maximizes welfare CE of an heterogeneous-agent, incomplete-market economy Nonlinear tax/transfer system Valued public expenditures also chosen by the government Various social welfare functions Tractable equilibrium framework clarifies economic forces shaping the optimal degree of progressivity
6 Overview of the model Huggett (1994) economy: -lived agents, idiosyncratic productivity risk, and a risk-free bond in zero net-supply, plus:
7 Overview of the model Huggett (1994) economy: -lived agents, idiosyncratic productivity risk, and a risk-free bond in zero net-supply, plus: 1. differential innate (learning) ability 2. endogenous skill investment + multiple-skill technology 3. endogenous labor supply 4. heterogeneity in preferences for leisure 5. valued government expenditures 6. additional partial private insurance (other assets, family, etc)
8 Overview of the model Huggett (1994) economy: -lived agents, idiosyncratic productivity risk, and a risk-free bond in zero net-supply, plus: 1. differential innate (learning) ability 2. endogenous skill investment + multiple-skill technology 3. endogenous labor supply 4. heterogeneity in preferences for leisure 5. valued government expenditures 6. additional partial private insurance (other assets, family, etc) Steady-state analysis
9 Demographics and preferences Perpetual youth demographics with constant survival probability δ Preferences over consumption (c), hours (h), publicly-provided goods (G), and skill-investment effort (s): U i = v i (s i )+E 0 (βδ) t u i (c it,h it,g) t=0 v i (s i ) = 1 κ i s 2 i 2µ u i (c it,h it,g) = logc it exp(ϕ i ) h1+σ it 1+σ +χlogg κ i Exp(η) ϕ i N ( vϕ 2,v ϕ )
10 Technology Output is CES aggregator over continuum of skill types: Y = [ 0 N (s) θ 1 θ ] θ θ 1 ds, θ (1, ) Aggregate effective hours by skill type: N(s) = 1 0 I {si =s}z i h i di Aggregate resource constraint: Y = 1 0 c i di+g
11 Individual efficiency units of labor logz it = α it +ε it α it = α i,t 1 +ω it with ω it N ( v ω 2,v ω ) α i0 = 0 i ε it i.i.d. over time with ε it N ( v ε 2,v ε ) ϕ κ ω ε cross-sectionally and longitudinally
12 Individual efficiency units of labor logz it = α it +ε it α it = α i,t 1 +ω it with ω it N ( v ω 2,v ω ) α i0 = 0 i ε it i.i.d. over time with ε it N ( v ε 2,v ε ) ϕ κ ω ε cross-sectionally and longitudinally Pre-government earnings: y it = p(s i ) }{{} skill price exp(α it +ε it ) }{{} efficiency determined by skill, fortune, and diligence h it }{{} hours
13 Government Runs a two-parameter tax/transfer function to redistribute and finance publicly-provided goods G Disposable (post-government) earnings: ỹ i = λy 1 τ i Government budget constraint (no government debt): G = 1 0 [ yi λy 1 τ i ] di Government chooses (G, τ), and λ balances the budget residually
14 Our model of fiscal redistribution T(y i ) = y i λy 1 τ i The parameter τ measures the rate of progressivity: τ = 0 : τ = 1 : 0 < τ < 1: τ < 0 : no redistribution flat tax 1 λ full redistribution ỹ i = λ progressivity T (y) T(y)/y > 1 regressivity T (y) T(y)/y < 1
15 Our model of fiscal redistribution T(y i ) = y i λy 1 τ i The parameter τ measures the rate of progressivity: τ = 0 : τ = 1 : 0 < τ < 1: τ < 0 : no redistribution flat tax 1 λ full redistribution ỹ i = λ progressivity T (y) T(y)/y > 1 regressivity T (y) T(y)/y < 1 Marginal tax rate monotone in earnings Negative average tax rates below y 0 = λ 1 τ
16 Our model of fiscal redistribution Log of Diisposable Income Log of Pre Government Income CPS 2005, Nobs = 52,539: R 2 = 0.92 and τ = 0.18
17 Our model of fiscal redistribution 0.5 Marginal and average tax rates US Marginal (τ US =0.18) US Average (τ US =0.18) Labor Income (1 = Average Earnings)
18 Representative Agent Warm Up max C,H U = logc H1+σ 1+σ +χlogg s.t. C = λh 1 τ Market clearing C +G = H Define g = G/H Equilibrium allocations: logc RA (g,τ) = log(1 g)+ logh RA (g,τ) = 1 (1+σ) log(1 τ) 1 (1+σ) log(1 τ)
19 Representative Agent Optimal Policy Welfare: W RA (g,τ) = log(1 g)+χlogg+(1+χ) log(1 τ) (1+σ) 1 τ (1+σ) Welfare maximizing (g,τ) pair: g = τ χ 1+χ = χ Allocations are first best (same as with lump-sum taxes) Result for g will extend to heterogeneous agent setup
20 Markets Competitive good and labor markets Competitive asset markets (all assets in zero net supply) Non-contingent bond
21 Markets Competitive good and labor markets Competitive asset markets (all assets in zero net supply) Non-contingent bond Full set of insurance claims against ε shocks If v ε = 0, it is a bond economy If v ω = 0, it is a full insurance economy If v ω = v ε = v ϕ = 0 & θ =, it is a RA economy
22 Markets Competitive good and labor markets Competitive asset markets (all assets in zero net supply) Non-contingent bond Full set of insurance claims against ε shocks If v ε = 0, it is a bond economy If v ω = 0, it is a full insurance economy If v ω = v ε = v ϕ = 0 & θ =, it is a RA economy Perfect annuity against survival risk
23 Budget constraints 1. Beginning of period: innovation ω to α shock is realized 2. Middle of period: buy insurance against ε: b = Q(ε)B(ε)dε, where Q( ) is the price of insurance and B( ) is the quantity E 3. End of period: ε realized, consumption and hours chosen: c+δqb = λ[p(s)exp(α+ε)h] 1 τ +B(ε)
24 Recursive stationary equilibrium Given (g,τ), a stationary RCE is a value λ, asset prices {Q( ),q}, skill prices p(s), decision rules s(ϕ,κ,0), c(α,ε,ϕ,s,b), h(α,ε,ϕ,s,b), and aggregate quantities N(s) such that: households optimize markets clear the government budget constraint is balanced
25 Recursive stationary equilibrium Given (g,τ), a stationary RCE is a value λ, asset prices {Q( ),q}, skill prices p(s), decision rules s(ϕ,κ,0), c(α,ε,ϕ,s,b), h(α,ε,ϕ,s,b), and aggregate quantities N(s) such that: households optimize markets clear the government budget constraint is balanced The equilibrium features no bond-trading b = 0 allocations depend only on exogenous states α shocks remain uninsured, ε shocks fully insured
26 No bond-trade equilibrium Micro-foundations for Constantinides and Duffie (1996) CRRA, unit root shocks to log disposable income In equilibrium, no bond-trade c t = ỹ t
27 No bond-trade equilibrium Micro-foundations for Constantinides and Duffie (1996) CRRA, unit root shocks to log disposable income In equilibrium, no bond-trade c t = ỹ t Unit root disposable income micro-founded in our model: 1. Skill investment+shocks: wages 2. Labor supply choice: wages pre-tax earnings 3. Non-linear taxation: pre-tax earnings after-tax earnings 4. Private risk sharing: after-tax earnings disp. income 5. No bond trade: disposable income = consumption
28 Equilibrium risk-free rater ρ r = (1 τ)((1 τ)+1) v ω 2 Intertemporal dis-saving motive = precautionary saving motive Key: precautionary saving motive common across all agents r τ > 0: more progressivity less precautionary saving higher risk-free rate
29 Equilibrium skill choice and skill price FOC s κµ = (1 βδ) U 0(ϕ,s) s = (1 τ) logp(s) s
30 Equilibrium skill choice and skill price FOC s κµ = (1 βδ) U 0(ϕ,s) s = (1 τ) logp(s) s Skill price has Mincerian shape: logp(s) = π 0 +π 1 s s = (1 τ)κµπ 1 η π 1 = θµ(1 τ) (return to skill)
31 Equilibrium skill choice and skill price FOC s κµ = (1 βδ) U 0(ϕ,s) s = (1 τ) logp(s) s Skill price has Mincerian shape: logp(s) = π 0 +π 1 s s = (1 τ)κµπ 1 η π 1 = θµ(1 τ) (return to skill) Distribution of skill prices (in levels) is Pareto with parameter θ var(logp(s)) = 1 θ 2 Offsetting effects of τ on s and p(s) leave pre-tax inequality unchanged
32 Upper tail of wage distribution x 10 4 Top 1pct of the Wage Distribution 2 Model Wage Distribution Lognormal Wage Distribution Density Wage (average=1)
33 Equilibrium consumption allocation logc (α,ϕ,s;g,τ) = logc RA (g,τ)+ M(v ε ) }{{} level effect from ins. variation +(1 τ)logp(s;τ) }{{} skill price (1 τ)ϕ }{{} pref. het. +(1 τ)α }{{} unins. shock Response to variation in (p(s), ϕ, α) mediated by progressivity Invariant to insurable shock ε
34 Equilibrium hours allocation logh (ε,ϕ;g,τ) = logh RA (g,τ) ϕ + 1 σ ε }{{}}{{} pref. het. ins. shock 1 σ(1 τ) M(v ε) }{{} level effect from ins. variation Response to ε mediated by tax-modified Frisch elasticity 1ˆσ = 1 τ σ+τ Invariant to skill price p(s) and uninsurable shock α
35 Utilitarian Social Welfare Function Steady states with constant (g,τ) W(g,τ) 1 µ k k= 0 U i,k ( ;g,τ)di Government sets weights: µ k = β k cohort size SWF becomes average period utility in the cross-section Skill acquisition cost for those currently alive imputed to SWF proportionally to their remaining lifetime
36 Exact expression for SWF log(1 τ) W(g,τ) = log(1 g)+χlogg +(1+χ) (1+ ˆσ)(1 τ) 1 (1+ ˆσ) [ ( ) 1 +(1+χ) θ 1 log ηθ + θ ( ) ] θ µ(1 τ) θ 1 log θ 1 1 ( ( )) ( )] 1 τ 1 τ [ log 2θ (1 τ) 1 θ θ (1 τ) 2 v ϕ 2 ( ) δ v ω (1 τ) 1 δ 2 log 1 δexp τ(1 τ) 2 v ω 1 δ (1+χ)σ 1ˆσ 2 v ε 2 +(1+χ)1ˆσ v ε
37 Representative Agent component log(1 τ) W(g,τ) = log(1 g)+χlogg +(1+χ) (1+ ˆσ)(1 τ) 1 (1+ ˆσ) }{{} Representative Agent Welfare = W RA (g,τ) [ ( ) 1 +(1+χ) θ 1 log ηθ + θ ( ) ] θ µ(1 τ) θ 1 log θ 1 1 ( ( )) ( )] 1 τ 1 τ [ log 2θ (1 τ) 1 θ θ (1 τ) 2 v ϕ 2 ( ) δ v ω (1 τ) 1 δ 2 log 1 δexp τ(1 τ) 2 v ω 1 δ (1+χ)σ 1ˆσ 2 v ε 2 +(1+χ)1ˆσ v ε
38 Skill investment component W(τ) = W RA (τ) [ ( ) 1 +(1+χ) θ 1 log ηθ + θ ( ) ] θ µ(1 τ) θ 1 log θ 1 }{{} 1 2θ (1 τ) }{{} avg. education cost productivity = loge[(p(s))] = log(y/n) [ ( ( )) ( )] 1 τ 1 τ log 1 θ θ }{{} consumption dispersion across skills (1 τ) 2 v ϕ 2 ( ) δ v ω (1 τ) 1 δ 2 log 1 δexp τ(1 τ) 2 v ω 1 δ (1+χ)σ 1ˆσ 2 v ε 2 +(1+χ)1ˆσ v ε
39 Optimalτ as a function ofθ Assume κ is the only source of heterogeneity Set σ = 2 and χ = τ θ
40 Skill investment welfare decomposition (θ = 3) 40 Skill Investment Component welfare change rel. to optimum (% of cons.) (A) Prod Gain Edu Cost (B) Btw Skill Cons Ineq (A)+(B) Net Effect Progressivity rate (τ)
41 Uninsurable component W(τ) = W RA (τ) [ ( ) 1 +(1+χ) θ 1 log ηθ + θ ( ) ] θ µ(1 τ) θ 1 log θ 1 1 ( ( )) ( )] 1 τ 1 τ [ log 2θ (1 τ) 1 θ θ (1 τ) 2 v ϕ }{{ 2 } cons. disp. due to prefs ( ) δ v ω (1 τ) 1 δ 2 log 1 δexp τ(1 τ) 2 v ω 1 δ }{{} consumption dispersion due to uninsurable shocks (1 τ) 2 v α 2 (1+χ)σ 1ˆσ 2 v ε 2 +(1+χ)1ˆσ v ε
42 Insurable component W(τ) = W RA (τ) [ ( ) 1 +(1+χ) θ 1 log ηθ + θ ( ) ] θ µ(1 τ) θ 1 log θ 1 1 ( ( )) ( )] 1 τ 1 τ [ log 2θ (1 τ) 1 θ θ (1 τ) 2 v ϕ 2 ( ) δ v ω (1 τ) 1 δ 2 log 1 δexp τ(1 τ) 2 v ω 1 δ 1 v ε 1 (1+χ)σ } ˆσ 2 +(1+χ) {{ 2 } ˆσ v ε }{{} hours dispersion prod. gain from ins. shock=log(n/h)
43 Parameterization Parameter vector {χ,σ,δ,θ,v ϕ,v ω,v ε,}
44 Parameterization Parameter vector {χ,σ,δ,θ,v ϕ,v ω,v ε,} To match G/Y = 0.20: χ = 0.25
45 Parameterization Parameter vector {χ,σ,δ,θ,v ϕ,v ω,v ε,} To match G/Y = 0.20: χ = 0.25 Frisch elasticity (micro-evidence): σ = 2
46 Parameterization Parameter vector {χ,σ,δ,θ,v ϕ,v ω,v ε,} To match G/Y = 0.20: χ = 0.25 Frisch elasticity (micro-evidence): σ = 2 cov(logh,logw) = 1ˆσ v ε var(logh) = v ϕ + 1ˆσ 2v ε var 0 (logc) = (1 τ) 2 ( v ϕ + 1 θ 2 ) var(logw) = v ω
47 Parameterization Parameter vector {χ,σ,δ,θ,v ϕ,v ω,v ε,} To match G/Y = 0.20: χ = 0.25 Frisch elasticity (micro-evidence): σ = 2 cov(logh,logw) = 1ˆσ v ε v ε = 0.18 var(logh) = v ϕ + 1ˆσ 2v ε v ϕ = 0.06 var 0 (logc) = (1 τ) 2 ( v ϕ + 1 θ 2 ) θ = 3 var(logw) = v ω v ω = 0.005,δ = 0.963
48 Optimal progressivity 10 Social Welfare Function welf change rel. to optimum (% of cons.) Welfare gain = 0.82 pct τ * = τ US = Progressivity rate (τ)
49 Optimal progressivity: decomposition 10 Social Welfare Function welf change rel. to baseline optimum (% of cons.) (1) Rep. Agent τ = Progressivity rate (τ)
50 Optimal progressivity: decomposition 10 Social Welfare Function welf change rel. to baseline optimum (% of cons.) (2) + Skill Inv. τ = (1) Rep. Agent τ = Progressivity rate (τ)
51 Optimal progressivity: decomposition 10 Social Welfare Function welf change rel. to baseline optimum (% of cons.) (2) + Skill Inv. τ = (3) + Pref. Het. τ = 0.00 (1) Rep. Agent τ = Progressivity rate (τ)
52 Optimal progressivity: decomposition 10 Social Welfare Function welf change rel. to baseline optimum (% of cons.) (2) + Skill Inv. τ = (3) + Pref. Het. τ = 0.00 (1) Rep. Agent τ = 0.25 (4) + Unins. Shocks τ = Progressivity rate (τ)
53 Optimal progressivity: decomposition 10 Social Welfare Function welf change rel. to baseline optimum (% of cons.) (2) + Skill Inv. τ = (3) + Pref. Het. τ = 0.00 (1) Rep. Agent τ = 0.25 (5) + Ins. Shocks τ = (4) + Unins. Shocks τ = Progressivity rate (τ)
54 Actual and optimal progressivity 0.4 Average Tax Rate 0.3 Average tax rate Actual US τ US =0.18 Utilitarian τ = Labor Income (1 = Average Earnings)
55 Alternative SWF Utilitarian SWF embeds desire to insure and to redistribute wrt (κ, ϕ) Turn off desire to redistribute
56 Alternative SWF Utilitarian SWF embeds desire to insure and to redistribute wrt (κ, ϕ) Turn off desire to redistribute Economy with heterogeneity in (κ,ϕ), and χ = v ω = τ = 0 Compute CE allocations Compute Negishi weights s.t. planner s allocation = CE Use these weights in the SWF
57 Alternative SWF Utilitarian κ-neutral ϕ-neutral Insurance-only Redist. wrt κ Y N Y N Redist. wrt ϕ Y Y N N Insurance wrt ω Y Y Y Y τ Welf. gain (pct of c)
58 Optimal progressivity: alternative SWF 0.4 Average Tax Rate 0.3 Average tax rate Actual US τ US =0.18 Utilitarian τ =0.087 No ψ redist τ =0.030 Ins. Only τ = Labor Income (1 = Average Earnings)
59 Factors limiting progressivity 1. Discourages skill investment 2. Reduces labor supply especially important when G valued
60 Factors limiting progressivity 1. Discourages skill investment 2. Reduces labor supply especially important when G valued Welfare maxizing τ var(log(λy 1 τ )) / var((logy)) Baseline (1) Exog. skills (2) σ = (3) χ = (1)+(2) (1)+(2)+(3)
61 Alternative assumptions on G 1. G endogenous and valued: χ = 0.25, G = χ/(1+χ) = G endogenous but non valued: χ = 0, G = 0 3. G exogenous and proportional to Y : G/Y = ḡ = G exogenous and fixed in level: G = Ḡ = 0.2 Y US
62 Alternative assumptions on G 1. G endogenous and valued: χ = 0.25, G = χ/(1+χ) = G endogenous but non valued: χ = 0, G = 0 3. G exogenous and proportional to Y : G/Y = ḡ = G exogenous and fixed in level: G = Ḡ = 0.2 Y US Utilitarian SWF Insurance-only SWF G Y (τ ) τ τ G endogenous χ = G endogenous χ = g exogenous ḡ = G exogenous Ḡ = 0.2 Y(τ US )
63 Progressive consumption taxation c = λ c 1 τ where c are expenditures and c are units of final good Implement as a tax on total (labor plus asset) income less saving Consumption depends on α but not on ε Can redistribute wrt. uninsurable shocks without distorting the efficient response of hours to insurable shocks Higher progressivity and higher welfare
64 Going forward Median voter choosing (g,τ) once and for all Skill-biased technical change Comparison with Mirlees solution Rent-extraction by top earners? (Piketty-Saez view) Endogenous growth?
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